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ABSTRACT

A MOORING FOR ETHICAL LIFE:
ASSESSING THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY
Chris Melenovsky
Samuel Freeman

In order to articulate a political philosophy that applies beyond state action, John Rawls
took the “the basic structure of society” as the first subject of justice. In this dissertation, I
explain both what the basic structure of society is and why it is an appropriate subject in
moral theory. As the set of institutions that specify our valid claims as members of
society, the basic structure has a profound influence on the content of ethical life; shaping
our values, virtues, relationships, and obligations. In order to adequately assess this
influential set of institutions, we should treat the the basic structure as a fundamental
moral concern.
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Introduction

Even once we accept that morality has a universal foundation, we should still recognize
that the particular values, virtues, relationships and obligations that guide our decisions
are often contingent. We should respect one another, advance happiness, live flourishing
lives and advance justice, but the way in which we should do these things will always be
specific to our social context. In recognizing that much of our form of ethical life is
relative to our social world, we do not need to think that all of ethics is relative. The
ultimate moral ends or principles that ground our pursuits and restrict our actions will
only have meaning and substance through the particularities of the form of life we live.
To ignore these particularities will only obscure what the ultimate ground for ethics and
morality truly is.
The particular way in which we live together determines much of our particular
form of ethical life. In living together, we organize, coordinate and understand our actions
in accordance with social practices. These practices set our expectations of others and
give meaning to our activities. When our interactions are complex and when we live with
large groups, we organize our interaction more and more, and our practices become more
and more structured. What we identify as our social institutions are particularly ordered
practices that structure our life together. In ordering our lives, these institutions have
profound and pervasive effects on the content of ethical life. These institutions not only
determine the material conditions in our society and the distribution of advantages, they

2

also influence the shape of ethical life. Our social practices establish new obligations,
define our rights, shape our values, and set the terms of our relationships.
These social institutions are a concern of ethics and morality because the
institutions that structure our conduct could have been otherwise and we can change them
now. Since these institutions have profound effects on our form of ethical life, which
institutions we choose to have can have a broad impact on the values, virtues,
relationships and obligations that define our particular ethical life. This makes the
question of which institutions we should have a distinct and weighty ethical concern.
Of course, there is the view that our real obligations, values, and virtues are
everywhere and always the same. To some extent, this must be true if we recognize a
universal foundation for our moral and ethical claims. Yet, we should not take this view
too far. We live particular lives with particular concerns and particular ways of
interacting. If ethics is to properly treat us as particular persons, it needs to be sensitive to
the differences in our ways of living. What ends we set, what makes us happy, and what
we rely on others to do will also be specific to our social context, and a complete
identification of our values, virtues, relationships and obligations should be sensitive to
these particular features of our lives.
This dissertation is about how moral and political philosophy should proceed after
recognizing the profound influence of our social institutions on the content of ethical life.
I argue that there is a distinct and unified set of institutions that have a kind of moral
primacy. The institutions establish moral rights, obligations and powers for individuals as
members of society. They establish a background for living our life together. The central
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role that these institutions play in determining that which is particular to our form of
ethical life makes these institutions of primary moral importance. These institutions are
those that constitute the basic structure of society, and I will argue that they have primacy
in a proper order of evaluation amongst those moral issues that we need address.
0.1 The Basic Structure and Justice
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls made the claim that “the primary subject of justice is
the basic structure of society.”1 By the “basic structure,” Rawls meant the way our basic
social institutions-- which include a property scheme, economic system and political
constitution--come together as a single system of social cooperation.2 I take this choice of
subject to be one of the many contributions that Rawls made to the fields of moral and
political philosophy, and I take it to be a contribution that is separable from his others. A
reader could agree with Rawls in taking the basic structure as primary subject even when
they do not accept his two principles of justice, contractualism, constructivism, or his
conception of the person. In this dissertation, I mean to show, not only that a reader
could, but that she should appreciate the Rawlsian choice of subject even when she
disagrees with Rawls on these other core issues.
What turns many recent theorists away from the Rawlsian focus on the basic
structure is linked to what turned theorists towards Theory of Justice when it was first
published. As the title states, the book was offered as a theory of justice and the

1

Rawls, Theory of Justice (Revised), 6.
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Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 10.
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importance of justice immediately grabs us.3 The fact that Rawls seemed to offer a
renewed account of justice made it more attractive as a major work in philosophy. The
fact that this renewed account was appealing, rigorous and deep made it one of the most
significant works in 20th century philosophy. However, if we think of Theory of Justice
as a theory of justice, we are tempted to read the phrase “the primary subject of justice is
the basic structure of society” as a claim about the nature of justice. We think of it as a
thesis about justice; that justice has some unique relationship to the Rawlsian artifice that
is the basic structure. At this point, many come to doubt the Rawlsian choice of subject.
Should we think that justice is really about the basic structure in some primary way? Isn’t
justice something broader than that? Our pre-theoretic understanding of justice seems to
cut against the claim that justice is somehow uniquely related to the specific subject of
the basic structure. So, being about justice makes Theory of Justice appealing, but being
about justice makes the Rawlsian choice of subject seem unappealing.
G.A. Cohen, Liam Murphy and Aresh Abizadeh have used this intuition against
the Rawlsian choice of subject in each of their more focused arguments. First, Cohen
argued that justice is a unified moral demand whether we are assessing institutions, states
of the world or individual actions.4 If we are to identify the basic structure--or anything-as “just,” then we must be claiming that the unified and fully general demand of justice is
instantiated in the basic structure. Given that justice is general in this way, Cohen argues
3

G.A. Cohen motivates his criticism with this claim, “It was because it was thought to offer a new and
comprehensive theory of justice that the book A Theory of Justice was welcomed with such excitement: the
excitement was not that Rawls had proved a theory of something, well, sort of like justice.” Rescuing
Justice and Equality, 304.
4

Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, Ch. 7 (especially p. 291).
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that we cannot rightly identify justice with a principle that applies only to the basic
structure. A principle of justice is general across subjects by its very nature, so it cannot
apply only to the basic structure. Second, Murphy argued that if we think of justice as
primarily a concern of our basic institutions, then this only frustrates our ability to
promote justice in an unjust world. For Murphy, identifying justice as an institutional
virtue means that we can only advance justice through institutions, but this would mean
we cannot always do that which would directly advance justice. Here again, Murphy uses
a common intuition about the nature of justice to challenge the Rawlsian focus on the
basic structure. Third, Abizadeh has focused on distributive justice specifically and
challenged the idea that the basic structure of society would limit the scope of distributive
justice. Once we recognize that distributive justice has demands beyond the basic
structure, this recognition seems to pull us away from the basic structure’s importance as
a primary subject. In these arguments again, Abizadeh uses a pre-theoretical idea of
distributive justice to challenge the Rawlsian choice of subject.
My response to these arguments is to distance the claim that “we should take the
basic structure as subject” from any claim about the nature of justice. Accordingly, I do
not claim that the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, but instead
claim that the basic structure has primacy as a distinct moral subject. I will claim that the
basic structure of society is a kind of mooring for ethical life. Regardless of what we
think about justice as an ideal, we should treat the evaluation of the basic structure as
amongst the most important ethical concerns.
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Before explaining why the basic structure is such an important subject, I first want
to make clear how my approach differs from typical responses to Cohen, Murphy and
Abizadeh. Their arguments appeal to a pre-theoretical understanding of justice and show
the problems with taking the basic structure as primary subject given that understanding
of justice. The obvious response to their arguments would be to develop or defend an
alternative understanding of justice, and then to show why we should take the basic
structure as primary subject given that understanding of justice. Thomas Nagel and
Samuel Scheffler seem to make such an argument with their appeal to the division of
moral labor, each offering an understanding of justice that uniquely applies to
institutions.5 Andrew Williams argues for an understanding of justice that is uniquely
related to publicity.6 Kok-Chor Tan shows that core social institutions are the site of a
suitably defined idea of distributive justice.7 In each case, theorists defend the Rawlsian
view by articulating a view of justice such that institutions are uniquely related to it.
By contrast, my argument does not appeal to any understanding of justice. I do
not claim that the basic structure is the primary subject of justice but that the basic
structure is a centrally important subject for ethics. I claim that the reasons for taking the
basic structure as subject are independent of the nature of justice. Instead, the reasons
come from the ways in which the basic structure affects the content of ethical life.

5

Nagel, “The Moral Division of Labor,” Equality and Partiality; Scheffler, “The Moral Division of Labor:
Egalitarian Liberalism as Moral Pluralism,” Equality and Tradition.
6
7

Williams, “Incentives, Inequality and Publicity” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1998).

Tan, “Justice and Personal Pursuits” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 101, No. 7 (2004); Justice,
Institutions and Luck, Ch. 3.
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There is an important difference between what I believe about justice and what I
need to claim for my argument. I have a certain belief about how we should understand
justice, but my arguments do not require that belief. Specifically, I believe that the
demands of justice are not general across all subjects. What makes for a just society, just
relations between societies, just agreements, and a just character is not a single and
unified moral demand instantiated in all these things. Such a view towards justice is wellsuited for those concerned with a single moral good, like equality or happiness, but it not
well-suited for those who focus on the complexities and conflicts of ethics. Instead, I treat
justice in the way that deontologists treat rightness. For deontologists, what is “right” is
determined by a principle that applies in that circumstance and not by a single principle
that applies across all circumstances. Likewise, I believe that what is “just” is determined
by a principle that applies to that subject and not by a single principle that applies across
all subjects. When it comes to justice, I am a “non-generalist”. With this understanding of
justice, I can explain why the principles that apply to the basic structure are principles “of
justice” even when they are not derived from any more fundamental principles of justice.
I will return to this issue in Chapter 5 in order to articulate a response to Cohen’s
argument.
For now, the key is to recognize that I do not need this understanding of justice to
make my point. I do not need to make any argument about the nature of justice in order to
show the ethical importance of the basic structure. We can appreciate the Rawlsian choice
of subject most easily when we distinguish the argument for this choice of subject from
any claim about the nature of justice.

8

0.2 Profound and Pervasive Effects
So, why is the basic structure such a centrally important ethical subject? In short, because
the basic structure determines the rights, obligations and powers that we have as members
of society, and these moral demands and claims form a background for our social
interaction and thereby for the various practice-dependent aspects of ethical life. The
whole complex of values, virtues, relationships and obligations that specify our ethical
life is not explained solely by the particularities of the basic structure, but the basic
structure has both profound direct effects and wide indirect effects. It directly establishes
core obligations, has far-ranging effects on our material conditions, and determines much
of the distribution of social advantages. It also indirectly affects what associations and
relationships persons build and the ways we think of ourselves. It is this kind of profound
and pervasive effect on ethical life that makes the basic structure so centrally important
for ethics. Think of all the ways in which a feudal society differs from a democratic
market society. Think of both the direct effects that has in individual rights and
obligations, and think of the indirect effects in has on our relationships and ends. That is
the kind of deep significance the basic structure has.
In making this claim, I am bound to perk the ears of those familiar with recent
criticisms of Rawls. Rawls claimed that the basic structure was the primary subject of
justice because its effects are so “profound and pervasive” from the start of life.8 Yet,
G.A. Cohen’s argued against such a justification for the focus on the basic structure in his

8

Rawls, Theory of Justice (Original Edition), 96.
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popular essay “Where the Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice.”9 The criterion,
“having profound and pervasive effects,” cannot justify a unique concern for the basic
structure of society because things beyond the basic structure also have profound and
pervasive effects. For example, suppose we live in a society in which a majority of
persons greatly value poetry. Perhaps a majority see poetry as the highest form of human
accomplishment. It is likely that this appreciation would have profound and pervasive
effects on education, leisure time, career choices, and much else. We would not, however,
think that this appreciation for poetry is part of the basic structure. Accordingly, we could
not justify an exclusive concern for the basic structure by appeal to profound and
pervasive effects because it would not rule out our concern for the appreciation of poetry.
It is because of such an argument--and his subsequent support for this argument--that
Cohen will be the primary interlocutor for much of my argument. I need to explain why
my appeal to the profound effects of the basic structure does not make me liable to
Cohen’s objection.
In response to Cohen’s argument, I want to make two points. The first point does
not address his objection, but is nonetheless important. I sense that persons read the
phrase “profound and pervasive effects” as if it refers solely to material effects. At least,
this is how Cohen uses the ideas when the effect he is concerned with is material equality.
He makes the point that an egalitarian ethos could have profound and pervasive effects on
equality in the same way that economic institutions can.10 It is important for my response
9

Cohen, “Where the Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 26,
No. 1 (1997), 3-30.
10

ibid, 13-14.
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however, that profound and pervasive effects are not only material effects but also effects
on the content of ethical life. The profound and pervasive effects are on our values,
virtues, relationships, obligations and self-conception. My concern is with the effects on
our relationships with one another, our pursuits in life and what our responsibilities are.
Even once we are concerned with profound and pervasive effects on ethical life,
however, Cohen’s objection still stands. The above poetry case is an example of how. I
move then to a second point, which directly addresses Cohen’s objection. The profound
and pervasive effects criterion is not meant to distinguish the basic structure from other
moral concerns. It is, instead, meant to show why the basic structure--otherwise
distinguished as an ethical concern--is so important. In short, the appeal to profound and
pervasive effects is not meant to answer the question "what distinguishes the basic
structure from other ethical concerns?" but instead to answer "why is the concern with the
basic structure primary amongst ethical concerns?" The organization of the basic
structure has profound effects, so it is ethically important that we address it. It is also true
that the informal structure of society has profound effects, so it is ethically important that
we address it as well. Yet, the fact that both the informal structure and the basic structure
are ethically important is no problem for taking one as subject over another.
In short, I want to claim that the basic structure is so important because it has
profound and pervasive effects on ethical life, Cohen objects that other aspects of social
life also have such effects. I agree. Those other aspects of social life are also important to
assess. This fact takes nothing away from the importance of the basic structure.
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The question inevitably raised at this point is “if other aspects of social life are
also important, then why direct our attention to the basic structure specifically?” I still
need to explain why the basic structure, specifically, deserves attention. I recognize that
an appeal to profound and pervasive effects on ethical life will not do that by itself.
0.3 Three Issues
At this point, I have said what I will not do. I will neither argue for a focus on the basic
structure by arguing for a particular conception of justice nor claim that the basic
structure is unique in having profound and pervasive effects. To explain what I will do, I
need to distinguish three issues. In his criticism of Rawls, Cohen mixes these three
different issues together, and I mean to separate them again.
The first issue is the need to offer an adequate account of what the basic structure
of society is. What differentiates the basic structure from the entire system of law or from
all norms of conduct? What unifies the major social institutions into the basic structure?
Rawls does not give any such full articulation of what the basic structure is, and he does
not do so purposively.11 However, given recent challenges, we need a more precise
account of what the basic structure is. Call this issue a concern with the identity of the
basic structure.
The second issue is explaining why we would need to assess the basic structure
specifically, once it is identified. Why is the basic structure--given what it is--an object of

11

Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 12, 57. The way that Rawls purposively uses an intuitive understanding of
the basic structure is brought out in Samuel Freeman, "The Basic Structure as First Subject of Justice," in
Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy (eds.), A Companion to Rawls (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, forthcoming).
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moral concern? Why wouldn’t our concerns with it be addressed by other moral
principles? Even if we recognize that certain problems of political philosophy need to be
addressed, it is not clear why we should address them with principles that apply to the
basic structure rather than, say, justifying the use of coercion or justifying our social
institutions individuality. What would require that arguments in political philosophy be
about the basic structure specifically?

Call this issue a concern with the moral

indispensability of the basic structure.
The third issue is offering a justification of why we would treat the principles that
applies to the basic structure as distinct from other moral principles. Even if we should
morally assess the basic structure, why would we think that the moral demand on it
would be any different from the moral demands on other subjects? Why wouldn’t we
merely apply a more general principle to the basic structure as we do other subjects?
After all, Rawls starts out developing principles for this subject rather than developing
first principles to be applied to it. What could warrant detaching the basic structure from
broader moral commitments in this way? Call this issue a concern with the moral
distinctiveness of the basic structure.
Cohen wrongly supposes that the identity, moral indispensability and moral
distinctiveness of the basic structure are all addressed by a single account. He offers two
options that would explain the identity of the basic structure, and then shows either option
to be inadequate as an explanation for its moral distinctiveness. In the 2009 version of his
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argument,12 Cohen claims that we cannot identify the basic structure as the coercive
structure because it does not explain why we are concerned with the coercive structure
rather than the other features of social life that have profound and pervasive effects.
Likewise, he argues that we cannot identify the basic structure as certain norms of
conduct because it does not explain why we are not likewise concerned with other norms
that have profound and pervasive effects. In this way, he claims that no explanation of the
identity of the basic structure is adequate because it does not explain its moral
distinctiveness.
A single explanation does not need to resolve these three issues. Why would we
think that a single account would explain the identity, moral indispensability and moral
distinctiveness of the basic structure? The three issues are fundamentally different. First,
identity is a descriptive problem. It addresses what part of the world is picked out by the
idea of the basic structure. One could articulate a view about what the basic structure is
and think it has no moral significance whatsoever.13 Second, the moral indispensability
issue turns on claims about the aims of moral theory. It depends on a view about what our
moral principles need to do such that we would need principles that apply to the basic
structure. Third, the moral distinctiveness depends on broader views about how our moral
commitments hang together--or don’t. Whether we can detach the basic structure as an
ethical subject and develop principles for it depends on views about what makes
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In §5.1.1, I will point out that Cohen slightly changes his argument from the 1997 article to the 2009
book.
13

I have no idea why one would do this, but that is not the point.
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appropriate principles. For example, are all appropriate principles derived from first
principles or can they be generated by a constructive procedure?
I suspect that the reason why Cohen mixes these three issues together, despite
their apparent differences, is because of the role that “justice” plays in our moral
reasoning. Justice seems to be both morally indispensable and morally distinctive. First,
we intuitively think that the demands of justice are a centrally important aspect of
morality and ethics. Second, the ideal of justice seems distinct from other moral ideals,
like rightness or goodness. If “the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of
society” our views about the indispensability and distinctiveness of justice would
seemingly make the basic structure both morally indispensable and morally distinct.
Those who argue for a conception of justice that is uniquely tied to the basic structure,
thereby get the moral indispensability and moral distinctiveness of the basic structure for
free through its ties to justice. For Cohen, justice is indispensable and distinct, but it is
broader and more fundamental then our judgements about the basic structure. It is for this
reason that the focus on the basic structure seems misplaced to him.
In my core arguments, I do not make any claim about the nature of justice.
Instead, I claim that the basic structure is a centrally important subject for ethics. To make
this claim, I need to explain the identity, moral indispensability and moral distinctiveness
of the basic structure. If I am right that its association with the ideal of justice previously
made the basic structure seem indispensable and distinct, then my challenge will be to
explain these two features of the basic structure without appeal to the nature of justice.
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0.4 Addressing the Three Issues
The first three chapters of this dissertation address the identity, moral indispensability and
moral distinctiveness of the basic structure respectively. In the fourth chapter, I review
the significance of these arguments for moral theory more broadly. The final two
chapters, address objections to my arguments.
The first chapter identifies the basic structure as a specific set of social practices.
It begins by defining the general idea of a social practice and then progressively defines
subclasses of social practices until we reach the idea of “major social institution.” I then
claim that the basic structure is the way these major social institutions come together to
form a single system.
There are two important ideas that are introduced in the first chapter that form the
core of its argument; the first is the idea of an “ostensibly binding practice” and the
second is the connected idea of a “major social institution.” Ostensibly binding social
practices are those practices that persons understand as requiring that they act in ways
specified by the practice. As an example, the practice of line-waiting is understood by
participants as requiring that they wait in line in order to get service. There are two
important features of this kind of practice. First, we can understanding these practices as
requiring action without commit ourselves to the judgement that we should act in the
required ways. In this way the practices are only “ostensibly” binding. For example, one
could describe the practice of line waiting as included the rule that “one ought to wait in
line” without themselves thinking that persons really ought to wait in line. Whether we
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should act in the ways required by an ostensibly binding social practice is a moral
question that is not answered by detailing our understanding of practice alone.
Second, I identify the “major social institutions” as those practice that meet two
conditions; (1) the rules are specific enough so that persons can form definite claims on
their basis and (2) the rules apply to us as members of society. For example, a property
system is a major social institution because it requires that persons respect property
specific claims that persons have due to their membership in society. As members of
society, we know that persons are required by the rules to act in that way, and we plan our
lives against the expectation that they will do so. The fact that the major social
institutions are specific enough to establish claims gives members of society a kind of
“background security.” As they live and plan their lives, they can rely on people to
generally act according to the institutional rules. I then argue that we can best understand
the basic structure as constituted by the major social institutions for a single society.
Hence, the basic structure is the way in which the major social institutions together
establish background security for persons as members of society. This is the key idea that
unites the basic structure as a single subject rather than a mere heap of institutions.
With the identity of the basic structure thereby established, I move on to the moral
indispensability of the basic structure in the second chapter. It might seem natural to
show any particular subject is morally indispensable on the basis of a substantive moral
view. For instance, one might argue that we need to assess the basic structure because of
the moral importance of either autonomy or happiness and claim that the basic structure
uniquely bears on autonomy or happiness. Instead, I give a more ecumenical argument
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that is not based on a commitment to any substantive moral claim. Instead, the argument
is made on the basis of a view about the normativity of social practices. Most simply, I
claim that to assess certain actions we need to assess the practices that those actions are a
part of. Analogously, I claim that to assess the major social institutions, we need to assess
the basic structure of which they are a part.
To see the motivating commitment of my argument, we should look to Hume. In
his Treatise on Human Nature, Hume gives an example that highlights the kind of
argument I mean to make. In §3.2.2, he writes
“A single act of justice is frequently contrary to the public interest; and
were it to stand alone, without being followed by many other acts, may, of
itself, be very prejudicial to society. When a man of merit, of a benevolent
disposition, restores a great fortune to a miser, a seditious bigot, he has
acted justly and laudably, but the public is the real sufferer. Nor is every
single act of justice, considered apart, more conducive to private interest,
than to public; and ‘tis easily conceived how a man may impoverish
himself by a single instance of integrity.”
In these two cases, Hume gives examples of actions that would be quite wrongful if
judged in isolation. If one had the choice between giving money to a bigoted miser or to a
charity, then to give the money to the miser would be uncaring. Yet, if we see the action
as an instance of returning a loan, our assessment of the action changes. Here, the man of
merit ought to give the miser the money because the action is part of a practice of
contract-keeping. Whether the action is part of a social practice is thereby relevant for
properly assessing the action. Hume here assumes that the practice of contract-keeping is
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a good one, because we would hardly approve of the action of the man of merit if it were
not. For this reason, we can recognize the importance of assessing the practice of which
the action is a part in order to assess that action.
The moral indispensability of the basic structure is explained by carrying this
analysis to a second level. To properly assess an action that is part of a practice, we need
to assess that practice. To properly assess an institution that is part of the basic structure,
we need to assess the basic structure itself. We need to treat institutions as we treat the
action of the man of merit; just as we see his action as part of the practice of contractkeeping we should see contract-keeping as part of the basic structure. The basic structure
is morally indispensable as a subject because we can only properly assess our major
social institutions by assessing the basic structure as a whole.
In the third chapter, I move on to explain why the basic structure is morally
distinctive. To do this, I argue for a fundamental distinction between moral judgments
that apply within a social practice and judgments that apply to that practice. The reason
for this distinction is because social practices affect the moral context of individuals
within that practice. Judgments made within a moral context should be sensitive to the
context established by the practice, but the judgments made of that practice should not be.
For example, suppose that a property system establishes trespass as a wrong. Our
evaluation of an action within a property system should be sensitive to the wrong of
trespass, but our assessment of the property system should not be. The fact that a property
system makes trespass wrong is not a reason to support a property system. I claim that it
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is this distinction between judgments that apply within a social practice and those
principles that apply to a practice that distinguishes the basic structure as a moral subject.
In making this argument, I contrast my account of the moral distinctiveness of the
basic structure with the primary alternative, the “division of moral labor” arguments
offered by Thomas Nagel and Samuel Scheffler. Both arguments justify distinguishing
principles for institutions from principles for individuals based on the efficacy of such a
separation in satisfying our diverse moral aims. Instead of this, I argue that what justifies
assessing the basic structure according to distinct principles is a division between
principles that apply within a moral context and those that apply to practices that
establish that moral context. Within an ethical life, the particularities of our social
practices establish certain values, virtues, relationships and obligations that are relevant
to determining how we should act. The principles that apply to these practices should not
be sensitive to the particularities that they establish, but principles that apply within these
practices should be. The principles that apply to the basic structure are principles that
should not be sensitive to any moral context whereas the principles that apply to a variety
of other subject should be. While the basic structure is not the sole determinant of the
particularities of ethical life, it has a kind of independence that justifies treating it
differently.
With these three chapters complete, I will have explained the identity, moral
indispensability and moral distinctiveness of the basic structure. First, the basic structure
is the way in which the major social institutions together establish background security
for persons as members of society. Second, we need to assess the basic structure as
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subject in order to properly assess the major social institutions that together form it.
Finally, the moral demands on this structure are distinct because of the difference
between principles that apply within a social context and the principles that apply to those
practices that determine that context. What explains why the basic structure is a centrally
important subject for ethics is not the nature of justice, but the normativity of social
practices and the kind of social practices the basic structure consists of. It is because the
basic structure is a system of practices that we need to assess it, and it because it is a
system of practices that it is morally distinct from the principle that apply within it.
0.5 Significance and Two Objections
Together, the first three chapters show why the basic structure is a centrally important
ethical subject. Depending on the reader, this conclusions might seem either humdrum or
extreme. In Chapter 4, I mean to counter both of these objections. I seek to show that the
general approach I support meets a reasonable middle between those who insist that
morality is independent of our social context, and those who believe it is fully determined
by our social context. In this way, the approach has the possibly of appealing to both
Kantians and Hegelians, communitarians and liberals, as well as sociologists and moral
philosophers. However, I do not think that I am only creating friendships through my
argument. I also claim that my argument is inconsistent with any moral theory that cannot
accept “limited conventionalism.” I define limited conventionalism as the view that
some--but not all--of our moral demands and claims are practice-dependent. If a moral
theory cannot recognize either (a) that some demands or claims are practice-dependent or
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(b) that some demands or claims are practice-independent, then they will not accept my
arguments.
This fourth chapters does not complete my argument. I still want to respond to
two objections in Chapter 5 and 6 respectively. Both objections are inspired by recent
criticism of Rawls, but I dentify them with much deeper tendencies in moral and political
theory.

In the final two chapters, I want to show why the approach I argue for is

preferable to the approaches that are consistent with those deeper tendencies.
The first objection is developed from Liam Murphy’s argument in “Institutions
and the Demands of Justice.” There, Murphy makes an both a direct argument and an
intuitive argument against separating principles that apply to institutions from those that
apply to individual actions. His direct argument seeks to show that separating the
principles that apply to institutions frustrates our attempts to advance justice in our
imperfect world. This argument can be easily addressed, but there is a deeper intuitive
argument that presents a more persistent difficulty. Specifically, Murphy appeals to the
intuitive idea that all our moral principles are united at some fundamental level. Those
principles that are at this fundamental level must then be general across all subjects; they
apply to institutions as much as they apply to individuals. This intuitive view directly
conflicts with the moral distinctiveness of the basic structure, because it limits the extent
to which practices can affect our moral context. Murphy’s view is an intuitive view of
moral theory, and since this view conflicts with the moral distinctiveness I defend, I need
to address it.
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In response, I first want to show exactly why Murphy’s argument would be
problematic for the view I argue for. Our social context can affect the assessment of
individual action in two ways. First, our social context might change the causal processes
by which we satisfy moral principles. For example, one might think that the convention
of driving on the right changes the ways by which I satisfy my obligation not to harm
others. One could argue that no news moral standards arise from this convention but only
a new way by which to satisfy an older moral standard. Second, our social context might
establish new standards by which to assess individual action. For example, one might
think that if the institutions of property is justified, then I should respect property claims.
Someone with this view with think that our social context establishes new standard by
which to judge actions. My argument relies on the possibility of the second way that
social context affects our moral assessment of individuals. Murphy’s argument is only an
objection against my view insofar as it shows why the second possibility is impossible. It
is not clear that Murphy seeks to make this point, but some might interpret his argument
in this way. They might claim that “if all valid moral judgments are entailed directly by
first principles, then social context cannot create new standard by which to judge
individual actions.” The act-consequentialist, for example, is committed to only one
principle as grounding any judgments of individual action. If such a view is necessarily
correct, then social context is not as important for assessing individual action as my
argument requires. Such a moral theory might seem to be entailed by Murphy’s claim that
all moral principles are united at a fundamental level.
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I identify this challenge as a commitment to “Generalism,” which holds that all
valid moral judgements must be entailed directly by a fully general first principle (or
fully general first principles). Now, I recognize that a commitment to generalism would
block my argument for the moral distinctiveness of the basic structure because it would
block the importance of social context, so Chapter 4 is focused on defending against
arguments for generalism. Overall, I mean to show that an argument from generalism are
not problematic because we have no reason to be committed to the generalism. Any
argument that assumes it to argue against a focus on the basic structure is therefore
question-begging. I look at four major kinds of argument offered in defense of generalism
and show why each of them is lacking. Finally, I end by giving one brief argument
against a commitment to generalism.
In Chapter 6, I am concerned with a second objection that is used by G.A. Cohen
in his 2009 book, Rescuing Justice and Equality. In this book, Cohen goes beyond the
argument from his 1997 article and appeals more directly to the concept of justice to
ground his criticism of Rawls. As I made clear in §0.2, my argument consciously avoids
making any claims about the nature of justice. I see the biggest impediment towards
accepting the central importance of the basic structure to be the fact that persons see such
a focus as only motivated by views about the nature of justice. Yet, while I avoid arguing
from claims about justice, someone might still object to my view from their own view
about justice. Shouldn’t we be concerned with justice, especially when we are assessing
something like the basic structure? As Cohen points out, if we think that the basic
structure ought to be just, then shouldn’t we first identify what justice requires and then
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apply it to determine how the basic structure ought to be? While I have been avoiding
making claims about the nature of justice, I have ignored how justice bears on the issue.
Since justice seems to be a central moral concern, shouldn’t we be concerned with what
justice requires?
I meet this objection by focusing on what the concept of justice is and how it
bears on the basic structure. I draw a contrast between unified and disunified conceptions
of justice. A unified conception of justice consists of a single moral demand that unifies
all objects that we can rightly consider just or unjust. A disunified conception of justice
views the demands of justice as different for different subjects. A disunified conception of
justice is like the deontological conception of rightness. For the deontologist, what is
right is determined by a principle that applies in that circumstance (rather than a single
overarching principle for all circumstances), and a disunified conception of justice
maintains that what is just is determined by a principle that applies to that subject (rather
than a single principle of justice that applies to all subjects). Cohen’s argument relies on a
unified conception of justice, and I argued against such a view in Chapter 5. Specifically,
I show that such an understanding of justice does not fit well with the role that concept
plays in our practical reasoning. I then show how a disunified conception of justice can
better explain why the basic structure of society would be the primary subject of justice,
thereby returning to the original Rawlsian claim.
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0.6 A Mooring
The arguments in the chapters to come will show why the basic structure is an
indispensable and distinct ethical subject, but I here want to briefly preview the argument
of Chapter 4 and say what is so important about the basic structure for ethical theory.
Recognizing that it is not profound and pervasive effects that either identifies or
distinguishes the basic structure as subject, I want to return to explain why it’s profound
and pervasive effects make the basic structure--otherwise distinguished--such a centrally
important subject.
To see this, we need to recognize the effects that social practices have on ethical
life. Our most important decisions are often made between options determined by the
social structure, the relationships that mean the most to us are understood on conventional
terms, and many of our moral obligations arise from customary norms. The influence of
these various social practices on ethical life is apparent whenever one gains a deeper
understanding of some distant culture. In comparing their ideals, virtues, relationships
and obligations with our own, we can see how different life in one society can be from
life in another.
Given the apparent influence of social practices, it makes sense that some come to
explain all of ethical life as dependent on contingent practices. One can easily go from
recognizing that social practices substantially shape ethical life to supposing that these
practices fully shape ethical life. However, when we take this perspective, we give up on
the possibility of any ultimate assessment of those practices. While one might criticize a
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society according to the values that the society itself inculcates, we would still give up on
any perspective that is external to these practices from which to judge them.
Yet, when we then look to find some practice-independent ethical perspective
from which to judge our own society, we risk a different problem. If so much of our
ethical life is influenced by contingent social practices, then any practice-independent
foundation for ethical life risks being too thin. The danger is that if we treat the practiceindependent perspective as though it were the only perspective, we then ignore the rich
aspects of ethical life that come from being embedded in a specific culture. In looking for
some way to assess our own practices, we risk looking past them; we risk losing sight of
the significant practice-dependent aspects of ethical life.
Given these two difficulties, our ethical theories are pulled in two directions, one
local and one universal. We are pulled towards a more local perspective in being
concerned with the particular ideals, virtues, relationships and obligations that are
specific to our society. We often care deeply about these aspects of ethical life even when
we recognize that our concern with them is explained by our being embedded in a
particular culture. Alternatively, we are also pulled towards a more universal perspective
in seeking out a suitable principle or perspective from which to judge our own society.
We can be concerned with this perspective even when we do not see how it can explain
the richness of ethical life.
The conflict between these two contrary pulls has manifested itself historically in
arguments between figures allied more with either local or universal concerns. For
instance, Kant was explicit in trying to identify a transcendental perspective from which
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to judge all moral questions. He tried to identify a valid standard that was not only
independent of the contingencies of a culture but also independent of the contingencies of
our inclinations. In response, Hegel was pulled in the opposite direction. He was
concerned that Kant’s ultimate standard was too thin to validate the full experience of
ethical life.14 To do so, we need to recognize the richness of a particular culture at a
particular time and we need to appreciate our place within it. Whether or not Hegel
offered an adequate standard for assessing particular cultures, many readers stop with his
criticism of Kant. For them, it is more important to recognize the significance of a society
for ethical life than to determine how one should assess that society.
Given the conflicting pulls of our local and universal concerns, perhaps the
appropriate role of moral theory is to discredit one or the other. One could try and show
that all the richness of ethical life can be validated by a practice-independent ethical
perspective, or one could show that there is no practice-independent perspective that
could provide such validation. Neither of these seem the right approach because each
would miss something important. We should instead recognize that our contingent social
practices have an important role in vindicating many of the ideals, virtues, relationships
and obligations that we care most deeply about, and a practice-independent perspective
has an important role in both grounding certain duties and providing a perspective from
which to assess those practices. With this view, the real difficulty is not to discredit one
aspect of ethical experience but to show how they complement one another. Some of the
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Likewise, while Henry Sidgwick sought the standard that could decides all moral disputes, F.H. Bradley
looked towards the particularity of our lives to identify the self that ethics sought to realization of.
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most important aspects of ethical life are practice-dependent and some are practiceindependent, and we can hardly expect to progress far in ethical theory until we
determine which are which. This project is all the more difficult because it must be done
always from within a particular culture, but that is the project I am concerned with.
What I have found most valuable in Rawls’s political philosophy is his
contribution to this project. Too often, theorists will read Rawls as carrying through on
the Kantian project as conceived above; he is thought of as identifying the perspective
from which we can assess all aspects of ethical life. Yet, that is not the Rawlsian view. He
does not try to identify a single perspective from which all ethical questions are
addressed. Instead, he sought to identify a perspective from which to address a specific
question; how should the basic structure of society be organized? It is Rawls’s
identification of this question that contributes to the project I am concerned with.
Identifying the basic structure as ethical subject can properly respect both the
universalizing and localizing aspects of ethical experience.
There are practice-dependent aspects of ethical life, and the particularities of a
basic structure have profound and pervasive influence on those aspects of life. There are
also practice-independent aspects of ethical life, and the particularities of the basic
structure have no effect on these. In assessing the basic structure, we need to treat it as
having this profound effect on ethical life and differentiate it from the choices that
happen within ethical life. We respect the practice-independent aspects of ethical life by
ensuring that our assessment of the basic structure is sensitive to them. We respect the
practice-dependent aspects of ethical life in recognizing that the basic structure has a
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profound influence on the content of ethical life. It is because the basic structure has this
profound influence on the content of ethical life that its assessment can properly respect
both the universalizing and localizing perspectives in ethical philosophy.
According to this analysis, we can recognize that the particularities of our social
context are relevant for much of moral and ethical philosophy. Our culture, shared
meanings, institutional roles, and social ideals are important for understanding how we
should live; their importance is not merely a socially determined illusion. Moreover, we
can recognize particularities of ethical life without embracing a kind of moral relativism.
How our society is organized will influence much of the content of ethical life, but how
our society is organized should be justified by practice-independent values. In this way,
our assessment of the basic structure acts as a kind of mooring for ethical life. The
particularities of culture, history and chance will swash our culture in different directions
and with it carry the particularities of our values, virtues, relationships and obligations.
Nonetheless, so long as we hold that the basic structure of society should be a certain
way, these particularities will not sweep our ethical life too far afield. We will stay
tethered to the solid ground that our practice-independent values provide.
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Chapter 1:
Social Practices, the Basic Structure, and Social Cooperation
“‘Let us unite,’ he says to them, “to protect the weak from oppression, restrain the
ambitious, and secure for everyone the possession of what belongs to him. Let us
institute regulations of justice and peace to which all are obliged to conform, which
make an exception of no one, and which compensate in some way for the caprices of
fortune by equally subjecting the powerful and the weak to mutual duties. In a word,
instead of turning our forces against ourselves, let us gather them into one supreme
power which governs us according to wise laws, protects and defends all the
members of the association, repulses common enemies, and maintains us in an
eternal concord.” ...All ran to meet their chains thinking they had secured their
freedom, for although they had enough reason to feel the advantages of a political
establishment, they did not have enough experience to foresee its dangers.”
- J.J. Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality

When we plan our lives, we do so against a background of expectations. Some of these
expectations are about the natural world, as when the sailor plans her voyage in
accordance with the tides or a biker plans his cross-country trek for when his knees are
sturdier. Other expectations are social. We plan a career on the basis of how professional
fields are organized; going into marketing rather than sales or teaching mathematics
rather than physics. We put work into a house based on the expectation that we will have
an exclusive claim to use and sale of the property. We build a family with the expectation
that we bear responsibility for our children. In these cases and so many others, we are
able to plan our lives because we have reliable expectations about the social world.
The expectations we have about our social world are expectations about other
persons, but they are not like those expectations we have of those we know personally.
For instance, we might save up for a beachside cottage because we expect that it would
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make our partner happy. Or, we might choose to live closer to home on the expectation
that our closest friends will also stay near. These expectations are based on personal
information in a way that our expectations about the social world are not. Instead, our
expectations of the social world are based on an understanding of how persons--even
strangers--will generally act. We expect that persons will generally continue to treat sales
and marketing as fields and that strangers will abide by the rules of property. Because
these expectations are general, they can seem quite similar to our expectations of the
natural world. The fact that our economy is organized as it is and that occupations are
categorized as they are can seem determined by scientific laws. However, these
generalized expectations are nonetheless expectations of other persons; they are
expectations of how persons will generally act. 15
Oftentimes, our expectations about how persons will generally act are backed by a
kind of normativity. It is not merely our observation that persons generally follow a
certain pattern of behavior but that persons “ought” to follow this pattern.16 If a person
doesn’t act in the expected way, they act wrongly (rather than merely acting strangely). I
say that these expectations are based on a “kind” of normativity because it does not need
to be the case that (a) one judges that persons really should act a certain way or (b) that
persons objectively should act that way. Instead, these expectations are backed by our
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In The Company of Strangers (Princeton University Press, 2004), Paul Seabright advances the view that
what makes society possible between creatures with our biology is a kind of trust in strangers to act
according to expectations.
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In Grammar of Society (Cambridge University Press, 2006, 11), Cristina Bicchieri analyzes social norms
as having a similar structure. She argues that a social norm exists when a person prefers to act in a way
because (a) they recognize a social rule that requires that action (b) they believe others in their social group
will act in that way, and (c) they believe others expect them to act in that way.
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recognition that persons in a relevant group make claims on one another to act according
to these patterns. For example, I expect others to wait in line behind me when they come
to get coffee, but I do not expect this merely because I have observed a pattern of people
doing this. I also recognize that those who wait in line make claims on others to do so.
Whether I judge these to be valid claims is quite different from my recognition that
persons make these claims.
Oftentimes, the phrase “normative expectations” is used exclusively to refer to
those expectations that I hold others to. It refers to those expectations for which I think
certain reactive attitudes are appropriate if those expectations are not met. Yet, I can
recognize that persons will generally hold others to certain normative expectations even
when I do not hold them to those expectations. I might think that one should not wait in
line but still recognize generally held normative expectations that persons “ought” to wait
in line.
There is a sense in which mere patterns of behavior can be described in terms of
“rules,” but it is when patterns are backed by claims and normative expectations that they
seem most “rule-like.” It is because there is a rule that persons should act a certain way
that we can identify behavior that violates that rule as “wrong” in some sense. Since my
recognition of such a rule involves my belief that the members of a relevant group make
claims on others to act in certain ways that these rules are “social rules.” When I
recognize a social rule, I recognize that the rule requires that I should act in a certain
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way.17 I may or may not ultimately decide that I should act in the way that the rule
dictates, so we can identify these rules as “ostensibly binding.” They claim to bind in
virtue of their form, but do not necessarily do so.
In outlining ways in which persons should act, these rules can create certain
obligations, rights, and powers. They create an obligation when the rules specify that a
person must act a certain way, they create a right when the rules specify claims that a
person has on the actions of others, and they create a power when the rules specify ways
in which one might change the obligations and rights of others. Yet, these rules are
merely ostensibly binding, so they can merely create ostensible obligations, ostensible
rights, and ostensible powers.
As I will continue to emphasize, our social world is incredibly complex. I might
recognize social rules that apply to members of a religious organization, an ethnic group,
a company, or a group of friends. In each case, the social rules are relative to a particular
social position. In this chapter, my concern is the social rules that apply to individuals as
members of society. There are certain social rules that apply to persons due to
membership in a society, and the mutual recognition of these rules establishes
obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as members of society.
From this idea, I argue that we can understand the basic structure of society as
consisting of those and only those practices that establish ostensible obligations, rights,
and powers for individuals as members of society. Accordingly, the basic structure is a
17

It might be more appropriate to say that “when I recognize a social rule, I interpret the members of a
particular community as generally holding normative expectations that I should act in a certain way.”
However, I think that we tend to skip this step and merely understand social interaction in accordance with
rules rather than as normative expectations.
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basis for those expectations that we can rely on as members of society in planning our
lives. These expectations are not merely based on observed patterns of behavior but on
our recognition of social rules. Understanding the basic structure in this way gives us a
clear standard by which to distinguish it from other aspects of the social world. A “social
ethos,” for example, might be important in shaping the values and relationships in a
society, but it does not specify clear claims. It does not consist of “rules” in the strict
sense. By contrast, a property scheme, economic system, political constitution and legal
system are constituted by strict rules that specify individual claims. Accordingly, these
institutions create determinate obligations, rights and powers. Moreover, the fact that the
basic structure institutions establish our claims as members of society differentiates it
from a myriad of other practices that might also ground specific claims.
1.1 The Basic Idea of the Basic Structure
The idea of the basic structure is most familiar from Theory of Justice, where it is
identified as

consisting of “the political constitution and the principle economic and

social arrangements.”18 Examples of these arrangements include, “the legal protection of
freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, competitive markets, private property in
the means of production, and the monogamous family.”19 While this characterization of
the basic structure provides some guidance in thinking about what it is, Rawls never
provided a clear criterion by which one could identify whether some aspect of our social
world is or is not part of the basic structure. He supposes that we should understand the
18

Rawls, Theory of Justice, 6.
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ibid.
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basic structure as “the main political and social institutions and the way they fit together
as one scheme of cooperation,”20 but this notion leaves it unclear exactly what the main
political and social institutions are and how they fit together.
Rawls himself did not see any problem with his looser characterization of the
basic structure. He writes, “Note that our characterization of the basic structure does not
provide a sharp definition, or criterion, from which we can tell what social arrangement,
or aspects thereof, belong to it. Rather, we start with a loose characterization of what is
initially a rough idea.”21 Likewise, he says, “A sharp definition of that [basic] structure
might have gotten in the way of fitting it into these other ideas, just as a sharp definition
of them would have gotten into the way of fitting them to it.”22 For Rawls, a more precise
articulation of what the basic structure is was not necessary for his project and may have
made issues unnecessarily difficult. Yet, while a clear criterion for identifying the basic
structure was not necessary for Rawls’s primary purposes, recent objections show why
such a criterion might be helpful for us.
Specifically, there are three recent objections that a more precise articulation of
the basic structure might address. First, recent cosmopolitan challenges demand a
principled differentiation between the basic structure and the global structure. Such a
differentiation seems important for understanding why distributive justice would or
would not be a concern for domestic society alone. Specifically, Aresh Abizadeh has
20

Rawls, Theory of Justice, 4.
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Justice as Fairness, ed. Erin Kelley (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, MA. 1999), 12.
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argued that none of the criteria typically used to ground a concern with the basic structure
can actually justify restricting the difference principle to domestic society. 23 Second,
some political theorists have identified the basic structure of society as the coercive
structure. Most prominently, Michael Blake has argued that we are concerned with the
basic structure because of the kind of coercion it uses against us, which differentiates it
from the global structure and justifies the limited scope of distributive justice.24 Since the
justification of coercion has been one of the most historically significant concerns in
political philosophy, it is important to identify exactly what the connection between the
basic structure and coercive power is. Finally, arguments like G.A. Cohen’s and Iris
Marion Young’s put pressure on Rawlsians to include more informal aspects of society
within the basic structure.25 For Cohen, the personal is political and an exclusive focus on
the basic structure obscures this. Insofar as certain norms in society have important
effects on us, why not assess them by the same standard we assess political and economic
institutions by? To better address these three challenges, the contemporary Rawlsian
needs a more developed conception of the basic structure than Rawls himself used.
Below, I develop a characterization of the basic structure that can address these
challenges. Specifically, I argue that we can understand the basic structure as those social
practices that establish obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as members of
society. To do so, I will first explain the Rawlsian use of “institution” as referring to-23 Abizadeh,
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what I call--ostensibly binding practices in §1.3. Then, in §1.4, I will better explain what
I mean by saying that we are concerned with those practices that establish obligation,
rights, and powers “for individuals as members of society.” In many ways, this idea
allows us to see what unifies the major social institutions as all forming the basic
structure.
My central concern in this chapter is to show how we can conceive of the basic
structure, and it is not to address the three criticisms above; an adequate answer to each
would require its own focus. However, to see the general contours of the account I offer, I
want to give a broad-brush response to each of these three challenges.
First, my response to Abizadeh’s cosmopolitan argument comes in two parts. We
should distinguish the claim that (a) there is no principled way to distinguish the basic
structure from the global structure from the claim that (b) there is no moral reason to be
concerned with the basic structure and not the global structure. The argument of this
chapter is concerned with addressing the first claim, and I address the second in Chapter
2. I want to give a characterization of the basic structure that distinguishes it from the
global structure, but I do not here say why the distinction is morally significant. I will
return to that issue in §2.3.2. I do not claim that the basic structure is the exclusive site of
distributive justice (nor do I claim that it is not). Abizadeh is ultimately concerned with
whether there is a morally significant difference between the basic structure and global
structure that could justify restricting the scope of distributive justice.
While I am not concerned with identifying the site of distributive justice, I am
concerned with giving a principled distinction between the basic structure and the global
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structure. While I do not deny that there are global institutions, these institutions do not
establish obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as members of society in the way
that domestic institutions do. The primary difference is that the basic structure institutions
bind individuals as members of society whereas the global structure binds international
bodies (such as states). Ultimately this difference will be morally significant, but it is left
to Chapter 2 to say why.
To address the second challenge, I argue that some coercive institutions are part of
the basic structure, but the basic structure is not identified as the coercive structure. For
us, the basic structure of society is likely to be coercively enforced, but that is not what
makes it the basic structure. We could have a system of social practices that establishes
obligations without those practices being coercively enforced, but coercive enforcement
will always be an important part of ensuring that are institutions are reliable. Given the
creatures that we are, the basic structure institutions should be coercively enforced, but
that does not mean that they are necessarily coercively enforced. We should not confuse
the justification of coercive force within a basic structure with the justification of the
basic structure.
Finally, to address the third challenge, I argue that the basic structure consists only
of ostensibly binding practices. While there are many other important aspects of society
that form the “informal structure,” the basic structure consists only of ostensibly binding
practices because those are the practices that provide the relevant kind of security. In
requiring specific actions at specific times, these practices establish claims for individuals
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as members of society. The informal structure does not provide this same level of security
and specificity in our claims.
In short, I argue that we should understand the basic structure as consisting of
those institutions that establish obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as members
of society. This provides us with not only an intuitive sense of the basic structure, but a
criterion. The basic structure is differentiated from the global structure by the moral
demands it establishes, differentiated from the coercive structure because it is not
necessarily coercive, and differentiated from the informal structure because it consists of
specific rules capable of establishing claims. To better explain the various aspects of the
account, I will start with the idea of “ostensibly binding social practices” in §1.2, explain
social institutions as an instance of these practices in §1.3 and and then show which
institutions form the basic structure in §1.4.
1.2 Ostensibly Binding Practices
Social practices take a variety of forms and and diverse roles in social life. Some
practices allow for coordination, others create new forms of behavior, and some require
that we act in specified ways. In this section, I narrow our focus to “ostensibly binding
practices.” I use this phrase because these practices present themselves as requiring
action, but the mere fact that social practices present themselves in this way does not
mean that we are morally or prudentially bound to follow its rules. As paradigm
examples, I take the practices of line-waiting, property, and a legal system. An
appropriate description of these practice’s rules requires a “should,” “ought,” “must,” or
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similar term, but that does not mean that we actually should, ought or must follow the
rules. The practices are not necessarily binding; they are only ostensibly binding.
Ostensibly binding practices have three key features; they are (a) conventional (b)
systems of rules that (c) have an authoritative character. First, by being “conventional” I
mean that these practices could have been otherwise.26 The specific rules that constitute
the practice are not morally required or naturally required.27 Second, each practice can be
understood by certain rules that guide behavior and specify valid claims that participants
can make on one another. The feature that most distinguishes authoritative practices,
however, is the third; we understand these practices as requiring certain actions or
validating certain claims. Rather than merely providing opportunities or structuring our
choices, these practices make a claim on what we ought to do. For example, it is not only
that we think we should wait in line, but that line-waiting consists in rules that persons
should wait in line. Accordingly, we understand the rules of authoritative practices as
ostensibly binding; whether or not we actually have reason to follow the rules, we
understand the rules as having a binding character.
It can be potentially misleading to refer to a social practice as constituted by
“rules” because we often think of rules as explicit or promulgated while the rules of
social practices do not need to be either. Instead, in referring to social practices as a
26

I recognize that the phrase “conventional” is used in many different senses, some more vague and others
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does not morally require a specific set of rules. For instance, we might have a natural right to property, but
the rules of property are underspecified.
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“system of rules,” I mean that we can articulate our implicit understanding of a social
practices in the form of rules. If we want to individuate or discuss the structure of a
particular social practice, we do so by articulating the features of this practice in terms of
rules. Importantly, our implicit understanding of any social practice might very well
outrun our ability to articulate rules for the practice. Just as we can accurately use a word
in conversation without having an explicit definition in mind, so can we follow a social
practice without having any explicit rules in mind. We should not think that an individual
understands a social practice by consciously applying explicit rules; an implicit
understanding often comes before any rules can be articulated.
Yet, while the rules of a social practice do not need to be explicit or promulgated,
they can be.

When there are differences in interpretation of practices, it will aid

cooperation when there is an “official statement” of the rules.28 This official statement
might come from either a trusted or conventionally-recognized authority. For instance, a
system of law acts as such an authority and makes many of the rules of social practices
explicit that might be disputed. In these cases, there will be an explicit and promulgated
set of rules that outline the social practice because it will be codified in legislation or in
28

When the rules of a social practice do not have any explicit articulation, any description of the rules must
be an interpretation of that practice. Any particular set of rules will merely be what is generally understood
about the practice rather than a uniform understanding across all participants. A description of the rules of
the practice is meant to give explicit content to our shared implicit understanding, but that understanding is
more likely to be an overlapping sense of the rules than any clear agreement. For instance, persons
generally understand when a promise has been made, but there will surely be disagreements. Does it count
as a promise when someone says, “I swear to you that I will do X” without uttering “I promise” and
without further remark? Is there a mutual understanding that a promise does not need to be fulfilled when
the personal costs exceed a certain amount, or is a wrong always done in such cases that needs be repaired?
Different persons are likely to have different understandings on how the conventions of promising bear on
these particular situations. When one offers an interpretation of promise-keeping, they seek to find the
overlapping consensus that is implicit in our shared understanding. For this reason, I will refer to the rules
of a practice as they are generally understood without any claim that there is a single authoritative standard
in all cases.
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court decisions. Yet, even if there are such cases in which social practices have definitive
and explicit rules, we do not need to think that all social practices must.
In The Myth of Ownership, Thomas Nagel and Liam Murphy seem to mistakenly
suppose that the rules of a property system must be explicit legal rules. It is surely the
case that most rules of property are explicit and legally enforced, but this does not mean
that a property scheme needs to have explicit rules or to be legally enforced. Perhaps
Nagel and Murphy did not mean to suggest that property is necessarily a legal practice
but merely meant to say that it is a legally specified practice for us.29 In either case, it is
important to recognize that a system of property can exist without explicit rules. This is
easiest to imagine in small societies where the conflicts related to property claims are
limited, but such an implicit understanding would not be efficient in contemporary
society. However, we should not confuse efficiency with possibility. There is nothing
about a scheme of property or any normative practice that requires that rules be explicit.
What is most distinct of ostensibly binding practices is that our implicit
understanding of the rules involves some implicit “ought,” even when we do not think it
is morally or prudentially required of us. Other practices might be articulable in terms of
interpreted patterns of behavior, but ostensibly binding practices require that we act a
certain way. When I choose to make a promise, I recognize a role that I “ought” to keep
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They emphasize that property is a “legal convention” in order to support their larger argument that
taxation schemes do not violate anyone’s rights or claims to desert. They argue that a taxation scheme and a
property scheme must be assessed together as part of a legal scheme, thus it is wrongful to suppose that a
taxation scheme could conflict with moral claims to property. Their conclusion is correct, but it has nothing
to do with whether a property scheme is necessarily legal. It is not their joint membership in a legal scheme
that makes it wrongful to treat the property and taxation schemes as conflicting, it is because of their joint
membership in the basic structure of society. I argue this in Ch. 2.
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that promise. How we should understand our recognition of this ought is open to
interpretation, but I will take its recognition as basic for my account.
In this same way that we can articulate the structure of social practices in terms of
rules, we can articulate the authoritative character of social practices in terms of
ostensibly-binding rules. The rules are not just that when persons utter “I promise to X”
they typically do X but instead the rules have the form that “a promise made ought to be
kept.” We recognize a rule that we should wait in line even if we could sneak into the
front. We recognize a rule that we should not steal even if we could get away with it.
These demands are implicit in our understanding of the practice that is represented in the
form of rules. When represented, these rules take the form of ought claims, “persons P
ought to X in circumstances C.”
In referring to the rules of a practice as ostensibly binding, I purposively mean
that their authoritative character is not reducible to either moral oughts or prudential
oughts. We represent the rules as requiring that “person P ought to do X in context C,”
but we can recognize this rule without thinking that either “P morally ought to do X in C”
or that “P prudentially ought to X in C.” In regards to the prudential ought, there is a
tradition in rational choice theory that has explained conventions as arising from the
coordination of individuals around a salient choice.30 Given this perspective, it would
seem sensible to understand “recognizing a social rule” as either (a) a prediction about
coordination or (b) coming to see a particular strategy of interaction to be most rational.
30

Most recognized in this tradition is David Lewis, Convention (Harvard University Press; Cambridge,
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Yet, the first does not explain the ostensibly binding representation of the rules and the
latter fails to explain how we can recognize a social rule that applies to us even when
following that rule would not be an optimal strategy. For instance, I might recognize a
social rule that requires me to keep a promise, even without being sure whether keeping
that promise would be most rational for me. Perhaps I should keep promises only when I
might be found out instead. For similar reasons, we cannot explain “recognizing a social
rule” as consisting in the judgment that a particular action would be morally best. As
above, we can recognize a social rule without thinking that there is moral reason to
follow that rule. For instance, an individual might recognize the social rules that they
ought to follow (what is mutually recognized as) the law, without thinking that they really
have a moral obligation to obey the law.
Since we cannot reduce the notion of recognizing an ostensibly binding social rule
to either of these notions, we can distinguish three judgments from each other; (a) the
judgment that an action would be prudential, (b) the judgment that an action would be
morally best, and (c) the judgment that an action is required by a social rule. Oftentimes
the fact that there is a generally recognized convention that requires one to take some
action will make taking that action prudential (as when the rules are backed by coercive
power) or moral (as when the practice serves a justified purpose), but neither of these
need to be the case for us to recognize a social rule.
In explaining ostensibly binding practices, I am most concerned with the fact that
we can recognize a rule as part of a practice and still be uncommitted as to whether we
ought to follow the rule. If a person were explaining the practice of line-waiting, they
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would say that the practice consists in the rule that “persons ought to wait in line who are
waiting for service” even if they do not think that persons morally ought to wait in line.
A devout Nietzschean who thought line-waiting was the most pure form of herdmentality might think that persons ought not to wait in line, yet still describe the social
practice as consisting of the rule “persons ought to wait in line.” We can recognize the
social rule without judging that we ought to follow it. This opens up the space for a
person to ask “I know that the social practice of line-waiting requires that I wait in line,
but should I wait in line?”
1.3 Institutions
The next step in this analysis of the basic structure is to show why “institutions”--in the
Rawlsian use of the term--should be understood as a kind of ostensibly binding practice.
To show this, I need to answer two questions. First, why would we think that the
Rawlsian understanding of “institutions” aligns with this model of ostensibly binding
practices? Second, what distinguishes the class of social institutions from the larger class
of ostensibly binding practices? To answer the first question, we can look to Theory of
Justice, where Rawls writes,
“by an institution, I shall understand a public system of rules which
defines offices and positions with their rights and duties, powers and
immunities, and the like. These rules specify certain forms of action as
permissible, others as forbidden; and they provide for certain penalties and
defenses, and so on, when violations occur. As examples of institutions, or
more generally social practices, we may think of games and rituals, trials
and parliaments, markets and systems of property”
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In this characterization of institutions, Rawls identifies institutions with social practices,
but he does not mean “social practices” in the broadest sense of “regularities in conduct.”
He specifically has in mind those practices that are a “public system of rules.” It might be
possible that there are some practices that could not be easily specified by a system of
rules, let alone a public system of rules. For instance, many symbols in pop culture or
artistic expression have a conventional significance that could not be easily specified by
rules. In American music, the use of a banjo tends to suggest southern backcountry living,
but this convention might not be aptly describable in terms of rules. If we would identify
this use of the banjo as part of a social practice, then that is not the kind of social practice
Rawls has in mind. Instead, Rawls is speaking specifically of those practices that can be
specified by rules, and ostensibly binding practices are of this type. 31
The more important feature of Rawls’s characterization of institutions is the way
in which the rules are authoritative. As Rawls puts it, these rules “specify certain forms of
action as permissible, others as forbidden.” Rawls never explains the authority of these
rules, but he cannot do so either in terms of moral or prudential authority. First, these
rules cannot explain certain forms of activity as “morally” permissible or forbidden
because it is not a social practice that determines the morality of those actions. Whether it
is morally permissible to follow the rules is different from what the rules make

31 An

alternative interpretation of the above Rawlsian definition is to think of “a public system of rules” as
a legal code rather than a system of generally recognized social rules. Here the normativity of the rights,
duties, powers, etc. would be explained by appeal to the requirements of the explicit laws rather than by
appeal to more implicit social rules. The first problem with this alternative is the fact that the law is one
such institution that itself needs to be justified. If institutions are necessarily defined by laws, then it is
difficult to see how law itself could be an institution. Second, it seems odd that Rawls would not say “laws”
if that is what he meant, given that it would be easier to explain. Third, he compares the rules of institutions
to the rules of rituals and games, which do not need to be codified in law.
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permissible. The property norms might make it permissible for me to bequest my entire
wealth to the Ku Klux Clan, but it is not morally permissible for me to do so. Likewise,
we would not think of the rules of “games and rituals” as making certain action morally
permissible, but only permissible as part of the game or ritual. Second, these rules cannot
explain certain forms of activity as “prudentially” permissible for similar reasons.
Whether it is prudentially right to follow a social rule is different from what the rules
make permissible, as we can notice that the rules forbid breaking a promise even when
doing so might be in our interest.32
The model of ostensibly binding practices is able to explain the authority of
institutional social rules without recourse to either moral or prudential authority. The
social rules specify certain actions are permissible and other as forbidden because they
are ostensibly binding. We understand the rules as requiring certain actions, but that does
not mean that we have judged that it would be moral or prudential to follow those rules.
Insofar as Rawlsian institutions are systems of ostensibly binding social rules, then
institutions are authoritative social practices.
Yet, what about the second question? Even if institutions are a kind of ostensibly
binding practice, we might not think that all ostensibly binding practices are institutions.
While someone is free to define institutions in any way they like, we typically use the
phrase “institutions” to apply to a subclass of ostensibly binding practices. However,
32

Rawls is quite explicit that social rules are not prudential strategies: “It is necessary to note the
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there does not seem any necessary and sufficient conditions that a social practice might
meet for it to be an institution. Rather, we are more likely to call a social practice an
“institution” to the extent that it meets three conditions. First, the rules of institutions are
more clearly understood and less open to interpretation; there is a general understanding
about what the core rules are that structure institutions. Oftentimes this feature is
explained by the fact that there is some body that has the authority to determine those
rules, but not always. Second, institutions are often more complex and structured than
other social practices. This complexity is not just in the nuances of particular rules, but in
the different roles that system of rules may establish. Institutions often include different
positions, powers and privileges that fit together into one system. Third, institutions are
particularly important or socially significant. There is no single definitive standard for
determining when a social practice is an institution, but these are three features that
“institutions” seem to have to a greater degree than social practices generally.
This link between institutions and ostensibly binding practices is significant
because it shows why we do not need to think of institutions as anything more than a
particular kind of practice. They do not need to have a legal or material basis. There is a
natural tendency to see aspects of our social world as if they were part of the natural
world. In short, we tend to reify our social institutions. This is quite obvious when one
hears conservative activists claim that we should not allow same-sex marriage because
that is not what marriage is, but reification of the social structure goes far beyond this. 33

33

We might be charitable and suppose the argument underneath these claims is that the values that the
institution of marriage promotes are undermined by allowing same-sex marriage, but that does not seem to
be the argument offered.
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The fact of reification should be no surprise because our institutions form a
background for our plans, and we thereby take their presence and stability for granted.
Thinking in these terms can even be quite helpful because it allows us to abstract away
from the complicated structure of interaction that forms an institution, and just focus on
the institution itself. It is because of our commonsense reliance on these institutions that
persons looks for something beyond social practices to ground social institutions, and
they ultimately look towards the law or patterns of sanction as something more solid than
mere social practice. Ultimately, however, our social structure is composed on nothing
more than social practices, certain shared patterns of activity and expectation. The above
analysis shows how we can understand institutions in these terms and do not need to
make recourse to anything else.
So, the social world is structured by a thick array of social practices, some of
these social practices are authoritative, and some of these authoritative practices are
social institutions. The next step of the analysis is to show that some of these institutions
form the basic structure of society. The difficulty is explaining which social institutions
do so.
1.4 The Major Social Institutions and the Basic Structure
The basic structure is constituted by the “major social institutions,” but it is not
immediately clear what qualifies a social institution as “major.” So, in order to explain
what the basic structure is we need a standard by which to distinguish the major social
institutions from the broader class of institutions. The goal of this section is to explain
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this standard. I argue that the major social institutions are differentiated by their unique
role in structuring our lives as members of a society. By better explaining the unique role
of these institutions, I will identify the standard by which we can distinguish the basic
structure.
The unique role of the major social institutions is that they establish obligations,
rights, and powers for individuals as members of society. Accordingly, those institutions
that do this are those that belong to the basic structure and we can understand the basic
structure as the system of institutions that together establish these demands and claims for
individuals as members of society. To better substantiate this idea, I want to break my
exposition into two parts. First, I will better explain how the basic structure “establishes
obligations, rights, and powers.” Second, I will explain the significance of the clause “for
individuals as members of society.” With these notions explained, I then identify the
basic structure as the way in which the major social institutions come together to form a
single system.
1.4.1 “establishing obligations, rights and powers...”
In understanding how a class of practices can establish obligation, rights, and powers, it
is crucial that we distinguish the ostensible from the actual. The mere fact that a social
practice is practiced does not mean that we should act in the ways required by the rules or
that we have legitimate claims based on the rules. The practice itself is merely a pattern
of behaviors, expectations and understandings. To accurately explain these practices, we
need to represent them as consisting of rules, but we need only represent these rules as
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“ostensibly binding.” The rules are understood as involving the claim to bind but might
not actually bind.
In representing rules as “ostensibly binding,” I mean to offer an analysis of
practices that is consistent with social theory. Yet, I would need to draw on resources
from a moral theory in order to explain when these rules are “actually binding.” Such a
moral theory would need to explain both when persons should follow the rules of
contingent practices and when they have claims on others to do likewise. Typical
explanations appeal to the principle of fair-play, the power of consent, our identification
with the social roles,34 and indirect utilitarianism. Any such explanation will need to
explain (a) why an individual is obligated to follow the rules of a morally justified
practice (rather than merely showing how the rules are often efficacious ways to advance
some end), and (b) when a practice is morally justified. The fair-play theorist, for
example, supposes that (a) we are obligated to practices because we owe a fair-share for
receipt of the benefits and (b) we are so obligated when the practice is fair to each
participant. 35
For my argument to succeed, I do not need to argue for any one of these theories
over the others. Instead, I merely need to suppose that there is some explanation for why
contingent practices can establish actual obligations, rights, and powers. I identify any
moral theory that meets this requirement as a form of “limited conventionalism.” It is a
form of conventionalism because conventional practices can establish new requirements
34
35
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The conditions that consent theorists and Hegelians would put on obligating practices are more difficult
to articulate, but I nonetheless believe that both views need to satisfy both conditions.
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and claims, but it is a limited form of conventionalism because it does not suppose that
all more requirements and claims are established by practices. Limited conventionalism
is fully consistent with commitments to practice-independent obligations, rights and
values. It merely needs to be the case that the major social institutions can establish
requirements and claims. I better explain the commitments and importance of limited
conventionalism in §4.1.
Importantly, practices can establish requirements and claims in two different
ways. A practice can either (a) better specify pre-existing obligations/rights/powers that
are too vague, or (b) create new obligations/rights/powers ab nihilo. For example, we
might think that we have a practice-independent right to personal property, but that this
practice-independent right does not entitle us to any specific property. According to this
view, it is only when we live within a society with definitive property norms that our preinstitutional right entitles us to the specific property that the norms identify as ours. Or,
we might think that there is no practice-independent rights to personal property. Instead,
we might think that persons have come to coordinate around norms of property and that
these norms bind us because the Principle of Fair-Play requires that we follow the rules
that benefit us. In the first case, a practice of property specifies a pre-existing right while
the practice creates a right to property in the latter case. Either case is consistent with
“limited conventionalism.” In each, our practices establish specific requirements or
claims that we would not have if the practice did not exist.
A moral theory that accepts limited conventionalism will recognize that the major
social institutions can establish actual obligations, rights, and powers. However, we do
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not need to appeal to any such moral theory to identify a basic structure. The moral
theory explains when an an ostensibly binding practice is actually binding, but we can
still identify ostensibly binding institutions when they are not actually binding.
The major social institutions are those practices that establish ostensible
obligations, ostensible rights, and ostensible powers. For this reason, society can have
major social institutions that are so unjust that persons should not follow the rules of
those institutions. For example, the institution of slavery is typically so unjust that no
person has a moral reason to follow it’s rules. However, it is still likely that persons
would understand that institution as consisting of ostensibly binding rules. The rules
create ostensible obligations to obedience, ostensible rights of ownership, and ostensible
powers of authority. The fact that these rules are morally heinous does not change the
analysis of these rules as ostensibly binding, and an institution of slavery can accordingly
be amongst a society’s major institutions.
1.4.2 “...for individuals as members of society”
The basic structure institutions are not all the institutions that establish (ostensible)
obligations, rights, and powers, but are specifically those that establish these demands
and claims by virtue of membership in society. In this way, the basic structure institutions
are closely tied with belonging to a particular society. To see the importance of this point,
we can see that there will be free associations that establish obligations, rights, and
powers. For instance, the employees of IBM could mutually comply with social rules that
establish obligations amongst coworkers, rights to vacation, and powers of authority. In
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this case, these demands and claims are established for individuals as employees of IBM.
Likewise, the members of a church could mutually comply with social rules that establish
obligations, rights, and powers in the religious community.
What is unique about the basic structure institutions is not that they establish
demands and claims--since IBM and a church might do that--but that they establish these
obligations and claims for individuals as members of a society. It is because I am a
member of the United States that I have certain obligations and rights. In a society that
cooperates through norms of property, members can know that each has obligations and
rights to property. In a society that cooperates through certain norms of family life,
members can know that there are certain demands and claims in a marriage. Even if a
person chooses to be an ascetic and live without property or to be single and live without
a family they are aware that they could be entitled to security in those things as a member
of society. They know that if they acquired property, then others would generally refrain
from seizing it. They know that their authority over and responsibility for children would
generally be respected if they choose to have children. These demands and claims are part
of being a member of society because all members of a society live under the same social
rules.
At this stage, an objection from circularity might seem obvious. I have said that
the basic structure institutions establish security for individuals as members of society,
yet how can we understand who is a “member of society” in this sense? If one defines
membership in a society as being an individual to whom the rules of the basic structure
institutions apply, then we define “member of society” in relation to the idea of the
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“major social institutions” and define the “major social institutions” in relation to the idea
of being a “member of society.” If that is correct, my account seems circular. I rely on a
notion of members of society to explain who is a member of society.
Yet, there are two ways of getting away from this circularity objection. First, I can
deny that the idea “member of society” is best defined as a participant in the basic
structure institutions. While this first way of avoiding circularity might be open to me, I
do not currently know of any other satisfying way to explain who is a member of society.
Accordingly, I will assume that a “member of society” is best understand as “a person
identified as participant in the basic structure institutions,”36 and I will appeal to a second
way to avoid the circularity objection. Even if “member of society” is explained in terms
of participation in the major social institutions and the “major social institutions” are
explained by relying on a notion of member of society, this is not actually a problem.
Remember that the various basic institutions are social practices. In explaining these
practices and their relations to one another, we give an explanation of how persons act
and reconstruct their implicit understanding of the social world. Doing this does not
require an ontology whereby we appeal to some fundamental notion from which all other
notions are built. Rather, it only needs to depict how persons act and understand the
world. Such a depiction can be circular without problem. We start from within an
ongoing social practice, and we only need to characterize that practice. At this stage, we
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might understand Americans as those bound by American institutions and understand
American institutions as those that bind Americans. While this might be circular, it is not
problematic if it accurately describes our implicit understanding of these practices.
1.4.3 the basic structure
At this stage, we have narrowed our concern from social rules to ostensibly binding
practices to institutions and, finally, to the major social institutions. From this final
notion, we can now understand the basic structure of society as constituted by the major
social institutions. The basic structure is how these institutions come together and
complement one another. Accordingly, we can now understand the basic structure of
society as those ostensibly binding practices that together establish our obligations,
rights, and powers as members of society.
In establishing obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as members of
society, the basic structure creates a kind of social “background.” In deciding how to live
our lives, we do so on the basis of various expectations about our social world. This
includes the various opportunities we have, the powers and rights of individuals, and the
limits on what we can rightfully do. As we plan our lives, we hold things about our
society constant as we think about the different lives we might lead within that society. In
such choices, the obligations, rights, and power that we have as members of society form
a kind of background for the choices about which particular life we will lead. Our various
expectations of others give us a security with regard to the actions of others. Since we
hold this security constant across the lives we might lead, the basic structure institutions
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establish a kind of “background security.” As we make the choices that make our lives
our own, we come to have security in particular things; in our property, our family, our
occupation, and our worship. The basic structure institutions do not establish the security
we have in these particular things, but they establish the security we have as a member of
society; it establishes background security.
To better emphasize the significance of this point, it might be helpful to see the
way in which a basic structure establishes background security through a comparison
between anarchy and society. We do not need to suppose that anarchy would be a war of
all against all, even if we recognize that it might be. Perhaps persons would not be likely
to attack one another or even to make claims on them. In the absence of society, persons
might live as in Rousseau’s “most-happy” age. 37 There, persons are independent of one
another and do not consider their needs to be satisfied by the actions of others. Now,
regardless of whether persons are peaceful or at war in anarchy, persons will not have
security with regard to the actions of others. Without a social structure that specifies how
each must act, no one can have rightful expectations of strangers. Even if moral rules or
natural rights are binding, we only have security when we believe that persons will
follow those rules. Even peaceful and safe anarchies do not have the obligations, rights,
and powers we have as members of society.

37

“This period in the development of human faculties, occupying a just mean between the indolence of the
primitive state and the petulant activity of the our amour propre, must have been the happiest and most
lasting epoch...The example of the Savages, almost all of whom have been found at this point, seems to
confirm that Mankind was made always to remain in it...that all subsequent progress has been so many
steps in the appearance toward the perfection of the individual, and in effect towards the decrepitude of the
species.” (Cambridge Tran. 167). As Rousseau would argue, even if conflict is necessary with
interdependency, we do not need to suppose interdependency in an anarchic state.
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As soon as there are mutually recognized social rules, there is a social structure,
and there is no longer anarchy. We move away from anarchy as soon as we “institute
regulations of Justice and peace to which all are obliged to conform, which make
exception of no one, and which compensate in some way for the caprices of fortune by
equally subjecting the powerful and the weak to mutual duties.”38 These are rules that
establish obligations, rights, and powers amongst the members of a society. In
establishing these clear and reliable rules, our social rules establish a kind of background
security. In §1.6, I will argue that we can understand “social cooperation” as the unique
form of cooperation between members of society that establishes these rights,
obligations, and powers. First, however, I want to survey a few objections to this
understanding of the basic structure.
1.5 Objections
On first look, this characterization of the basic structure might seem problematic for a
number of reasons. I want to address three of the most pressing objections here. By
addressing these objections, I should also be able to explain the central idea behind my
account.
First, one might be tempted to think that my characterization of the basic structure
would be too expansive. For example, does it include the obligations and rights we have
against deception? After all, if we are lost on a street corner and ask a random passerby
for directions, we can have a right to the truth and the passerby has an obligation to tell
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the truth. Since I characterized the basic structure as establishing such rights, it would
seem like my characterization of the basic structure would include truth-telling. Since we
do not typically recognize truth-telling as part of the basic structure, this would be
problematic for my characterization.
In response, I only need to stress the importance of the clause that the basic
structure establishes obligations, rights, and powers “for individuals as members of
society.” When we have a right to the truth, it has nothing to do with our position as
member of society. Instead, if we do trust persons, it is either on the basis of a judgment
of their individual character or on the basis of our position as persons. Regardless of
whether that street corner is in one’s own society or in a distant society, we likely will
still trust a random passerby to tell the truth. Accordingly, norms of non-deception are not
part of the basic structure because they do not establish rights for individuals as members
of society.
A second, and similar, objection would charge that my account would include
obligations like promise-keeping as part of the basic structure. If one thinks that it is a
moral obligation of all persons to keep their promises, then my response to this objection
will be the same as that above. Our promissory obligations are established by being
persons rather than being members of society. If one thinks that promise-keeping is a
moral obligation only because it is a social convention, then it seems more difficult to
claim that our promissory obligation is established by our role as persons.
Nonetheless, this obligation is still unproblematic. First, insofar as a person utters
“I promise” it is clear that they identify themselves as a participant in the promise-
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keeping convention, regardless of whether they are a member of society or not. So, if
promise-keeping is conventional, it can still establish security for persons as persons
because our security is explained by their recognition of the convention rather than our
membership in society. To see the difference, compare the rights and obligations involved
in a signed contract between strangers and the rights and obligations involved in a
promise. The conditions that identify a contract as valid are specified by legal norms
specific to a society whereas the conditions that identify a promise as valid are more
important to interpretation and may vary from one social group to the next. In this way,
we can recognize security in contracts as arising from our role as members of society
while we explain security in promises as arising from our role as persons.
Finally, as a third objection, one could point out that foreigners and tourists have
obligations, rights, and powers specified by the major social institutions even though they
are not members of society. This objection might seem to show problems with the clause
that the basic structure establishes security for individuals as members of society.
Yet, if everything else about the account is not problematic, then this last
objection should be no worry. This is because when foreigners and tourists are treated as
members of a society that is not their own, they merely assume the role of member of
society.39 Now, this does not mean that they assume the role of citizen. To be a citizen--in
the way, I distinguish the phrase--is to have a particular role in a political and legal
structure. Being a citizen entitles one to certain privileges and responsibilities, but being a
citizen and being a member of society are not synonymous. It is fair to say that illegal
39

I discuss the idea of our “role as member of society” more extensively in 2.2.3.
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immigrants are members of society even if they are not citizens in the proper sense.
Likewise, we might not consider tourists to ultimately be members of society, though we
do treat them accordingly. When we travel to other societies, we likewise should act
according to the norms that members of that society act in accordance with.
In this way, the identification of basic structure institutions does not include moral
rules because we do not have security in these rules as members of society, it does not
include aspects of the informal structure because the rules of the informal structure are
not sufficiently particular, and it does not rule out the possibility that those in a foreign
society assume the role as member of society.
1.6 The Basic Structure, Social Cooperation and the “Fundamental Problem of Justice”

In this chapter, I have developed the idea of the basic structure in ways that Rawls does
not. While I have not said anything that I believe Rawls would reject, I want to go
beyond Rawls’s intuitive understanding of the basic structure and develop the idea in
ways that withstand recent challenges. In this section, I want to explain one additional
advantage of this account; it can better justifying Rawls’s own method by connecting the
idea of “social cooperation” with the idea of the basic structure.
In Political Liberalism, the idea of social cooperation is central for unfolding the
various aspects of Rawls’s theory. He writes, “the fundamental organizing idea of justice
as fairness, within which the other basic ideas are systematically connected, is that of
society as a fair system of cooperation over time.”40 In assessing a society, we should not
be concerned with whether it advances some particular moral end or makes human
40

Rawls, Political Liberalism, 15.
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perfection possible. Instead, we should be concerned with whether the terms of social
cooperation are fair. In society, we work together to advance what we each think is
important in life, but we need to ensure that we work together on fair terms. For
Rawlsians, the central problem of political justice is then identifying the fair terms of
social cooperation. Rawls makes this point explicit when he identifies “the fundamental
question of political justice” as determining “what is the most appropriate conception of
justice for specifying the terms of social cooperation between citizens regarded as free
and equal, and as normal and fully cooperating members of society over a complete
life?”41
Now, it is not immediately obvious from Rawls’s own remarks why this concern
with the terms of social cooperation justifies his focus on the basic structure of society.
Rawls uses an intuitive extension of the basic structure as including “the political
constitution,...the legally recognized forms of property, and the structure of the
economy... as well as the family in some form.”42 Yet, why would these institutions be
the ones most relevant for setting the terms of social cooperation? Rawls starts from a
concern with the terms of social cooperation, but then only stipulates that we address this
concern by focusing on the basic structure. How is a concern with identifying the fair
terms of social cooperation related to a focus on the basic structure?
While the connection between these ideas is not obvious from Rawls’s explicit
remarks, it can be explained by the account provided here. The key is a particular
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understanding of social cooperation. Cooperation is distinct from coordination in that
cooperation is done with deference to the others with whom one cooperates. One can
selfishly coordinate, but one cannot selfishly cooperate. The best way to interpret Rawls’s
use of “social cooperation” (in contrast to “cooperation” more generally) is as referring to
the unique form of cooperation that exists between members of a society.43 Social
cooperation is the distinct kind of cooperation engaged in by members of society, it is
neither mere coordination nor cooperation in all its forms.
Yet, what is the unique kind of cooperation between members of society? What is
referred to by “social cooperation”? I maintain that we can best understand this unique
form of cooperation as the cooperation between members of society in following the
social rules that establish obligations, rights, and powers for individuals as members of
society. This is a form of cooperation when persons (a) coordinate in following the same
social rules (b) with deference to those with whom they coordinate. This is a unique
cooperative relationship between members of society because it specifically establishes
our obligations, rights, and powers as members of society.
Given this understanding of social cooperation, the terms of social cooperation in
a particular society will be specified by the rules of the major social institutions. In this
way, the terms of social cooperation are given form as the basic structure of society.
Thus, by determining how the basic structure ought to be organized, we determine what
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the terms of social cooperation are. In short, by focusing on “the first subject of justice,”
we address “the fundamental problem of political justice.”
In the section, I have made important connections between a number ideas quite
quickly, so it will be helpful to provide a more formal summary of the main points. The
core ideas that got us to the above conclusion can be expressed as follows:
1) Social cooperation is the unique form of cooperation that establishes the
obligations, rights and powers of individuals as members of society.
2) In any society, these obligations, rights and powers are established by mutual
compliance with certain social rules, R.
3) The major social institutions are those institutions defined by those social
rules R.
4) Thus, in any society, these obligations, rights, and powers are established by
mutual compliance with the rules of the major social institutions.

[2, 3]

5) The basic structure of a society is the way in which all the major social
institutions together form a single system.
6) Thus, these obligations, rights, and power are established in any society by
mutual compliance with the rules of the basic structure

[4, 5]

7) Thus, in any society, social cooperation proceeds through the rules of the basic
structure.

[1,6]

8) Thus, by evaluating the organization of the basic structure, we evaluate the
terms of social cooperation.
All together, this explanation should make better sense of why the basic structure is “the
arrangement of the major social institutions into one scheme of cooperation.”44 Social
cooperation is the unique cooperation between members of society in establishing
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background security, and the basic structure is the entirety of those institutions that social
cooperation proceeds through. In this way, the basic structure forms a single scheme of
cooperation.
Rawlsians do not ultimately judge society by whether it accomplishes some moral
end, such as the promotion of happiness, individual perfection or equality. Instead,
society is a system of social cooperation and we ought to assess it by determining
whether the terms of cooperation are fair. Since the terms of social cooperation are given
form in the basic structure of society, we should take the basic structure as the primary
subject for assessing society.

1.7 The Identity of the Basic Structure
The primary task of this dissertation is to show why the basic structure has primacy as a
distinct moral subject. As I discussed in the introduction, I will do this by explaining
three features of the basic structure; its identity, its moral indispensability, and its moral
distinctiveness. The account of this chapter addresses the identity of the basic structure
specifically. It explains that the basic structure consists of those institutions that establish
background security for individuals as members of society.
Starting from the idea of ostensibly binding practices and building up to the
notion of the basic structure, we have the tools to overcome many of the traditional
problems with the idea of the basic structure. According to this theory, the basic structure
consists of ostensibly binding social rules. It does not necessarily consist of rules that are
legally or coercively backed. Instead, it consists of rules that we understand as ostensibly
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binding. Likewise, the rules are specific enough that they differ from the informal
structure. While our entire social structure consists in many ostensibly binding practices,
the basic structure does not include all of them. Rather, the basic structure consists of
only those ostensibly binding practices that establish obligations, rights, and powers for
individuals as members of society. This differentiates the basic structure from moral
practices that bind all persons, from social practices that persons choose to be part of, and
from the global structure that provides security for international actors. The basic
structure remains a distinct and unified aspect of the social structure.
Moreover, this articulation distinguishes the basic structure from the broader set
of practices that establish our social context. There is wide diversity of practices in social
life, and only some of them are part of the basic structure of society. In his objections to
Rawls, Cohen appeals to the example of a society with an “egalitarian ethos.”45 Even if
our major social institutions maximally promote equality, we promote equality even
further if persons generally acted for the sake of equality in their personal decisions. In
his arguments from “On the Site of Distributive Justice,” G.A. Cohen argues that there is
no non-arbitrary way by which Rawls can distinguish the norms that form the basic
structure from the norms that would form an egalitarian ethos.46 Now, I have little doubt
that such an ethos would be a significant part of social life. It might impact what
individuals in that society value, the shape of their life plan, and their relationships.
45
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Moreover, I do recognize that both the basic structure and an egalitarian ethos are formed
by norms. However, neither of these points mean that there is no non-arbitrary way by
which to distinguish an egalitarian ethos from the basic structure.
While the norms of an egalitarian ethos outline patterns of behavior, the norms of
the basic structure require action or specify claims. The rules are particular in identifying
specific actions as required and as rights-violations. Once one has security in property or
security in religious freedom, then there are certain actions that individuals cannot take.
With an egalitarian ethos, there is no such specificity. The fact that we live in a society
where members of the military are particularly esteemed does not require any particular
actions from individuals or give any persons claims. I do not act wrongly if I do not buy a
soldier a beer at the bar even if there is an ethos of appreciate for the military. Such
informal norms--whether esteem for military personnel or appreciation for equality--do
not establish particular obligations, rights, or powers in the way that basic structure
institutions do.
In his 2009 book, Cohen slightly changes his objection. He does not claim that
there is not way by which to distinguish the basic structure from informal norms like an
egalitarian ethos. Instead, he argues that any such distinction would be morally arbitrary.
Ultimately, we only care about identifying the basic structure as distinct from informal
norms because we think that there is something morally significant about the basic
structure and not about the informal structure. Instead of focusing on the possibility of a
distinction between the basic structure and the informal structure, Cohen focuses on the
moral significance of the distinction.
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So far, I have only tried to show what the distinction is and not what the moral
significance of this distinction in. In Chapter 2, I will show why the basic structure is an
indispensable moral subject, and I show why the principles that apply to it will be distinct
from the principles that apply to individual action in Chapter 3. Here, I have identified
the basic structure as those institutions that establish our obligations, rights, and powers
as members of society. An egalitarian ethos does not establish specific rights or
obligations upon persons. In being concerned with the basic structure, Rawlsians are
concerned with these specific institutions. Next I argue for why they should be so
concerned.
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Chapter 2
Levels of Moral Evaluation
“The social virtues of humanity and benevolence exert their influence immediately,
by a direct tendency or instinct, which chiefly keeps in view the simple object,
moving the affections, and comprehends not any scheme or system, or consequences
resulting from the concurrence, imitation, or example of others...The case is not the
same with the social virtues of justice and fidelity. They are highly useful, or indeed
absolutely necessary to the well-being of mankind: but the benefit, resulting from
them, is not the consequence of every individual act; but arises from the whole
scheme or system, concurred in by the whole, or greater part of society. General
peace and order are the attendants of justice or a general abstinence from the
possessions of others: But a particular regard to the particular right of one individual
citizen may frequently, considered in itself, be productive of pernicious
consequences.”
- Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Appendix 3

Few doubt that we need some guiding principles for individual action. We are faced with
the difficulties of ethics because we need to act, so we seek principles that help guide our
choices. Being members of political communities, we are also accustomed to arguing
about principles to guide the choices of the state, so few doubt that we need some guiding
principles for government decisions. We know that we need principles for these issues,
but why would we need principles that apply to the basic structure of society?
The question is not why we could develop principles for such a subject. After all,
we might invent any number of subjects to develop principles for; we could develop
principles to regulate which street fairs a city ought to have or what beers bars should
serve. We are not concerned with all the subjects for which we could develop principles,
so why be concerned with the basic structure? Why wouldn’t the various issues
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surrounding the basic structure be otherwise addressed? Why couldn’t a broader principle
be applied to the specifics of the basic structure? Since there are so many ways to think
about the moral questions involved in society, the questions that needs to be answered is
why we would be particularly concerned with any particular subject. Why treat the basic
structure as a morally indispensable subject?
Many of the most intuitive answers do not explain why the basic structure, rather
than some similar subject, deserves our attention. For example, my concern with the basic
structure is not explained by a concern for its profound and pervasive effects on
individual life because other aspects of the social world also have similar effects.47
Undoubtedly, one of the reasons why the basic structure is so important is because of its
profound and pervasive effects, but that cannot be the reason why the basic structure
(rather than all influential norms) is an indispensable moral subject in itself. Second, I
cannot claim that a concern with justifying coercion explains why we need to evaluate the
basic structure because I have not identified the basic structure as coercive. Third, I
cannot claim that a concern for social cooperation explains why we need to evaluate the
basic structure because I have identified “social cooperation” as the unique form of
cooperation between members of society. Since the basic structure is constituted by the
institutions that persons cooperate with one another through as members of society,
justifying a concern for the basic structure on a concern for social cooperation would be
like justifying a concern for the basic structure on a concern for the basic structure.
Moreover, arguing from profound effects, coercion, or social cooperation would require
47 As
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that I support a moral theory that identifies coercion or social cooperation as particularly
morally significant. I want to construct an argument that fits with a broader range of
moral views.
In “The Basic Structure as Subject,” Rawls did give one clear reason why the
basic structure is morally indispensable.48 He argued that principles for the basic structure
were needed in order to regulate “background fairness.” This argument starts from the
intuitive idea that both the economy and society generally should progress “in accordance
with free agreements fairly arrived at and fully honored.”49 Such an ideal ensures that
persons’ free decisions are respected. However, free agreements can only be fairly arrived
at against a background of fair relationships between persons. If inequalities are too great,
then we could not expect the agreements made to truly be fair to all participants. Thus,
we need to evaluate the basic structure of society in order to ensure background fairness,
which would make the ideal of a society progressing according to free and fair
agreements possible. Thus, the basic structure is morally indispensable because of our
concern for background fairness.
The force of Rawls’s argument, however, is limited. It was meant primarily as a
response to libertarians and classical liberals who hold the ideal that “society should
progress according to free agreements fairly made.” In this way, the Rawlsian argument
shows why libertarian ideals require a concern with background fairness and, therefore, a
concern with the basic structure. While many others (besides libertarians and classical
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liberals) share this ideal, it is not universally held. If this was the sole argument for
treating the basic structure as subject, a Hegelian who saw this ideal as inappropriately
applying the ideals of civil society to the state would not have reason to treat the basic
structure as subject.50 A second challenge that Rawls’s argument faces is to show why we
need principles that apply specifically to the basic structure rather than principles that
regulate background fairness. After all, the basic structure is not obviously those and only
those institutions that regulate background fairness. For these reasons, we should see
Rawls’s argument in “The Basic Structure as Subject” as a response to the laissez-faire
capitalists who see no reason to be concerned with the basic structure. It is not a complete
argument in favor of taking the basic structure as subject.
With the identity of the basic structure established in the last chapter, I can now
give a more complete argument for the moral indispensability of the basic structure in
this chapter. The argument does not rely on profound effects, coercion, social cooperation
or background fairness. Instead, it relies on the normative structure of social practices.
Oftentimes, individual actions are part of social practices. For example, if I walk through
your land uninvited, I am trespassing. Yet, this action is understood as trespass only
because it occurs within a generally recognized practice of property. In order for me to
fully evaluate the actions that are part of a practice, I often need to evaluate the practice
of which it is a part. Whether an act of trespass is rightful or wrongful, for example,
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depends on whether the practice of property is rightful or wrongful. In such cases, the
proper evaluation of an action requires that we evaluate the practice that the action is part
of. This requires that we have some way of evaluating the practice; we need principles
that apply to the practice that action is part of. In the example, we need some way of
determining whether the property system is rightful.
Likewise, I argue that to properly evaluate certain social practices, we need some
way of evaluating the systems of which those practices are a part. In the same way that
we need to evaluate a practice to determine whether the actions that are part of that
practice are justified, we need to evaluate a system of practices to determine whether the
practices that are part of that system are justified. Since the major social institutions
together form a system--the basic structure--we need to evaluate the basic structure in
order to properly evaluate the institutions that are part of the basic structure. All the basic
structure institutions together specify our role as member of society, so we need to
evaluate these institutions as part of that system. For example, in order to evaluate a
property scheme, political constitution or economic system, we need to see each as part
of the basic structure; we need to see each as contributing to the specification of our role
as members of society.
To establish this argument, the chapter will proceed in three parts. In §2.1, I
explain why the evaluation of individual actions often requires that we evaluate the
practices that the action is part of. Then, §2.2 explains why the evaluation of certain
practices requires that we evaluate the systems of that those practices are part of. I then
apply this argument to show how it justifies evaluating the basic structure as subject. In
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the final part, §2.3, I answer some important objections and highlight what needs to be
established in the next chapter.
In making this argument, this chapter seeks to show one way in which ethical life
is complex. Whether moral principles aid or determine our moral evaluations, we cannot
think that moral principles apply only to individual actions. We must see actions as part
of practices, which also need to be evaluated. Moral principle either aid or determine our
evaluation of these practices. This makes for a complex moral landscape, especially since
our actions are part of so many different practices. This complexity extends even further
when practices together form systems. We then evaluate not only actions and practices
but systems of practices. The basic structure is an indispensable moral subject because it
is the system that specifies one’s role as member of society. As complex as the social and
moral landscape is, we need to evaluate the basic structure in order to properly evaluate
those institutions that establish our obligations, rights, and powers as members of society.
2.1 Actions as Part of Practices
In many cases, we can properly evaluate an action by looking at it and its effects in
isolation. If one saves a child from drowning, for instance, we can generally assume that
the person acted rightly. In other cases, we can only properly evaluate an action when we
look at it as part of a practice. Famously, Hume made this argument in A Treatise of
Human Nature. In §3.2.2, he writes
“A single act of justice is frequently contrary to the public interest; and
were it to stand alone, without being followed by many other acts, may, of
itself, be very prejudicial to society. When a man of merit, of a benevolent
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disposition, restores a great fortune to a miser, a seditious bigot, he has
acted justly and laudably, but the public is the real sufferer. Nor is every
single act of justice, considered apart, more conducive to private interest,
than to public; and ‘tis easily conceived how a man may impoverish
himself by a single instance of integrity.”51
In this passage, Hume emphasizes that we cannot merely look at all actions as though
they “stand alone.” If we look at the act of giving money to a seditious bigot, it would not
call for our approval. A more laudatory action would be to give that money to those who
need it and not leave it in the hands of the bigoted miser. Yet, we might approve of the
action when we see it as an instance of keeping contracts if we learn that the man of merit
had agreed to repay a loan. In this case, we see the action as part of a social practice of
contract-keeping. For Hume, this demonstrates that we cannot explain our judgment of
actions merely by appeal to the action in isolation. He ends the passage by pointing out
that doing so is no less problematic if we focus only on personal advantage. One might
uphold a contract and thereby bring herself into poverty, and we would still approve of
this action as appropriate. Looking at the effects of action alone--either the moral or
prudential effects--cannot explain why the action is laudable.
In Hume’s view, our approval of the man of merit’s action is explained by our
recognition that the practice, as a whole, benefits ourselves and others. Our approval is
transferred from the practice as a whole to the individual actions that contribute to it.
Even if upholding a contract does not seem to have any merit on its own, we recognize
that the practice of keeping contracts has merit, and so we approve of actions that are part
51
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of the practice. According to Hume, to understand our response to such actions, we
recognize how we see such action as part of a beneficial social practice.
Now, others might offer a different explanation of Hume’s particular example.
They might say that what explains our approval of the man of merit is our recognition of
a practice-independent moral obligation to keep contracts. So long as we recognize that
keeping contracts is morally laudable in isolation, we do not need to recognize the action
as part of a practice of contract keeping. Yet, even if this response shows a problem with
this particular case, it will not be a problem for all cases. Some actions will be
praiseworthy as part of a practice that will not be praiseworthy in isolation. For example,
a citizen who researches the candidates and votes in an election does a praiseworthy
action, but the fact that it is praiseworthy only makes sense within a representative
democracy.
Hume’s example works particularly well because it is a clear instance of an
action that would be judged differently if it were not viewed as part of a practice. In our
everyday life, however, the issue is much more complex. We live amongst overlapping
practices, and even those actions that are praiseworthy or condemnable because they fit
within a social practice are not as clearly linked to any specific practice. I harm a
student’s interests when I give a student a bad grade on a paper, but I am justified in
doing so within the complex practices of education. Grades should be given on the basis
of merit and the harm caused is irrelevant according to the practice. Beyond grading, if
we praise a teacher as particularly dedicated to students and clear in his explanations,
such praise makes sense within the role that is established for teachers. To properly
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evaluate the various actions one takes as teacher, we need to recognize the particular
practices that a teacher acts within.
In broader society, the ways in which our actions are part of practices proliferate.
We make choices as parents, citizens, and friends. All of these roles carry particular ways
of acting, and proper evaluation of action should be sensitive to these actions. We should
not think that Hume’s point is limited to simple cases where the rules are explicit and
clear; we have much more complex practices that individual actions need to be seen as
part of.
2.1.1 Why we should see actions as part of practices
What examples like Hume’s show is the intuitive way in which we see actions as part of
social practices, but it is less clear why we should do so. Hume offers it as a brute
psychological fact that our approval of the practice transfers to a our approval of the
action, but we can ask whether we really ought to transfer our approval in this way. Why
should we evaluate actions as part of practices? Answering this question is particularly
important for the larger argument of this chapter. Since I want to show that we should
evaluate practices as parts of systems, I will need to show that the same reasons that
explain why we should evaluate actions as part of practices can be extended to show why
we should evaluate practices as part of systems.
Put simply, the reason why we need to see actions as part of practices is because
the moral significance of a practice is not reducible to the significance of the actions that
are part of the practice. When an individual action is part of a practice, that action is

78

significant as contributing to whatever is significant about the practice that is not
reducible to the actions in isolation. If we did not see the action as part of the practice,
our evaluation of that action would not capture the way in which the action contributes to
that practice. We would capture the moral significance of the action in isolation, but we
would not capture the significance of the action related to the irreducible significance of
the practice.
In Hume’s example, there is a particular good involved in being able to rely on
others with whom one has made a contract. This is a good in having a practice of
contract-keeping that is not reducible to individual acts of keeping contracts. In isolation,
acts of contract-keeping are good because they promote the interests of the contracted
with, but bad insofar as they could advance greater interests of others. As a part of the
practice of contract-keeping, particular acts contribute to a system of reliance. Such a
practice allows persons to coordinate and trust one another in ways that might not be
possible in the absence of the practice. We can say that a practice of contracts facilitates
trust and cooperation in ways that would not otherwise be possible. Accordingly, there is
some value in having the practice that is not reducible to the value of persons generally
doing that which they said they would. It is relevant to the evaluation of the man of
merit’s action that it contributes to the well-functioning of the practice and thus
contributes to this irreducible benefit. To properly evaluate the man of merit’s action, we
need to see it as contributing to the practice of contract. If we looked at the action in
isolation, we would lose sight of this morally significant aspect.
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What is true in the case of Hume’s example is true of practices generally. To show
this, §2.1.2 will look more carefully at the benefits (and costs) of practices that are not
reducible to the benefits (and costs) of individual actions. Then §2.1.3 will focus more on
how we need to see individual actions as contributing to these practices. Finally, §2.1.4
will show how this all requires that there is (at least) two levels of moral evaluation. We
need to be able to evaluate actions, and we need to be able to evaluate the practices that
actions are a part of.
2.1.2 The irreducibility of practices
While practices manifest themselves through patterns of individual action, the effects of
practices are not fully reducible to the actions that are part of the practice. This is not
because there is some ontologically important entity over and above individuals, but
because the recognition of a practice changes how persons understand their social world.
In recognizing social rules, persons think about their own action in different ways and
expect different actions from others. The existence of a practice changes the social
context within which our choices are made. Our concern with social practices is not
merely a concern with a convergence of individual actions, we are concerned with the
ways that practices structure our actions.
In his article, “Two Concepts of Rules,” John Rawls is focused on the difference
between justifying a practice and justifying an action that is part of a practice.52 To show
the importance of this distinction, he uses the practices of punishment and promise-
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keeping as examples. From the utilitarian perspective, we cannot make sense of why
keeping promises per se is justified. After all, we always ought to do that action that best
promotes happiness and this will not always involve keeping a promise. Likewise, if
harming another could count as happiness-promoting deterrence, the utilitarian
perspective requires that we harm regardless of whether the harmed is innocent of a crime
or guilty. Yet, we can justify both punishment and promise-keeping as actions required by
the rules of a practice, and we can see that practice as justified by the utilitarian principle.
Accordingly, when the utilitarian principle is used directly to justify acts of promisekeeping or punishment, it seems inadequate. Yet, when the principle is used to justify
practices, and actions are justified as part of the practice, then utilitarianism seems like a
more appealing moral position.
Now this distinction would not be helpful if practices did not have effects that
were not reducible to individuals’ actions. The reason why both punishment and promisekeeping can serve as Rawls’s examples is because they both have effects that could not be
captured merely by individuals action. Punishment works as a deterrence only because it
sets up a certain context in which persons who contemplate crimes can expect to be
harmed. Moreover, it works as a good system of deterrence because there are certain
expectations about who does the punishment and under what situations, so that harm
cannot be perpetrated on a mere pretense of punishment. Likewise, the practice of
promise-keeping establishes a way of assuring others of your action due to the mutually
recognized wrong of breaking promises. In both cases, it is not merely individual actions
that are important, but the establishment of mutually recognized rules. These rules
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structure behavior in new ways, and the effects of this structuring go beyond the effects
of individual actions. These practices establish a social context for our actions.
Generalizing beyond these examples, we can recognize three ways that social
practices structure behavior and thereby have unique effects. First, a practice structures
behavior when it constitutes a new activity. As with punishment and promises, practices
can have important effects by making a new activity possible. For instance, persons can
only play chess when there are generally recognized rules that constitute the game of
chess. Likewise, persons can only have property when there is a generally recognized
practice of property claims. Persons can only pass, enforce or obey laws when a system
of law is in place. In any of these examples, by establishing the new activity, the practice
changes our social context. We now have an option to play chess that we would not
otherwise have. We are bound by claims of property that we would not otherwise be
bound by. We can make laws and be compelled to obey them. The effects of these
practices go beyond the effects that persons have in playing chess, making property
claims or making law. We need to also consider the effects that having the option to play
chess, make property claims or make law have. Oftentimes, the existence of these
practices will have an effect even when persons choose not to follow their rules.
A second way in which practices structure behavior is by facilitating cooperation.
For instance, the practice of waiting in line provides a way of cooperating for those who
wait for service. Through a mutually recognized system of rules, persons coordinate who
gets service next--whether at the DMV, at a coffee shop, or at Disneyland. While we can
identify line-waiting as its own activity in one sense, people only engage in this activity
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as a way of waiting for service.53 It coordinates our behavior rather than creating a new
activity. Such coordination structures our behavior by establishing specific ways of
working with others. As we make decisions, we hold these ways of coordinating with
others as fixed. For instance, I might not go to the coffee shop if I am running late
because I know there will be a long line. Moreover, such ways of coordinating can have
broader effects than merely coordinating. Right now, line-waiting is a particularly
egalitarian activity. However, in airports, a growing norm has been that those with a
willingness to pay a higher price can bypass the line--either at security or at the terminal-because they have bought a special pass to do so. If this were to become pervasive across
situations of line-waiting, then line-waiting would have a different social significance.54 It
would be an indication of social class. In this way, practices structure behavior by
coordinating our behavior and by coordinating it in a certain way. The particular way of
coordinating might have expansive effects beyond just coordination.
The third way that practices structure behavior is merely by creating expectations
of behavior. Even when individuals do not try to coordinate with others, the fact that
persons act in ways specified by a practice will have effects on how they understand the
social world. For instance, it might have an epistemic impact as persons take the fact that
others act a certain way as evidence that it is a good way to act. For example, in a society
where women primarily work in the home, members of that society might be more likely
53
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to think that there is something inherently right in women working at home. In planning
their lives, they will tend to think that this is the better way to live--even when they are
not concerned with coordinating with others. Even beyond this, we cannot ignore the
myriad ways in which expectations of the social world influence our linguistic practices,
and with that the ways we understand the world. To be any more specific on this would
require a theory of learning and development that I cannot offer, but few can doubt the
ways in which our social practices impact our habits, heuristic rules, modes of
understanding and aims.
Regardless of which of these three ways practices structure behavior, each has a
moral significance that is not reducible to the significance of those actions that compose
it. The fact that persons see that practice as part of the social world has a deeper
significance. These practices organize our behavior with one another and provide us with
a social context within which to act. For this reason, we need to be concerned with these
practices as having these effects. We need to be concerned with the irreducible
significance of practices.

2.1.3 Evaluating contribution
While the benefits and costs for any of these practices is not fully reducible to the effects
of those actions that are part of the practice in isolation, it is nonetheless true that there
would be no practice if persons did not follow the rules of the practice. Accordingly,
those actions that correspond to the rules of the practice contribute to the functioning of
that practice, and those actions thus contribute to the benefits and costs of the practice.
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When we evaluate those actions that are part of a practice, we need to evaluate them as
parts of a practice in order to capture this morally significant aspect of the action. The
fact that the action contributes to the benefits or costs of the practice is relevant for
evaluating that act.
To see the point here, imagine a case in which a city will suffer from a drought
unless persons generally cut down on their water usage. Suppose that the city is large
enough such that no one person’s usage will either cause or avert the drought, but a
general change by all would solve the problem. If we look at an individual situation in
isolation, there is little reason for any individual to cut back. After all, their own choice
will not either cause or solve the problem. Yet, we can praise an individual who
contributes to the solution by cutting back--even if the drought is not ultimately avoided.
In this case, it is the effects of general behavior rather than any particular action that
matters. We can then evaluate the action as contributing to this general behavior.
Similarly, when we are concerned about the effects of a practice that are not reducible to
effects of isolated actions, we should still evaluate actions as contributing to the practice.
Intuitively, we often jump from approving the general behavior to approving the
individual action. We jump from thinking that a general reduction in water usage makes
the particular choice of an individual to reduce their water usage good. Yet, this is a jump.
It does not directly follow and different moral theories will justify it on different grounds.
For instance, some appeal to the “Principle of Fair Play,” which requires that persons
contribute to a practice that they accept the benefits of. Alternatively, utilitarians might
appeal to an indirect utilitarian principle such that persons ought to act in the way that,
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when persons generally act that way, would best promote utility. 55 My present concern is
not to argue for any particular way of justifying individual contribution to practices, but
merely to point out that there must be some ground that aligns with our intuitive approval
of such actions.
In speaking of our evaluation of individual actions as “contributing” to a practice,
it may seem as though such actions would not be strictly obligatory. The phrase makes it
seem as though the practice accomplishes an end, and our action is praiseworthy insofar
as it contributes to that end. However, sometimes a practice strictly requires compliance
and then our evaluation of the action does not seem to depend on any contribution. For
instance, a practice of contract-keeping does not explain praise of those actions that
contribute to the reliability of contracts; it requires that persons keep their contracts. A
practice of property does not explain praise of actions that secure property claims; it
requires that persons respect property. How can we explain such requirements while
being concerned only with the ways the actions contribute to the practice?
Oftentimes, the efficacy of a practice requires that persons can fully rely on
individuals acting a certain way. For instance, a practice of promising only works because
persons are always required to keep their promises. It would not work the same way if
the practice only requires that persons do enough to maintain trust in promises. A practice
of property only works when persons have trust that others will respect their property
claims. When such practices exist, then one contributes to the practice by strictly
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following its rules. The praiseworthy action is not to contribute however one sees fit--it is
to follow the required rules. In these situations the rules of a practice will be obligatory.
What goes for good practices, equally goes for bad practices. If we praise actions
that contribute to good practices, then we condemn actions that contribute to bad
practices. For example, in areas of Africa and the Middle East, there is a practice of
female genital cutting. According to this practice, young girls undergo procedures of
varying severity from limited circumcision to complete infibulation. Given the harm
caused to these girls, we can condemn such a practice and with it condemn the actions
that contribute to it. Just as we evaluate actions that contribute to a justified practice as
good, we can evaluate actions that contribute to a unjustified practice as bad.
Accordingly, our evaluation of individual actions will often depend upon our evaluation
of the practice of which it is a part. To fully evaluate individual actions, we need to
evaluate the practices of which they are part.
2.1.4 Two levels of evaluation
So, individual actions will have moral significance as isolated acts, and they will have
significance as part of social practices. In order to fully evaluate an action we need to
appreciate both perspectives towards the action. In order to evaluate the action as part of
the practice, however, we need to evaluate the practice itself. If the practice is justified,
then individuals have reason to contribute to the practice. If the practice is unjustified,
then individuals have reason against contributing to the practice. A full evaluation of
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action needs to take this into account, so a full evaluation of action requires a judgment of
the practice of which the action is part.
What all this shows is that we cannot suppose that moral evaluation happens only
at the level of individual actions. At times, what an individual ought to do depends upon
whether a practice is justified, and this shows that moral evaluation cannot be directed
only at individuals actions. We need to be concerned with the evaluation of practices. In
developing moral principles, we should have moral principles for individual action and
we should have principles for practices.
So, this argument shows why we should be concerned with social practices, but it
does not do so on the basis of any substantive moral theory. Instead, the argument relies
merely on the role of social practices and the way in which actions contribute to them.
This argument applies whether one ultimately thinks that social practices should be
evaluated by self-interest, utility, rational agreement, reasonable agreement, pluralist
values or god’s will. Since practices have effects that are not reducible to effects of
isolated actions, we need to be able to evaluate those practices in order to evaluate the
actions that contribute to them.
In section §2.2, I will extend this argument to systems of practices and the basic
structure. I will argue that we have reason to view moral theory as having three levels. I
argue that we should be concerned with actions, practices and systems of practices. Since
the basics structure of society is a system of practices, we should be concerned with the
basic structure of society. In this way, I will have argued for the moral indispensability of
the basic structure without relying on any particular moral theory.
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2.1.5 Applbaum’s objection
In his 1999 book, Ethics for Adversaries, Arthur Applbaum examines the morality of
actions that are part of adversarial practices such as the law, business, and political
campaigning.56 His primary concern is with behavior that would not be permissible were
it not part of a social practice that licenses it. He asks how deceptive, coercive and violent
actions can be justified merely because they are part of a practice. As a particularly stark
example, he offers the case of an executioner. Such a person kills, but we think he kills in
virtue of a certain institutional capacity. If the executioner did not have a particular role in
a legal system, we would not think such killings could be justified. Applbaum’s challenge
is whether such killing is even justified within the institution. He asks how being part of
such an institution could really justify this violent behavior. In what way does being part
of a practice really change our evaluation of the action?
Applbaum’s real object of concern is not executioners, but the more mundane
institutions of law and market competition. In these cases, we pit persons against one
another and believe that a system in which they compete is beneficial in the long run. Yet,
when lawyers manipulate or hide facts in the courtroom, they do not cease to lie merely
because they are lawyers. When persons focus solely on profit in market exchanges, they
are not less guilty of greed. While persons might cite their role as a justification for their
conduct, it is not obvious how their role could justify such prima facie immoral conduct.
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Much of Applbaum’s argument presses against the view that I have argued for in
this chapter. While I argue that we should see actions as part of practices, he convincingly
argues that we should see actions in isolation. We ought to see lawyers as lying,
businessmen as greedy, and executioners as killing. Being part of a practice does not
justify a fundamentally different evaluation of the action. In fact, we might wrongly judge
an action by viewing it as part of a practice rather than by viewing it as an isolated act.
Applbaum’s arguments are significant because they push against the fundamental move
of this chapter. They show why actions that are part of a practice should not always be
evaluated as part of a practice.
Yet, Applbaum’s views and my own do not conflict in any way. Both can
recognize that we should evaluate actions as part of practices and that we should evaluate
actions in isolation. Both perspectives are relevant to the ultimate evaluation of that
action. My claim is not that being part of a practice fully determines whether an act is
right or wrong. My claim is only that a proper evaluation of that action requires that we
evaluate it as part of a practice. In fact, there could be four ways in which our evaluation
of the act in isolation and our evaluation of the act as part of a practice interact in an
ultimate evaluation of that action.
First, it might be the case that persons should generally follow the rules of a
practice, but that situations arise when the rules should not be followed. Here, the
particularities of the action in isolation require that we do not follow the rules that would
typically justify the action. Perhaps it is wrong for an executioner to kill political
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criminals even if an executioner can generally kill criminals.57 There might be cases
when a lawyer should not lie, even if the adversarial legal system is generally good.
There might be cases when one should not keep their contract, even if contracts should
generally be kept. In such situations the fact that persons should generally follow the
rules of a practice does not mean that they should always do so.
Second, it might be that a practice is unjustified because it requires that persons
act in ways that are immoral in isolation. It might very well be an objection against
capital punishment that it causes persons to kill outside of self-defense. It might be an
objection against adversarial legal conventions that they require lawyers to lie. In such
cases, the fact that practices encourage (if not require) such immoral acts would be a
reason against the practice being practiced. When this occurs the reasons for the practices
would be compared to the reasons against, and we could determine whether or not the
practice is, ultimately, justified.
Third, Applbaum does not deny that a practice can make an otherwise immoral
action moral, only that we cannot assume it does so.58 It is also consistent with both of
our positions that a practice might be important enough to justify persons acting in
immoral ways as part of it. Perhaps the advantages of the adversarial legal system are
great enough to justify the lies that it encourages. Perhaps a market system in which
advertisers deceive could be sufficiently justified in a way that excuses individual actions
of deception.
57
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Fourth, these two perspectives towards our action might very well be
irreconcilable. If the practice is justified, but the act it requires is immoral, then a person
who acts according to the practice might act both rightly and wrongly. We do not need to
suppose this conflict can be resolved. This, after all, is how Michael Walzer treats the
problem of dirty hands. 59 The political leader is put in a place whereby they ought to do
that which benefits their public. When this requires that they act in immoral ways, their
political role pulls them towards one action and the immorality of the isolated action
takes them in another. For Walzer, the politician who acts in accordance with their role
does right, but they do right by doing wrong. We should not suppose that the wrong is
wiped away by the right. The politician should appreciate both aspects of his act. This
might be a fact of moral life far beyond politics. Our institutional obligations and social
roles might require that we do wrong to do right--and we should not think that the wrong
we do is wiped away.
Applbaum’s argument importantly shows that the view of our actions as part of
practices is not the only morally relevant view of our actions. Even when they are part of
practices, our actions are still isolated actions. For a full evaluation of them, we need to
recognize both aspects. We need to see our actions in their particularity, and we need to
see them as contributing to practices. How these two perspectives towards the action are
resolved needs to be determined by a particular moral theory, so I cannot offer a general
solution here. What matters is that his emphasis on evaluating actions in isolation does
not itself conflict with my emphasis on evaluating actions as part of practices.
59
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2.2 Practices as Parts of Systems
The reason why we need to evaluate certain practices as part of systems is the same as the
reason why we need to evaluate actions as part of practices. Systems of practices can
have certain effects that practices alone do not have. When practices contribute to such a
system, this contribution is an important aspect of that practice. A contribution to a
beneficial system is laudable, and a contribution to a harmful practice is condemnable.
For instance, the coercive enforcement of good laws can be a great good whereas the
coercive enforcement of bad laws can be a great bad. While being part of a system is not
the only salient feature of such practices, it will be relevant for determining whether that
action is rightful. For this reason, it will often be the case that to properly evaluate an
individual’s action, we need to evaluate the practice of which that action is a part.
To extend this argument from the last section, §2.2.1 will argue that systems of
practices have the same kinds of unique effects as practices do. Oftentimes, systems of
practices can be justified by the effects they have beyond the effects of the practices they
are made of. Following this, §2.2.2 argues that we need to evaluate practices by their
contribution to such systems. The fact that a practice contributes to a justified system
counts in favor of that practice and it would count against it if it contributed to an
unjustified system. Finally, in §2.2.4, I better explain how we can understand the basic
structure, specifically, as a system that the major social institutions need to be justified as
part of.
2.2.1 The effects of systems
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Just as practices have unique effects in creating a social context for individual actions, so
do systems of practices create a context for practices. Accordingly, the effects of a system
of practices are not reducible to the effects of practices in isolation. Once we see the
unique effects that systems of practices have, we can see why we need to see individual
practices as contributing to systems.
As an example, we can focus on the educational system in the United States. In
this system, there is no one over-arching institution that has authority or influence over
the other institutions. Pre-schools operate under a different framework than primary
schools, public schools operate under a different framework than public schools, and
colleges operate under a different framework than high schools. Moreover, there are
plenty of secondary institutions that are well integrated within these. For instance, the
companies that administer Advanced Placement tests, the companies that organize the
SAT, ACT, GRE, and MCAT tests, and the various financing organizations that offer
student loans are all integrated within the educational system. While these various
institutions are not unified as part of any formal system, they do work together as part of
“the educational system” in the United States. Each institution is organized in ways the
presume the idiosyncrasies of other institutions, and members of society have certain
expectations on the system as a whole.
Because our educational institutions are part of the educational system, they are
all part of a particular social context. If we wanted to evaluate any one kind of institution,
we would need to do so within the context set by the system as a whole. If we were
evaluating high school education, we would need to think of it as situated within the
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system of primary schools, colleges and placement tests. We could not properly evaluate
high school as an institution if we viewed it in isolation; we would need to see it as part
of the educational system.
In this way, the evaluation of educational institutions is quite similar to individual
actions. If we are to evaluate the choice of the man of merit, we would need to see his
action as within the context of a practice of contracts. To see the action in isolation would
be to treat it wrongly. In fact, the same three ways in which practices structure individual
action also apply for how systems structure individual practices. First, systems of
practices could constitute new kinds of systems. When this occurs, then the practices will
only make sense within the system that it partly constitutes. For example, we might
understand “the state” as constituted by various institutions--perhaps a political
constitution, legal system, and police force. These institutions will only make sense as
part of the state, as a whole, in the way that moves of chess only make sense as part of the
game of chess. Second, systems of practices will often coordinate the actions of other
practices. For example, the educational system coordinates the activities of the various
educational institutions. In this case, the way the system is organized has influence on
how its parts are organized. Third, systems of practices will also have a structuring role
by setting expectations and a context for understanding. For example, persons might see
themselves and their own maturity in the context of the educational system. As the
normal course of education extends past high school into college, persons come to see
themselves as adults after college and not after high school.
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Just as practices structure behavior in these three ways, so do systems of
practices structure practices in these three ways. Accordingly, we need to evaluate
systems of practices as having this unique structuring effect; just as practices provide a
social context for actions, systems provide a social context for practices.
2.2.2 The contribution of practices
So, systems of practices have irreducible effects by establishing a social context for
practices, but it is still practices that together form a system. Accordingly, the role that a
practice plays in the system is important for evaluating that practice. Just as we need to
evaluate individual actions as contributing to practices, we need to evaluate individual
practices as contributing to systems. A practice will have morally significant aspects as an
isolated practice, but it will also have morally significant aspects as part of a system.
Thus, a full evaluation of practices requires that we see them as part of these systems.
Just as evaluating an action as part of a practice requires that we evaluate the
practice as a whole, so does evaluating a practice as part of a system require that we
evaluate the system as a whole. A practice could be part of a justified system, and
fulfilling a role within that system would count in favor of that practice. A practice could
contribute to an unjustified system, and fulfilling a role in that system would count
against the practice. A full evaluation of practices requires that we see them as part of
systems.
Continuing our example, while the educational system in the United States is far
from ideal, we can imagine an educational system that--as a whole--works well and
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fairly. Now, whether this system works well will depend on the individual institutions
that comprise it and how they work together. So, suppose that we focused on any one
institution--such as pre-school. Now, there are certainly parts of a pre-school that we can
evaluate as an isolated institution. For instance, pre-schools should be healthy
environments where children feel safe. However, we could not focus only on making preschool the best it could be without considering what role it plays in the larger system. If
we evaluate pre-school in isolation, we would not be adequately evaluating pre-school.
Part of our evaluation of the institution also depends upon what we think of the system as
a whole. The fact that a pre-school fulfills a necessary role in a justified system counts in
favor of that institution. Yet, if a pre-school fulfills its role within an unjustified system,
that does not count in its favor. In this way, the individual institutions that comprise the
education system need to be viewed as part of that system, and this will often require that
we be able to judge that system as a whole.
So, what all this shows is that we should be concerned with the moral evaluation
of systems of practices. Just as our concern for adequate evaluation of individual action
will require that we evaluate the practices that actions are part of, so does our concern
with practices require that we evaluate the systems of which practices are a part. Again, it
is not due to any substantive moral theory that we should be concerned with the system as
a whole, but because of the structure of practices and of systems. Regardless of what
moral theory one holds, we should be concerned with evaluating systems of practices.
Accordingly, moral evaluation cannot be confined to one level or two, but must
occur at (at least) three levels. We need to be concerned with individual actions, with the
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practices that actions are part of, and with the systems that practices are part of.
Oftentimes the evaluation of individual action requires that we view that action as part of
a practice and that requires that we evaluate that practice. To evaluate that practice, we
may need to see it as part of a system of practices, and that requires that we evaluate that
system as a whole. Accordingly, a full moral theory needs to have principles that apply at
these three different levels.
The final step of the argument will be to show that the basic structure of society is
one such system of practices that we should be concerned with. Yet, before I do that, I
want to clear up one difficulty.
2.2.3 What makes a system a system?
The argument thus far relies on the claim that those practices that are part of systems
should be evaluated as part of those systems. But, what exactly counts as a “system” of
practices? Whether or not we should evaluate any particular practice as part of a system
depends on how we answer this question. That will determine when a practice should be
evaluated only in isolation and when it should not be.
In accordance with the core analogy of this argument, I want to answer the
question of what counts as a system by asking what counts as a practice. When do we
know when actions are parts of practices? The same answer could potentially be applied
to determine when practices are a part of systems. There are, however, two problems with
this approach. First, we have an intuitive notion of practices that is not easy to articulate.
As Wittgenstein claimed of games, it is quite difficult to offer a clear standard by which
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to identify a practice.60 Second, we might be able to refer to the participants’ attitudes
towards a practice to identify it as a practice, but we cannot refer to the attitudes towards
systems to identify a system. It is not nearly as common for persons to think of systems
as it is to think of practices. Accordingly, it is not obvious how the analogy between
practices and systems can be carried through.
What we can say of both practices and systems is that they organize their parts as
a single activity. Oftentimes that activity is constituted by the rules of the practice, but
other times it merely provides a way of pursuing a prior activity. This is the key aspect of
practices that can be extended to identify systems. A practice organizes individual actions
around a single activity, and a system of practices organizes practices around a single
activity. In our repeated example, the educational system organizes the various
institutions around the activity of educating members of society. Each institution has a
role in education.
So, what makes a heap of practices into a system is that the practices jointly
contributes to some activity or goal. This raises the question: what activity do the major
social institutions jointly contribute to such that they form a system?
In the last chapter, I explained the basic structure as consisting of those
institutions that establish our obligations, rights, and powers as members of society.
While this gives some unity to the major social institutions, it is not clear whether it
really counts as a single activity. Isn’t it actually a mere heap of distinct activities;
establishing property rights, voting powers, and the like?
60
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My response to this worry is to emphasize the ways in which the requirements
and claims we have as members of society define our role as members of society. The
obligations, rights, and powers that the major social institutions establish jointly specify
our role as member of society. The unity of the basic structure as single system can be
explained as joint contribution to the single activity of specifying our role.
To talk in terms of a “role” might seem odd in this context. Often, we might
associate a role with specifying a particular goals that one has in virtue of occupying
some office. For example, one’s role as parent is to raise and healthy and autonomous
individual. In being a member of society, the is no single goal that one has. It therefore
seems odd to suppose that the major social institutions thereby specify our “role.” Being
a member of society hardly seems to give content to a role in the same way that various
offices do.
However, this objection comes from a skewed way of viewing a role. Oftentimes
our roles in an institution will be tied to the goal of that institution. Our role as parent is
tied together with the broader role that the family institution has. Yet, a liberal society
does not have a single goal. Instead, it is organized in ways that facilitate the
accomplishment of it’s members goals. The rules that we follow are those that mutually
advantage members of society generally. Their justification is this mutual advantage and
not a contribution to some goal. Accordingly, our role as member of society is not
understood as goal-oriented. Instead, our role is specified by the obligations, rights, and
powers we have as members of society. Our role comes in the forms of claims and
obligations rather than as ends. In a liberal basic structure, our goals will be our own and
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our role as member of society will be specified by the rules of the major social
institutions.
2.2.4 Why evaluate the basic structure
At this stage, all the parts of the argument have been assembled to show why we have
reason to be concerned with the basic structure of society. A full moral appraisal of
certain actions requires that we see them not only in isolation, but as part of a social
practice. If a practice is justified, then persons have moral reason to follow the rules of
the practice. If a practice is a morally bad practice, then persons have a moral reason to
not follow the rules of the practice. Accordingly our evaluation of the practice itself is
relevant to our evaluation of individual action. We need to be able to evaluate actions and
practices. However, to evaluate certain practices, we likewise cannot view them as
isolated. Certain practices should be evaluated as parts of systems of practices. When the
system is good, then the practice can be justified as contributing to the practice. When the
practice is bad, then the fact that the practice contributes to it might make the practice
unjustified. Accordingly, we need to be able to evaluate not only actions and practices;
we must also be able to evaluate systems of practices. Our moral evaluation must reach to
three levels.
As argued in the last chapter, the basic structure of society is a system of social
practices. Specifically, it is the system of social practices that specify our role as member
of society. Accordingly, it makes sense that we view the basic structure as a system. The
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various institutions that form the basic structure together specify the requirements and
demands that I have as member of society.
More intuitively, we can see this point by noticing that we live in a society, and
that society establishes a range of claims, obligations, and expectations. These various
claims, obligations, and expectations are established by the major social institutions, like
an economic system, property scheme, legal system and political constitution. We do not
have a choice to participate in any one of these institutions and not any of the others.
Instead, they come as a mutually supporting group. These institutions together establish
the requirements on and claims of persons as members of society. Since we cannot
choose to be a participant in one or the other, we should evaluate each of them as
contributing to the whole. The most important moral concern then is whether these
institutions as a whole are justified. Whether the society we find ourselves in is justified.
To try and evaluate one of these institutions in isolation from the others, like the legal
system or property system, would ignore the way in which they are part of the society
that establishes our claims, obligations and expectations as a whole. It would be like
evaluating preschool without understanding how preschool fits into the educations
system; it would be like evaluating returning money to the bigoted miser without seeing it
as part of contract-keeping.
Once we conceive of the basic structure as a system of practices, we can see why
we need to focus on the basic structure as an object of ethical concern. To fully evaluate
any basic structure institution, we need to see it as part of the basic structure. Whether the
institution is itself justified then depends upon its role within the basic structure and
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whether the basic structure--as a whole--is justified. Accordingly, we need to have some
way of evaluating the basic structure as subject.
The argument can be seen if we focus on particular actions. So, imagine we are
concerned with whether an individual ought to follow the law. If we conceive of a legal
system as a social practice that consists partly of the rule “citizens ought to follow what is
identified as the law,” then persons ought to follow the law if they ought to follow the
rules of the legal system. Whether they ought to follow the rules of this social practice
depends upon whether the social practice is justified, so we need to determine whether
the legal system is a good one. To do this, we need to see the legal system as part of a
system of practices. Since the legal system is one institution that establishes security for
persons as members of society, we should evaluate the legal system as part of the basic
structure of society. Whether the legal system is good partly depends upon whether the
basic structure of which it is part is good, and to determine this we must be able to
evaluate the basic structure of society. So, in order to properly evaluate certain actions-like following the law--we need to be able to evaluate the basic structure of society.
Regardless of what moral theory someone holds, we need to be morally concerned with
the basic structure of society.
In this way, the argument for being concerned with the basic structure as subject
extends the original argument offered by John Rawls in “Two Concepts of Rules.” As
explained above, Rawls was there concerned with the distinction between justifying an
action and justifying a practice. Some actions are parts of a practice, and the justification
of those actions requires that we see them as part of a justified practice. Likewise, I
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maintain a distinction between justifying a practice and justifying a system of practices.
Some practices are parts of systems, and the justification of these systems requires that
we see them as part of a justified system. A concern with the basic structure recognizes
the logical distinction between actions and practices and extends it to another level. The
concern with the basic structure is justified by this distinction between justifying
practices and justifying systems of practices.

2.3 Addressing Objections
At this stage, the core argument for focusing on the basic structure is established, but a
number of objections might still be raised. In this section, I seek to anticipate two major
objections and offer responses. Doing this should do more than seal potential gaps with
the view, it should also help to better explain the core argument.
The first objection I address is one that questions the restricted focus of the basic
structure. Why not instead focus on the entirety of our social life and see our basic
institutions as part of that social system. While we should judge our social institutions as
part of a larger social context, why restrict ourselves to seeing the institutions as only part
of the basic structure? The second objection argues for extending the argument beyond its
intended purview. Why wouldn’t we see the basic structure as itself part of an even larger
system, the global structure?
3.3.1 First objection: focusing on society as a whole
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Why do we need to see the basic structure institutions as part of the basic structure
specifically? One might recognize that we should evaluate the major social institutions as
part of a larger system, but does that larger system need to be the basic structure? Why
not see them as part of society as a whole? Why not evaluate them as part of the full
social structure, and determine how the entire social structure ought to be? In all
likelihood, this would seemingly require that we evaluate both the basic structure and
informal structure as working together as part of the same social system.
In “Remarks on Bentham’s philosophy,” J.S. Mill argues against Bentham that he
is too focused on individual actions and not the larger social context in which decisions
are made. His own objection to Bentham might support this first objection to my view.
Mill writes,
“A theory, therefore, which considers little in an action beside that
actions’s own consequences...will be most apt to fail in the consideration
of greater social questions--the theory of organic institutions and general
forms of polity; for those (unlike the details of legislation) to be duly
estimated, must be viewed as the great instrument of forming the national
character; of carrying forward the members of the community towards
perfection, or preserving them from degeneracy.”61
In this quotation, Mill recognizes the major driving intuition behind the argument of this
chapter. We cannot merely evaluate individual actions in isolation, but must see them as
part of the larger social context. For Mill, this meant using the principle of utility to apply
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to the entirety of the social context.62 He was concerned with using the principle to
evaluate “national character” and sees our actions are part of these larger social questions.
Mill does not make any such restriction in saying that we should see actions as only part
of practices and practices as only parts of systems. Rather, he seems to suggest that they
are all part of the whole of a national character.
Extending this idea, we only need to ask why we do not start from the largest
possible unit of evaluation. Why not be concerned with evaluating society as a whole,
and see the various aspects of society as part of it. This would mean that we evaluate the
basic structure institutions, the informal structure, and even particular acts as all part of
the national character. The perspective agrees with my claims that we need to take a
larger perspective towards our actions than seeing them in isolation, but why wouldn’t
this larger perspective see all aspects of social life as part of society as a whole and start
from an evaluation of society?
Most simply, we do not evaluate practices as part of the society as a whole
because society is not a system. There is no single activity that all parts of society are
contributing to. We evaluate the major social institutions as part of the basic structure
because they all contribute to the specification of our role as member of society. While I
urge us to take a broader perspective in evaluating actions and practices, this does not
62
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require that I take a maximally broad perspective. It is because actions contribute to
practices that we need to evaluate them as part of the practice and it is because practices
contribute to systems that we evaluate them as part of the system. Since society is not
understood as any single activity, we do not need to evaluate particulars as part of society.
In response, a teleological moral theory might object that we can see all of society
as contributing to a single activity; the furtherance of the moral end. The utilitarian, for
example, will see all of society as contributing to the activity of promoting the greatest
happiness. Accordingly, we could evaluate any practice as part of a single system; the
system that promotes happiness. Yet, even those who accept such a view need not reject
my conclusion. That we should be concerned with all of society does not mean that we
should not be concerned with the basic structure. If anything, it would only mean that we
should see the basic structure as part of the social structure. If we have a comprehensive
social view, then surely our evaluation of the basic structure should be consistent with
that larger view, but it does not show that you should not focus on the basic structure as a
particular system. Hence the argument does not seem like an objection against a concern
with the basic structure. It merely shows that this concern is insufficient for moral theory,
and I’ve never held that it would be.
As a final point, I want to make a more general point about ethical theory. From
the perspective of any moral goal, anything might be evaluated as instrumental towards
that goal. It is unsurprising that someone who has an ethical goal would then see little
reason to distinguish a concern for the basic structure from a concern with any other part
of the social structure; all of the social structure is viewed as instrument to that goal. If
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equality is a moral aim, then the basic structure, like any other part of the social structure,
can contribute to equality. If autonomy is a goal, then both the basic structure and the
informal structure are important for promoting autonomy. Yet, this does not really change
the underlying point of my argument. I mean to emphasize the distinct role that the basic
structure has in establishing our obligations, rights, and powers as members of society.
Even if we ultimately assess the basic structure by some single moral end, the way in
which it implicates that moral end will be unique. The basic structure forms a background
against which each person lives their lives; obligations, rights, duties and opportunities
are all explained by the idiosyncrasies of the basic structure. In so doing, the basic
structure will have unique effects on whatever moral ends we take to be important. Even
if we are concerned with how all of society affects autonomy, equality or happiness, we
have reason to distinguish our concern with the basic structure because of the unique
ways in which the obligations, rights, and powers we recognize will effect autonomy,
equality and happiness.
3.3.2 Second objection: focusing on the global structure
A second objection extends my argument and argues that just as we should evaluate the
major institutions as part of the basic structure of society, so should we evaluate the basic
structure as part of the global structure. We could not then properly evaluate the basic
structure without evaluating the global structure.
My first response is to point out that this is not, strictly speaking, an objection to
my argument. Even if we should see the basic structure as part of the global structure,
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that still does not count against evaluating the basic structure as a moral concern. It
merely suggests that we need to take a broader view to properly do so.
Nonetheless, we also should not see the basic structure of society as part of the
global structure. Actions are part of social practices because practices only exist when
persons act in accordance with the rules, and institutions are part of the basic structure
because the basic structure only exists when the practices that compose it exist. Yet, it is
not the case that the global structure is made up of basic structures. Rather, the global
structure consists of international practices, and those practices consist in actions by
international agents--such as states, corporations and various NGOs. In this way, the
global structure is similar to the basic structures rather than constituted by basic
structures. The difference between the two is that the basic structure is a structure of
practices between persons whereas the global structure is a structure of practices between
international agents. Whereas the objection supposes a relationship like that in figure A
below, the real situation is like that of figure B
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So, while the objection supposes that my argument should be extended to see the basic
structure as part of the global structure, the conclusion we should draw is quite different.
Just as we need to evaluate the basic structure to properly evaluate individual actions, so
we should evaluate the global structure to properly evaluate international actions.
Of course, this argument relies on a certain empirical fact about the global
structure, that international practices and the global structure are constituted by actions of
international agents rather than by individual agents. This point might seem contentious,
but my argument still stands even if I am wrong. Suppose it is the case that international
practices are constituted by the actions of individual agents. This still would not imply
that the basic structure should be evaluated as part of the global structure. Instead, it
would imply either (a) that the global structure is a system of practices alongside the
basic structure as system or (b) that the global structure counts as a basic structure. If (a),
the global structure might establish claims that individuals make on one another as
members of the globe--rather than as members of society. In the case of (b), the global
structure would establish obligations, rights, and powers for persons as members of
society, in which case there would be a global basic structure. In either case, it would not
mean that we should see the basic structure as part of the global structure.
2.4 The Moral Indispensability of the Basic Structure
So, the core argument for being concerned with the basic structure does not arise from
any particular moral value. I do not claim that happiness is important and the basic
structure has a unique role in promoting happiness. I do not claim that autonomy is
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important and claim that the basic structure has a unique role in protecting autonomy.
Instead, the argument arises from the way in which our social structure is organized and
how moral theory needs to treat that social structure. We live amidst social practices and
those social practices are part of systems of practices. In order for our moral evaluations
to be complete, we need to see actions as part of practices and practices as parts of
systems. As the basic structure institutions are practices that are part of an important
system, we need to see these institutions as part of the basic structure. Accordingly,
complete moral evaluation requires that we have a concern with the basic structure,
regardless of what is substantively valuable. It is for this reason that the basic structure is
a morally indispensable ethical subject.
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Chapter 3
Within and Without an Institutional Context
“In accord with the interests and occupations of the group, certain things become objects
of high esteem; others of aversion. Association does not create impulses of affection and
dislike, but it furnishes the objects to which they attach themselves. The way our group or
class does things tends to determine the proper objects of attention, and thus to prescribe
the directions and limits of observation and memory...Just as the sense requires sensible
objects to stimulate them, so our powers of observation, recollection, and imagination do
not work simultaneously, but are set in motion by the demands set up by current social
occupations”
- Dewey, Democracy and Education

Having shown that we should evaluate the basic structure as a moral subject, I now turn
to how we should do this. One intuitive approach holds that we should identify first
principles that can be applied across all moral problems, and then apply these principles
to the basic structure. Yet, this approach hardly warrants giving any more attention to the
basic structure as a moral problem than we would give to any other problem. In each
case, we would merely apply first principles to the issue.
To overcome this challenge, there must be something morally distinct about the
basic structure. What is morally different about the basic structure such that we would
evaluate it with distinct principles? Why not merely identify the correct ideals for
individual actions and recognize those as the same ideals for the basic structure? To claim
that the we should focus on the basic structure seems to require that there is something
that makes the basic structure worthy of distinctive principles.
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If one argues for a conception of justice that is uniquely related to the basic
structure, then one can easily explain what is distinct about the basic structure. Justice
strikes us as a distinct normative ideal. If justice uniquely bears on the basic structure,
then the basic structure is distinct by its relation to justice. However, I do not argue for a
focus on the basic structure from any particular conception of justice. Instead, I mean to
show why the arguments for a focus on the basic structure transcend any particular
conception of justice.
There is already an expansive literature on the ways in which the basic structure is
morally distinct, though it is not typically understood in these terms. Beginning with his
1992 Tanner Lectures, G.A. Cohen has argued that being committed to the principles of
justice should requires certain norms of conduct. 63 In these arguments, Cohen challenges
the Rawlsian approach of identifying principles that apply only to the basic structure. In
1997, Cohen explicitly argued that any distinction between principles that apply to the
basic structure and those that apply to individual actions is morally arbitrary; whatever
concerns us about the basic structure should concern us about individual action.64 In this
way, Cohen denies the moral distinctiveness of the basic structure as subject. Similarly,
Liam Murphy’s 1998 article, “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” argues that our
principles must be unified at a fundamental level. Any separation between two principles,
he argues, would only frustrate our attempts to promote our fundamental values or satisfy
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our first principles. Most recently, Seanna Shiffrin has offered a more nuanced argument
on behalf of a similar conclusion, claiming that our acceptance of the two principles of
justice indirectly commits us to certain norms for individual action because of our
commitment to the justification of the two principles. 65 Each of these arguments
challenges the moral distinctiveness of the basic structure in claiming that the
fundamental principles that apply to the basic structure should also be applied to
individual choices.
The predominant response on behalf of the moral distinctiveness of the basic
structure has been an argument from the “moral division of labor.” According to this
view, we have a plurality of fundamental values, and we can best respect all these values
by dividing the labor between principles that apply to institutions and principles that
apply to individuals. We do best in respecting all our values if our institutions are
primarily assessed by some values and our individual actions assessed by others. Thus,
we should divide institutional principles from individual principles. Both Thomas Nagel
and Samuel Scheffler advance versions of this basic argument, but they differ on why the
separation between principles would best respect our values. 66
In this chapter, I will offer an argument that addresses Cohen’s, Shiffrin’s, and
Murphy’s criticisms, but I will not appeal to any moral division of labor. Instead, my
argument relies on claims about how practices affect the content of moral and ethical life.
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Like the last chapter, I rely on claims about the normative structure of social practices.
Our social practices often establish an “institutional context,” and principles that apply
within this context should be sensitive to its particularities. For example, a justified
practice of property might identify certain acts as wrongful trespassing. For those who act
within that practice, the wrong of trespass is relevant for evaluating their action in a way
that the wrong of trespass is not relevant for evaluating the practice itself. As particular
persons in a determinate social structure, there are certain considerations relevant for
assessing our actions only because of the particular institutions we act within, and our
individual principles need to be sensitive to these considerations. I will claim that it is
these considerations that make the basic structure morally distinctive.
My argument for this conclusion will proceed in two sections. In §3.1, I argue that
those committed to conventionalism will recognize certain considerations that are only
relevant for evaluation within an institutional context. This allows me to provide a direct
answer to Seanna Shiffrin’s recent argument. In §3.2, I apply the argument of §3.1 to
justify the general distinction between principles that apply to the basic structure from
those that apply to individual action. This allows me to answer Cohen and Murphy’s
recent arguments. With my positive argument complete, I then contrast my own argument
with the moral division of labor argument offered by Nagel and Scheffler.
All together, the three sections of this chapter show the importance of our moral
context for the evaluation of actions and practices. In this way, it contributes to a view of
political and moral theory that respects both the importance of a universal foundation for
our moral claims as well as the ethical significance of our particular social context. We
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are, after all, determinate persons living within a form of social life, and this shapes who
we are, what we care about, and how we relate to others. Our individual principles should
not be distant and detached from our way of life but embedded within it.
3.1 Our Institutional Context
For my argument to succeed, I will need to show why there are certain considerations that
are relevant for moral evaluation within an institutional context that are not relevant
outside that context. To do this, I first need to explain what I mean by “institutional
context.” Suppose we recognize that trespassing is wrongful only because it violates the
rules of a specific system of property rights. In this case, the fact that an act counts as
trespassing is a consideration against the act for those to whom the practice’s rules apply.
It is only a wrong within the “institutional context” set by the property system. As we
recognized in the last chapter, institutions can establish obligations, rights and powers.
Because the institution so establishes these demands and claims, we say that a persons
only has such an obligation, right, or power in an institutional context.
The influence of such practices is pervasive across ethical life. Our practices
establish specific obligations that bind us and they set the terms of our most important
relationships. These practices can shape our particular values and they can define our
virtues. In a variety of ways, our institutions establish a moral context within which our
choices are made. If individual principles are to guide our conduct, then we cannot rely
solely on our foundational and universal values to determine how we ought to act.
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Instead, our individual principles need to be sensitive to the particular values, virtues,
relationships and obligations within our institutional context.
By contrast, the principles that apply to our basic social institutions should not be
sensitive to the particular values, virtues, relationships and obligations that arise within
the institutional context that those institutions create. For example, it would be wrong to
justify our system of property on the basis that it limited trespassing. For this reason,
principles that apply to the basic structure should not be sensitive to our moral context in
the way that principles that apply to actions within an institutional context should. I
maintain that this distinction explains the distinctiveness of the basic structure as moral
subject.
To build this broader argument, I will first need to show how practices can
establish considerations that are only relevant within an institutional context. In §3.1.1, I
give a general argument for how this occurs that draws on resources from Chapter 2.
Then, in §3.1.2, I show how this argument is relevant for addressing Seanna Shiffrin’s
recent arguments that those who accept Rawls’s two principles of justice shouldn’t accept
inegalitarian incentives. I then answer some objections in §3.1.3 and summarize the
significance of these arguments in §3.1.4.
3.1.1 Conventionalism
Consider the different ways in which property systems could treat trespassing. In one
system, the rules might absolutely forbid setting foot on someone’s land without their
consent. In another, the rules might forbid such action unless someone is in dire
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circumstances. In a third, the rules might only forbid setting foot on the land of another
when doing so would harm the owner’s property. In a fourth, the rules might not forbid
setting foot on another’s property at all, though it might forbid actions associated with
trespass such as violating certain privacy rights. We might immediately think that one of
these property systems would be better than another, but we nonetheless recognize them
as possible specifications of a property system.
Now, suppose we ask the moral question, “should an individual avoid setting foot
on another’s land?” According to some moral theories, we can only answer this question
if we know which of the above property systems the individual lives within. These
theories suppose that if the rules of property forbid setting foot on another’s land, then
one should avoid doing so. If the rules do not forbid it, then one does not need to avoid
doing so. Whether a person should avoid setting foot on another’s land would then
depend on the conventional rules of property. Of course, not every moral theory would
answer the question in this way. For some, trespass might be morally forbidden in every
possible social structure--perhaps because of a natural right to property. Or, one might
never act wrongly in setting foot on the land of another--perhaps because we all have an
inalienable right to the use of land.
To simplify the issue, we can say that one is either a conventionalist or absolutist
with respect to the morality of trespass. One is a conventionalist in this respect when one
must reference the conventions of the property system to settle whether one should not
set foot on the land of another. One is an absolutist when the particularities of a property
system are irrelevant for answering the moral question. A typically under-appreciated
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point is that one can be a conventionalist about any particular moral obligation without
being a conventionalist about all moral obligations. I might be a conventionalist with
regard to trespass but an absolutist with regard to promise-keeping.
In fact, it makes little sense to be a conventionalist about everything. One needs to
be able to explain why a practice can create new obligations, rights, or powers. To supply
this explanation, we need some non-conventional moral principle. For example, Rawls
was a conventionalist with respect to property rights. In this commitment, he followed
Hume, who analyzed promise-keeping, property, allegiance to government and even
fidelity in marriage as conventional obligations.67 However, Rawls grounded his own
conventionalism in two natural duties. First, the Natural Duty of Justice requires that
individuals (a) follow the rules of just institutions when they exist and apply to that
individual, and (b) build just institutions when they are needed.68 Second, the Principle of
Fair Play requires that we follow the rules of a cooperative scheme when we have
accepted the benefits of that scheme.69 Together, these two principles explain why we
would be obligated by the rules of conventional practices. We are obligated by the
67
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Principle of Fair Play to follow the rules when we have voluntarily accepted the benefits
of a practice, and we are obligated by a duty of justice to follow the rules when the
practice is sufficiently just and applies to us.70
Rawls was a conventionalist not only about obligations, but also about rights and
powers. This point is often lost because he emphasized the Principle of Fair Play and the
Natural Duty of Justice, which both explicitly specify obligations. However, his
conventionalism goes beyond this. As he writes in Theory of Justice,
“In a well-ordered society individuals acquire claims to a share of the
social product by doing certain things encouraged by the existing
arrangements. The legitimate expectations that arise are the other side, so
to speak, of the Principle of Fairness and the natural duty of justice. For in
the way that one has a duty to uphold just arrangements, and an obligation
to do one’s part when one has accepted a position in them, so a person
who has complied with the scheme and done his share has a right to be
treated accordingly by others...what we can say is that, in the traditional
phrase, a just scheme gives each person his due: that is, it allots to each
what he is entitled to as defined by the scheme itself.”71
Rawls does not ever develop this idea extensively, but a full treatment of his
conventionalism would need to recognize how claims arise and are linked to the natural
duties. I take the basic idea here to be quite intuitive; if persons are morally obligated to
stay off my land, then I also have a right that they do not set foot on my land. If the
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natural duty of justice explains why persons are so obligated, then a corresponding story
should be able to say why persons have a right. While a complete account would need to
be defended, the Rawlsian view accords with the general approach of this dissertation is
identifying institutions as establishing obligations, rights, and powers.
As with the commitments of the last chapters, my argument only requires that
persons recognize some way in which social practices can establish obligations, rights, or
powers. Regardless of what moral principle one appeals to to explain this, the point
remains the same; there are new considerations that arise within an institutional context.
The Natural Duty of Justice and Principles of Fair Play are popular ways in which to
ground such obligations, but they are not the only principles that can do so.
3.1.2 Labor markets, conventionalism, and incentives
In “Incentives, Motives, and Talents,” Shiffrin argues that those who accept the difference
principle are committed to treating talents as arbitrary from a moral point of view; the
fact that someone possesses a certain talent makes that person no more deserving of
social goods than someone without that talent. She then argues that if someone believes
that talents are morally arbitrary, then that person cannot justifiably seek out inegalitarian
incentives on the basis of their talents. They do not have a claim to higher wages on the
basis of their talents.
In this section, I will use the importance of an institutional context to address
Shiffrin’s claim that those who accept the difference principle should not pursue or accept

121

inegalitarian incentives.72 I will argue that an institutional context can change the way in
which talents are relevant in determining what persons deserve. An institution that treats
those with different talents differently can be justified on the basis of a commitment that
talents are morally arbitrary. Within that institution, however, talents will no longer be
fully arbitrary. An institutions might specify what persons deserve, and treat those with
talents as having different claims than those without. In this way, talents are not morally
arbitrary within a practice even when they are morally arbitrary for justifying that
practice. In this way, my argument will demonstrate the difference between moral
considerations within a social practice from the moral considerations outside a social
practice.
If we recognize, as Rawls does, that our institutions establish new rights,
obligations, and powers, then individual actions need to be assessed within the moral
context established by those institutions. For example, we can only say that a person acts
rightly or wrongly in setting foot on the property of another when we know whether
trespass is proscribed by the rules of a sufficiently just property scheme. For ease of
reference, I will say that we need to assess an agent’s actions within an “institutional
context” when the institutions they act within affect the agent’s rights, obligations and
powers.
Within a Rawlsian view, it is correct to say that talents are arbitrary from a moral
point of view when determining how our institutions should be organized. However,
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talents are not always arbitrary from a moral point of view within an institutional context.
If the rules of an institution identify those with a particular talent as the bearer of a right,
obligation, or power, then talents are no longer morally arbitrary within that institution. In
this case, the fact that a legitimate institution differentiates a person’s rights, obligations,
or powers on the basis of their talents makes talents morally relevant.
If we accept the moral arbitrariness of talents for assessing institutions, as Rawls
does, then it would be wrong to justify any institution on the basis that either (a) it treats
those with a particular talent well or badly or that (b) it gives them what they deserve.
However, if the institution can be justified while treating talents as morally arbitrary and
that institution treats talents differently, then talents are not morally arbitrary within the
context set by the institution.
Two examples might help to bring out this core point. First, we can return to the
property case. Suppose I am committed to the view that, outside of social institutions,
trespassing is not a moral wrong. In this case, I could not argue against some property
system because it did not proscribe trespass. Whether a property system proscribes
trespassing has no direct bearing on whether it is a good or bad property system.
However, I can recognize that trespassing might be wrongful when a property system is
established. While I do not think trespassing is wrongful when assessing the institution of
property, I can think it is wrongful within an institutional context.
Second, we can imagine a simple case where talents are not morally arbitrary.
Suppose the members of our society agree that high-quality music is a public good worth
investing in. In this case, we might think that it is worth funding public education in
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music and we might recognize the value of getting students started early in this
education. Suppose we then establish a system of schools where those who seem to have
exceptional musical talent are awarded a free and high-quality education in music. If such
a system were justified, then those identified as having exceptional musical talents
deserve the free education. If any particular child with sufficient talent were purposively
denied the education--perhaps by a sinister administrator with nepotistic motives--we
would recognize that the child was wronged. Yet, this wrong is not explained by a natural
right to free musical education. The child was wronged because they were denied a right
established by their particular institutions. If the musical education institution was
sufficiently just, then musically talented children have a right to that education.
Similarly, a labor market is a kind of institution, the rules of which put laborbuyers and labor-sellers at odds with one another. Sellers expect that buyers will want a
low price and buyers expect that sellers want a high price. The labor price is thus
established by the prices that buyers and sellers are willing to agree upon. Such an
institution tends towards an efficient allocation of labor because an individual’s labor is
then used in the place where it is most demanded. A labor market is efficient, in part,
because labor sellers aim to get a high price for their labor. The market would not be as
efficient if they did not do so.
While there are many good criticisms of a labor market as a way to distribute
wages and labor, let us suppose--for the sake of argument--that a labor market can be
sufficiently just under some conditions. Suppose the gains are greater than the costs, and
the costs can be offset by additional institutions like high quality and free education. If a
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labor market can be sufficiently just, then the rights, obligations, and powers that are
associated with that institution are legitimized according to Rawlsian conventionalism. If
labor-buyers put a higher price on certain talents, then those with such talents act within
the rules of the institution in seeking out or accepting that higher price. Their doing so
contributes to an efficient allocation of labor. In the institutional context of a labor
market, talents would no longer be morally arbitrary. If the labor market is justified, then
persons have a right to the wage they can get on the market and their talents might
explain their being offered that wage.
Importantly, this argument does not support the libertarian view that an individual
has a right to that which they can earn on a free market. A person’s claims are determined
by their institutional context, and this context might be established by more than one
institution. If a tax system taxes those with higher wages at higher amounts, then
individuals only have a claim to their post-tax income.73 Since the labor market is
justified within a broader context that includes the tax system, individual claims are
established by both the labor market and tax systems.
From Rawls’s perspective, a labor market is justified if it is part of a basic
structure that satisfies the two principles of justice. He believes that a labor market can be
sufficiently just because of the gains to efficiency, but his principles place strong
restrictions on when a labor market would be just. First, the society would be one with
fair equality of opportunity. This requires that we do not assess a labor market in isolation
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but see how it relates to an education system and the broader patterns of inequality.
Second, the society would be one in which the worst off are better off than the worst off
would be under any other system. 74 Third, Rawls suggests that a society that meets the
two principles of justice will have a state that acts as employer of last resort. 75 This
possibility would insulate individuals from the more rapacious aspects of a labor market.
When these conditions are met, it seems far less strange to think that a labor market could
be a sufficiently just economic institution. If it is sufficiently just, then the rights,
obligations, and powers associated with the institution are legitimate. Persons have a
valid claim to that which they can earn on the labor market.
When persons have a valid claim to what they can earn on the labor market, and
the market rewards those with certain talents, then persons have a right to the wage they
earn on the basis of their talents. Within the institutional context of a labor market, talents
are not morally arbitrary. Instead, persons deserve the wage they earn on a labor market
and that wage is partly explained by the talents one possesses.
For this reason a person can simultaneously (a) accept the justification for the
difference principle and (b) claim a right to higher wages on the basis of their talents, so
long as they believe that (c) the principles of justice justify a labor market that gives
persons a right to a market wage partly determined by talents. Such a person recognizes
that talents are morally arbitrary outside of an institutional context, but are not morally
74
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arbitrary within the context established by a labor market. In this way, it is Rawls’s
commitment to conventionalism that can explain why it is possible that one can accept or
pursue inegalitarian wages on the basis of their talents.
3.1.3 Three objections
I want to briefly address three possible objections to this argument. First, one might
object that my argument does not really show that talents are not morally arbitrary.
Instead, it only shows that persons have a right to what they earn on a labor market. In
this case, talents would only be morally relevant insofar as those talents explain the wage
one can earn on a labor market. The talent itself is not morally relevant, but merely the
wage one is able to get. After all, having adequate talent does not entitle anyone to a
wage or a job---as many a professional philosopher can attest to. According to this
objection, talents are still morally arbitrary in a sufficiently just labor market because
talents do not actually determine any claim. I only have a claim to what I can earn, it just
so happens that talents might explain why I am offered some wage.
I think this objection is broadly correct. I recognize that my argument does not
directly explain why talents are not morally arbitrary in an institutional context. However,
I do not think this changes the broader argument in any way. A person might cite their
talent as the reason they were offered a wage, and it is the fact that they were offered the
wage in a sufficiently just market that gives them a claim to this wage. I have chosen to
talk about the arbitrariness of talents because that is the language that Shiffrin and Cohen
use, but I do not think that refining our language would substantially change their
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argument or my response. In either case, Shiffrin would find the pursuit of inegalitarian
incentives wrongful whereas I argue that persons have a conventional right to such
incentives by the rules of a justified institution.
The second objection would claim that, “if this argument shows that talents are
morally relevant for wages, can it equally show that race, gender or sexuality are morally
relevant?” If my argument seemed to justify such discrimination, it would be a severe
problem. Yet, unless one thinks that a labor market could never be sufficiently just or that
a bigoted market could be just, the two cases will not be similar.76 My argument
presupposes that a labor market can be sufficiently just, but I doubt that a labor market
that established claims on the basis of race, gender, or sexuality could be sufficiently
just.77 While a labor market might be part of a society that satisfied the two principles of
justice, markets that discriminate on the basis of race, gender and sexuality would not be.
Accordingly, a labor market that discriminated on the basis of race, gender or sexuality
would not establish legitimate claims in the same way that a market that discriminated on
the basis of talents could.
The third objection points out a deeper problem of Rawlsian conventionalism.
The two principles of justice specify what a fully just society would be like. They express
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an ideal for a society. Yet, an institution only needs to be sufficiently just for that
institution to establish rights, obligations and powers. We would not think that only the
very best property system would establish property rights. Instead, the property system
only needs to be sufficiently just. Likewise, we have a right to market wage even when
the labor market is not part of an ideally just society. Instead, it only needs to be part of a
sufficiently just society.
Rawls does not give any general principles about when a basic structure would be
“sufficiently” just. So, we could not use Rawls’s theory to determine whether we--in our
imperfect institutions--have a right to what we earn on a labor market. We would first
need to argue about when institutions are sufficiently just before we could settle that
argument, and that is a complex problem far from the current point.
While Rawlsian conventionalism is limited in this way, it does not limit its
effectiveness against Shiffrin’s argument. This is because Shiffrin focuses on the specific
case of the well-ordered society in which all members accept the two principles of justice
and their justification. Accordingly, whether the institutions they live under are
sufficiently just is not an issue. After all, the institutions are fully just. So, the difficulties
that arise when we try to specify when institutions are sufficiently just do not arise. This
difference is relevant for us to decide how we ought to act in the here and now, but it does
not represent a problem for Rawls’s ideal theory.
3.1.4. How extensive is an institutional context?
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The significance of this argument goes beyond providing a Rawlsian response to
Shiffrin’s argument. It serves as an example of the way in which considerations within an
institutional context are distinct from those outside that institutional context. In this case,
the fact that the labor market establishes certain claims to wage shows why talents are not
morally arbitrary within an institutional context. The fact that persons have such claims,
however, has nothing to do with whether a labor market is justified. We do not justify a
labor market because the talented have certain claims, but the talented might have those
claims within an institutional context. In the example of property, trespass becomes a
moral consideration within an institutional context but it is irrelevant for evaluating the
property system itself.
The arguments of Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 appealed to the ways in which
practices can establish new obligations, rights, and powers. That is all my argument relies
on, but these same ideas might be extended further to recognize other effects that
practices might have on the particularities of ethical life. The fact that a particular
practice is practiced might not only ground demands and claims but also explain the
emergence of certain values, virtues, and relationships. While I have focused on more
rule-based features of moral life, the influence of social practices likely carries over to
features of ethical life that are much less ordered. In this section, I want to suggest how
my argument might be extended in this direction.
To show how this might be the case, I want to offer some possible examples for
how the choice of particular basic structure institutions might affect the relationships,
ideals and self-conception of members of society. I do not suppose that any evidence
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favors these stories, but I mean to show how our institutional context might effect ethical
life beyond the obligations, rights, and powers directly specified by the basic structure
institutions.
First, we might suppose that differences in the economic structure will create
differences in how we view our relationships with others. For instance, one might
stipulate that a capitalist economic structure relies on competition in the labor market. In
a competitive labor market, individuals are situated towards others as rivals. In order to
achieve one’s goal of securing an occupation, one must out perform other members of
society who vie for that job. While this mentality has its primary manifestation in the
adult search for jobs, it could easily spread to earlier stages of education; a competition
for spots at universities gives rise to a competition for top-level classes and gives rise to a
competition in high school, middle-school, elementary school, and pre-school. Children
would then be raised against a background of competition against one another and
parents would be aware that this is the relationship with which their children stand. Of
course, this is not to suggest that all children or parents will necessarily be competitive,
but only that the capitalist economic structure tends to make persons more competitive
than alternative economic structures. The relationship between persons is partly a
relationship of competition. This differs substantially from the way in which G.A. Cohen
envisions the relations of socialist society in which persons view one another through the
spirit of fraternity.78 If such a socialist economic structure were able to counter
competitive tendencies, then persons might view their relationships with one another as
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part of a larger “siblinghood.” While this might seem far more appealing than a society of
individuals in competition, it might also have different unfortunate results beyond a
reduction in production. For instance, if each individual understood him or herself as
related to the social family, this attitude might encourage social homogeneity. Persons
would be hesitant to explore new ways of life and pursuits, and there would not be the
diversity of pursuits available in a capitalist society.
Likewise, we could see why an individual’s conception of themselves might be
influenced by the contingencies of the social structure. For instance, in a capitalist
economy with a free labor market, and individual might conceive of themselves partly in
terms of what their assets in such a labor market are. In a sense, the individual comes to
see himself or herself as having “human capital”. The person with experience in the field
of retail sales might come to identify themselves partly as a retail salesperson (as others
might as well). More troubling, the person who cannot find a job might come to see
themselves as being less valuable of a person merely because they see themselves as less
valuable on the job market. Here, the individual identifies his personal value with the
market value of his skills. One might suppose that in a socialist economy, individuals
would be less likely to view themselves in terms of their human capital. Instead of being
individualized atoms competing in a chaotic and alien labor market, they see themselves
as having a place in democratically planed production scheme. In this economic system,
persons may be more likely to see themselves in terms of their contribution to society’s
projects. However, persons might also come to see themselves merely as parts of these
projects and not as self-standing and full individuals. In understanding themselves in
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terms of their role in society’s projects, they may be less likely to identify themselves
with their human capital, but also less likely to identify themselves with their own goals
and aspirations--atomistic as those might be.
With these differences in mind, we can likewise see why different ideals might be
emphasized in a society with a capitalist economic structure than an socialist structure. In
the competitive and labor-differentiated markets of capitalism, it would be unsurprising if
the public culture emphasized the ideals of individual achievement and self-perfection.
Likewise, insofar as capitalism tends to engender commercialism across its culture, the
ideals of personal happiness would be emphasized and associated with the accumulation
of goods. Alternatively, in a more socialist structure, the social ideals of solidarity might
be emphasized while the ideals of achievement and individuality are degraded.
What holds for the way in which the choice of economic structure impacts
relationships, self-conception, values and obligations also holds for our choice over other
aspects of the basic structure. While it is much more difficult to imagine alternative
family structures than economic or political structure, it is much easier to recognize how
differences in family structure might change a society’s public understandings. Likewise,
choice between government forms would be fundamental in how persons conceive of the
relation between themselves and those with political authority. We can imagine that the
members of a democracy would have different public understandings from the members
of an Aristocracy, Plutocracy, Military dictatorship, Theocracy or Hereditary Monarchy.
Still we can imagine different schemes of property whereby the class of things that can be
owed is different or who can own what is different. If the maternal head of a family were
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recognized as the primary owner of all property, then public understandings would be
quite than if all members of a family were recognized as co-owners.
When a basic structure protects a certain freedom, the existence of such an
institutionalized freedom has its own effects. The role the free religious institutions play
within a basic structure might have a quite profound influence on ethical life. For
instance, protecting freedom of religion will likely lead persons view their religious
denomination as a choice. The lesser role that religious institutions have on public life,
the more likely it is that persons will see these institutions as only part of their social life.
Rather than seeing themselves as liable for their behavior to the religious official or as
educating their children through church resources, they may see the religion as a resource
for personal, social and spiritual fulfillment. This will tend to impact the ways in which
religious officials interact with members as religious institutions seek ways to better
address the expectations and needs that members come to them with. More noticeably, a
plurality of religious organizations will likely create an environment of pluralism.
Optimistically, this might lead persons to better come to appreciate a diversity of views as
well as better know their own beliefs in all the ways that J.S. Mill suggests.
Pessimistically, it might lead to a kind of society that Marx warns about as public life
becomes a the space of satisfying wants, and persons treat other members of society as
means to their ends. In either case, the religious organizations themselves are not part of
the basic structure, but the freedom that allows free worship is. This freedom itself has
profound ethical effects.
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In each case, the choice of basic structure institutions has a much broader effect
on ethical life than what is immediately obvious. The choice of an economic structure has
a broader effect than merely efficiencies in production or employment rates, the choice of
family has broader effects than health and education of children, the choice of a
government has a broader effect than control over coercive power, and the choice of a
property scheme has a broader effect than the control over material objects. In each case,
the choice of a basic structure institutions exercises direct impact on our public
understandings and thereby on our relationships, self-conception values and (especially)
obligations.
There are difficult questions about the extent to which an economic structure
affects the content of ethical life as opposed to merely affecting our perception of that
content. If a socialist economy has the tendency to stifle individuality, that does not make
individuality any less morally significant. If a capitalist economy tends to stifle social
solidarity, that does not make solidarity any less significant. In this case, the economy
merely influences our perception of what is significant. However, the influence of social
institutions is still worth our attention if the major social institutions merely change our
perception of ethical life. The fact that our relationships and values are affected by
particular institutions is reason to evaluate the institutions differently from our individual
choices within those institutions. Beyond this, we should not diminish the extent to which
our perception of our values, virtues, and relationships affects what is actually ethical.
How we should live our lives is often partly dependent on how those around us our living
their lives. The fact that persons hold certain ends or think about their relationships in
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specific ways gives us some reason to value those ends and act within those relationships.
Otherwise, we risk acting as Prince Myshkin amongst St. Petersburg’s Yepanchins.
Living with others in a social world affects what ends we should hold and the terms
within which we should affect others. While the extent to which our institutions affect the
actualities of ethical life versus our perspective of ethical life is a difficult question on
which much more should be written, but I think the arguments of this section emphasize
the great influence of social institutions regardless of how you answer that question.
This all suggests that our institutional context is quite extensive. Which values,
virtues, relationships, obligations, rights, and self-conceptions are specific to our
institutional context and which are independent of that context? For my argument to
succeed, I only need it to be the case that the obligations, rights, and power established by
our major social institutions contribute to an institutional context. While much more of
moral and ethical life might be specific to such a context in the ways discussed above, I
do not require that it is. The more impact the basic structure has on ethical life, the more
important and distinctive the basic structure is. I now return to my more limited
argument, and explain how the establishment of obligations, rights, and powers justifies
distinct principles for the basic structure.
3.2 Moral Principles Within and Without an Institutional Context
The aim of this chapter is to show why the basic structure is a morally distinct subject. In
§3.1.1 - §3.1.3, I showed why the considerations relevant for evaluating actions within an
institutional context are different from the considerations relevant for evaluating the

136

institutions that determine that context. What I have not yet shown is why this justifies
developing distinct principles for the basic structure of society. Cohen and Murphy argue
that, at a fundamental level, the principles that apply to institutions must be the same as
the principles that apply to individuals. In §3.2.1, I will show how the difference between
relevant considerations differentiates the principles that apply within an institutional
context from those that apply to the institutions that establish that context. Then in §3.2.2,
I will show why the principles that apply to the basic structure are distinct from the
principles that apply to other institutions/systems. Finally, in §3.2.3, I will explain why
the principles that apply to the basic structure are distinct from those that apply to the
informal norms in a society.
3.2.1 Deliberative and decisive principles
To make the transition from talking about “considerations” to talking about “principle, I
need to make a distinction between two kinds of moral principles; deliberative principles
and decisive principles. I understand “deliberative principles” as guiding us towards the
recognition of considerations that are relevant for moral and ethical evaluation. I call
them deliberative principle because they guide us in our deliberation about moral and
ethical problems. By contrast, “decisive principles” guide us in reconciling various
considerations and coming to a final evaluation or decision. They are decisive in the
sense that they provide the decisive evaluation of that to which they apply.
Some moral theories, like forms of intuitionism or pluralism, will only recognize
deliberative principles as valid. Such theories suppose that we cannot articulate any final
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principles that can reconcile relevant considerations. Perhaps autonomy and well-being
are both irreducible moral considerations, but there are no principles that determine how
tradeoffs between the two should be made. Other moral theories will only recognize
decisive principles as valid. According to such views, the only relevant considerations are
those that decisive principles identify as decisive. Since other considerations do not
ultimately determine how we should act, they are not really considerations because they
should not be considered. A third group of theories might recognize both kinds of
principles, supposing that we need to understand what considerations are relevant before
we can make any decisive judgments. If we think that decisive judgments are explained
by a relation between considerations, then we will think both kinds of principles will be
relevant.
In §3.1, I argued that the considerations relevant for evaluating actions within an
institutional context will be distinct from those that are relevant for evaluating the
institutions that determine that context. Why does this mean that the principles that apply
to institutions will be distinct from the principles that apply to individual actions? Well,
that depends on what kind of principles you have in mind.
First, if one is concerned with deliberative principles, then such principle will
need to present the considerations that arise within an institutional context in some way.
If one is deliberating about whether they should accept inegalitarian wages, a deliberative
principle should present the claims that arise within a labor market as a relevant concern.
In this case, the (deliberative) principles that apply to an action within an institutional
context will not be the same as those (deliberative) principles that apply to the institutions
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that determine that context; the principles that apply to actions should represent the
claims within a labor market whereas the principles that apply to the labor market itself
should not.
My claim is not that all the principles or considerations that apply within an
institutional context will be different from those that apply to the institutions. Helping
persons satisfy their basic needs might be a consideration that is relevant for evaluating
both individual and institutions. Though some considerations might be relevant for each,
not all are. The crucial point is that the set of considerations relevant for assessing
institutions is distinct from the set of considerations relevant for assessing individual
action, so we should distinguish institutional principles from individual principles.
Second, if one is concerned with decisive principles, then we need recognize how
a institutional context ultimately affects what an individual should do. Suppose that two
different property schemes, A and B, would identify two different people, Y and Z, as the
owner of a particular object. If we live under property system A and that system grants
the property right to Y, then we think that Z should not claim that property as her own. A
decisive principle should recognize this, so decisive principles need to be sensitive to the
particularities of the institutional context in which they are applied. Y’s ownership of the
object is only a consideration against Z’s seizing it within a particular institutional
context, and our decisive principle should track the relevance of such considerations.
So, regardless of whether we are concerned with deliberative or decisive
principles, the principles that apply to individual actions within an institution’s context
should be distinct from those that apply to that institution. It should then be no surprise
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that moral theories that recognize both the validity of both deliberative and decisive
principles will recognize that principles should be distinct in these two cases. To present
and track the significance of considerations relevant in an institutional context, the
principles for the two should be distinct.
How does all this bear on the arguments of Cohen and Murphy. Well, Cohen’s
overall view is concerned with considerations that are represented by fundamental
principles. Suppose we recognize that equality, autonomy, and well-being are always
significant for any moral problem. Cohen wants to argue that we address moral problems
by seeing how they relate to these fundamental values, regardless of whether we are
evaluating institutions or individual conduct. I can agree with this. I only maintain that
we do not only evaluate individual actions by these fundamental moral values. The
considerations that are particular to an institutional context are also relevant. The fact that
our institutions specify obligations, rights, and powers is also relevant to evaluating
action. Our moral principles must also present the particularities within an institutional
context as relevant, and these considerations can oftentimes change our overall evaluation
of an action. It might be permissible for a person to enhance inequality within a justified
labor market if that labor market grants her a claim to such incentives. I do not need to
deny that equality, autonomy, and well-being are fundamental values to recognize that the
set of considerations relevant for evaluating actions within an institution’s context are
distinct from those relevant for evaluating that institution.
A similar point applies to Murphy’s argument. Murphy emphasizes that the same
fundamental principles should apply to individuals and institutions. I will have more to
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say on Murphy’s complete argument in §5.1, but let me give a preliminary reply here. So
long as we recognize that our institutions can establish obligations, rights, and powers,
then the considerations relevant for evaluating actions will be distinct in an institutional
context. Fundamental principles will still apply to both individuals and institutions, but
there will be additional (and often decisive) considerations that apply to individual action.
At this stage, I have shown (a) that the considerations relevant for evaluating
individual action within an institutional context are distinct from those relevant for
evaluating the institutions that establish that context, and (b) that the principles that apply
to individual actions in that context are distinct from the principles that apply to the
institutions. This does not yet get me to the claim that the basic structure is a distinct
moral subject. After all, the basic structure is not constituted by all institutions, but only
those that establish our obligations, rights, and powers as members of society. First, I
need to explain why it would be that principles for the basic structure would be morally
distinct from the principles for other institutions or practices. I do so in §3.2.2. Second, I
need to explain why the principles for the basic structure would be morally distinct from
the principles for the network of informal norms that also have a role in shaping ethical
life. I do this in §3.2.3.
3.2.2 Institutions and the Basic Structure
What would justify treating the basic structure differently from other institutions? So far,
I’ve only discussed the difference between principles that apply to actions in an
institutional context and the principles that apply to the institutions that establish that
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context. However, it would be wrong to think that individual actions are the only subject
evaluated within an institutional context. Our social practices and institutions shape the
moral context relevant for assessing individual actions, but they also shape the moral
context relevant for assessing other practices. Sometimes an institution will be justified
only because of the role it plays within a particular institutional context. What
differentiates the basic structure from other institutions is that our assessment of the basic
structure should not be sensitive to any institutional context whereas our assessment of
other institutions often should be. In this way, my strategy to distinguish principles for the
basic structure from institutional principles more generally is merely an extension of my
argument for distinguishing principles that apply to institutions from those that apply to
actions within an institutional context.
To see why the assessment of the basic structure should be insensitive to moral
context in a way that other institutions do not need to be, we need to look again towards
what the basic structure is and why it is morally indispensable. The basic structure is that
system of social institutions that establish our obligations, rights, and powers as members
of society. In so doing, it forms a social background against which the various other
practices and institutions in society are formed. Accordingly, these other practices and
institutions will often need to take into consideration the institutional context established
by the basic structure institutions. It is because various practices and institutions are
situated within a basic structure that we should treat the basic structure differently from
these other institutions. The basic structure is not situated within any other institutions
that its assessment should be sensitive to.
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As an example, consider our assessment of a particular educational practice--such
as the admission tests like the SAT and ACT. This practice is not itself part of the basic
structure because there is nothing about the practice that establishes obligations, rights or
powers as members of society. Instead, the practice is a general understanding amongst
students and admission officials about what one needs to do to get into a college. If we
want to assess the practice, we need to look at how it fits within the various practices
around it. We should look at the role that college plays in the job market, at the ways in
which high school prepares students for the test, and so on. Our assessment of the
educational practices as a whole requires that we see how education fits within the larger
society. How does education prepare students for the life they will live? Does it prepare
them for the economy? Does it prepare them to contribute to a democracy? In this way,
we assess our educational practices as within the basic structure institutions of the
political constitution and economic system, and we assess the admission tests within this
education system. Now, if we assess the individual actions of students, teachers, and
administrators that are related to admission tests, we need to see their actions as within
these practices. So, the actions of individuals are within an institutional context, but the
practices are also within such a context. The basic structure, however, sets the
fundamental rules in society around which various other practices are formed. This
distinguishes the basic structure as uniquely removed from the moral context established
by institutions.
Now, the explanation that I give here should not be confused for a mistaken
historical theory. I recognize that the particularities of the basic structure that one lives
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within were not created first and followed by the creation of other institutions. I
recognize that the institutions that constitute the basic structure were themselves
developed against a moral context composed of particular practices and norms that were
themselves within another basic structure. The point is not to say that the assessment of
other institutions should be sensitive to the moral context established by the basic
structure because the basic structure institutions are temporally prior. Instead, the idea is
that the rules of the basic structure institutions apply to all persons in a society, and so
they apply to persons engaged in other institutions within society. Accordingly, the
background that the basic structure sets is a background for these other institutions. It is
not because the basic institutions came first, but because their rules set a background for
the activities of other practices that we need to assess these other practices within the
moral context set by the basic structure.
For example, we can recognize the activities that religious organizations engage
in will be limited by the basic structure institutions. If our society establishes certain
basic rights, then the activities of religious organizations need to respect these rights.
Whatever property system is recognized designates what property rights these groups
have. What economic system we live within determines how the group can fund itself. In
these cases, it is within the broader systems of the basic structure that religious activities
proceed and religious groups are sustained. Even if we carve out exemptions for religious
groups, for example by allowing gender to be a factor in hiring, it is a feature of our legal
institutions that grants that exception. It might be the case that the basic structure of
society is explained because of the structure and influence of these religious groups, but
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that does not change the fact that their activities are now bound by their rules. Even if the
historical story is one in which the religious traditions explain the basic structure, the
normative story is that the religious traditions are now within a moral context set against
the rules of the basic structure.
One might object that the basic structure is situated within another institutional
context, the global structure. It might seem like the particularities of the global structure
should influence our evaluation of the basic structure, thus reducing the centrality of the
basic structure as subject. In response to this objection, I want to return to the response
made in §2.3.2. There, I argued that the global structure is constituted by norms that bind
governments whereas the basic structure is constituted by norms that bind individuals.
Because of this, I think it is wholly appropriate that we evaluate the decisions of
governments as occurring within a global context. However, that does not mean that we
should evaluate the basic structure as within a global context. 79
So, the core argument of §3.1 distinguishes institutions generally from the basic
structure in the same way that it distinguishes actions from the institutions those actions
occur within. Principles within a context should be sensitive to the particularities within
that context, but principles that apply to whatever establishes that context (whether an
institution or system of institutions) should not be so sensitive. Our assessment of college
entrance exams, for example, needs to be sensitive to the larger context set by the
education system. The basic structure is distinct as a moral subject because it establishes
79

We should also bear in mind that the idea that a state represents the interests of its citizens in
international relations is itself part of the basic structure of society. In this way, the features of the global
structure are, in part, best understood as within a context of basic structures (rather than the other way
around).
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a context within which our various other institutions and practices are situated. For this
reason, the principles that apply to the basic structure will be distinct from those that
apply to other institutions. Principles for other institutions need to be sensitive to the
moral context established by the basic structure within which they fit, but principles for
the basic structure do not need to be.
3.2.3 The basic structure and the informal structure
Now, it is of course true that institutions are not the sole determinate of the content of
ethical life, and this might seem to warrant an objection to the view. Recall that any
conception of the basic structure will need to distinguish the basic structure from the
various informal norms and generalized expectations within a society. These norms and
expectations might not rise to the level of “institutions,” but they still have profound and
pervasive effects on social life. Call these various features of social life, the “informal
structure” of society.
Now doesn’t the informal structure of society have as much affect on the content
of ethical life as the more formal institutions of the basic structure? Couldn’t we also say
that institutions occur within a context set by the informal norms of a society? It seems
just as important that a good society have the right mores as that it have the right
institutions. Since these norms establish a moral context as well, their assessment seems
formally similar to the assessment of institutions--if we need to distinguish principles for
the basic structure because they establish a moral context for other institutions why
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wouldn’t we distinguish principles for our basic mores on the same basis? If these are so
similar, then why wouldn’t the principles that apply to one also apply to the other?
The appropriate response to this criticism is to focus our attention on the
difference between systems of rules and patterns of behavior. As discussed in Chapter 1,
we should understand social rules as ostensibly binding. There are behaviors that are
identified as right or wrong by appeal to these rules. By contrast, the informal norms of
society do not have this bindingness. They undoubtedly have influence as persons aim to
either adhere to flout those norms, but they are not rule-like. If persons in society
generally celebrate the military, care about equality, or see poetry as the highest form of
achievement, then that society will have certain informal norms. It is not until persons
recognize rules that specify how they ought to act that such norms becomes rules.
Because of this difference between rules and informal norms, we can ask what
rules we should have without directly asking how persons ought to choose. By contrast,
our concern with the informal structure is fully captured by our concern with how
individuals should choose. Now, deciding how individuals should choose will always be
dependent upon their own social context and the complexities of their situation. In
deciding how the basic structure ought to be, we develop principles that apply to the
institutions that determine and institutional context whereas principles for the informal
structure must apply within an institutional context.
For example, if a basic structure gives parents the prerogative to choose private
schools or public schools, certain patterns will emerge wherein certain groups--the rich,
the religious, the artistic--might tend to enroll their children in private schools more
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often. If these patterns become sufficiently embedded, they could be considered part of
the informal structure. In this case, one might say that persons ought to choose to send
their children to public school. This would then seem to be a principle that applies to the
informal structure. However, it is quite difficult to make this claim independent of the
social context. It will depend on the quality of education as well as its fit with
philosophical and religious views. It will depend on the structure of society--with
democracies perhaps giving stronger reason--and the norms within family life. It will also
depend upon how that choice is viewed amongst persons, whether it will be seen as elitist
and selfish or as selfless and encouraging excellence. The particularities of a social
context seem highly relevant to determining how particular individuals should choose.
So, the objection is addressed by carrying through the original distinction that this
argument is based upon. While individual choices and the informal structure do affect the
structure of ethical life, the principles that apply to individual choice and the informal
structure will need to be principles that apply within ethical life because individual
choices always occur within a social context and the informal structure is constituted only
by individual choices. The basic structure, as a system of rules, can be assessed outside of
a particular social context.
Of course, none of this is to say that individual choices should not take into
consideration their effects of the structure of ethical life. In a society where women are
viewed as having a particular role in the family and in the workforce, then women and
men ought to recognize that their own choices have an effect on either reinforcing or
overriding those traditional ideas. Individuals need to recognize that their personal
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choices have influence on the structure of ethical life. However, recognizing this does not
mean that no women ought to pursue traditional roles if that is their life-plan. To make
such a broad claim would be insensitive to the complexities of ethical life. Such a
principle might be appropriate in some societies, but it will not be in many others. Each
person should take their effect on ethical life into consideration, but other concerns also
need to be considered. The point is only that the principles that apply to individual
choices will, in the end, need to be principles that apply within the particular context of
an ethical life. The principles that apply to the basic structure should not be.
3.3. Contrast with the Moral Division of Labor
In Equality and Partiality, Thomas Nagel gave an influential justification for developing
distinct principles for the basic structure that centered on the distinction between
principles for individuals and principles for institutions. Specifically, he argued that it is
appropriate to distinguish the two because of a fundamental difference between two
moral perspectives--one personal and one impersonal. When institutions were assessed by
appeal to the values of a impersonal perspective, it allows individuals to pursue those
values that are particular to the personal perspective. By dividing institutional and
individual principles in this way, we create a “moral division of labor” under which we
are better able to pursue our personal concerns secure in the knowledge that our
impersonal concerns are secured by our shared institutions. The choice to develop
principles specifically for the basic structure was justified by this kind of moral division
of labor.
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While it was meant as a defense of the Rawlsian focus, Nagel’s interpretation set
the terms of the debate in ways that were quite favorable to Rawls’s opponents. To many,
Nagel seemed to say that institutions were to take care of the requirements of justice so
that individuals did not have to. Famously, G.A. Cohen argued that the focus on the basic
structure licensed capitalistic avarice in personal decisions because institutions and not
individuals were charged with promoting equality. Liam Murphy tried to show that such a
distinction was ultimately unsustainable due to the challenges it faced in non-ideal theory.
Even Nagel was not fully enthusiastic about the approach he argued for because it did not
fully avoid conflicts between our values, leaving the possibility of a dissociated self.
Recognizing these difficulties, Samuel Scheffler offered a new argument on
behalf of a moral division of labor. This time, he was sure to emphasize that the division
between institutional principles and individual principles was not justified on the basis of
the pursuit of self-interest. Instead, he argued from a kind of value pluralism. He started
from the recognition that we have many important values, some are more “small-scale”
and some are more “large-scale.” The small-scale values are typically related to
interpersonal interaction and individual responsibility. The large-scale values are more
typically related to impartial concerns like equality, justice and fairness. Prima facie,
there seem to be conflicts between these kinds of values because acting for the sake of
one might frustrate acting for the sake of another. This conflict can be represented in two
kinds of cases. First, persons might live their lives in accordance with the small-scale
moral values, but feel that they are failing to adequately respect the large-scale values.
For instance, a strong dedication to family success might draw resources away that could
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be used to benefit the world’s worst off. Second, one might focus on respecting largescale values and thereby neglect small-scale values. For instance, a dedication to global
justice might take one away from one’s family or community in ways that seem not to
respect small-scale values.
One solution to these possible conflicts is to try and explain one set of values as
arising from the other. If this were possible, then one could grant deference to the more
basic set of values in any possible conflict. This deference might go in two possible ways.
First, if the rules of interpersonal interaction are explained in terms of the large-scale
values, then we know that ultimately we ought to act on behalf of the large-scale values
in any ostensible conflict. Scheffler identifies consequentialism as taking this approach
by explaining small-scale values in terms of the large-scale value of universal happiness.
Second, if the large-scale values can be addressed by proper adherence to small-scale
values, then the conflict is likewise resolved. Scheffler similarly identifies libertarianism
as taking this approach and being unconcerned with any large-scale values, such as
equality or social welfare, that are not addressed by proper respect for small-scale values.
Scheffler seeks to avoid both of these approaches and to avoid explaining one
kind of value in terms of the others. To do so, he recommends a division of moral labor,
which he identifies with egalitarian liberalism. Such a theory properly respects smallscale values in interpersonal relations and large-scale values in the design of institutions.
Accordingly, we assess individual action predominantly by small-scale values and
institutions by large-scale values. Whereas Nagel explained the division of labor as
grounded in two aspects of the self, Scheffler explains the division of labor as grounded
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in a single capacity to recognize diverse values. It is our responsiveness to both smallscale and large-scale values that explains why we would distinguish principles for
institutions from principles for individuals. This allows us to respect both kinds of value.
The reason why Scheffler’s view counts as a “division of labor” is because he
recognizes a guiding aim that we ought to jointly accommodate our values, both large and
small-scale. What justifies the division of labor is that it is the best way of accomplishing
this guiding aim. By dividing labor amongst individuals and institutions, we best
accommodate this guiding aim similarly to how we most efficiently produce pins by
dividing labor according to the different aspects of the pin-making process. Scheffler
does not suppose that there is some one measure by which our accommodation of values
can be maximized, so this guiding aim is not like the typical consequentialist aim.
However, it is nonetheless the effectiveness in accommodating value that justifies
Scheffler’s division of moral labor.
Upon first look, it might not be immediately obvious what kind of distinction
Scheffler means to draw in dividing “small-scale” from “large-scale” value. If we
interpreted small-scale values as those that are particular to a local community and large
scale values as those that are general across communities, then his arguments would be
much closer to my own. Under such an interpretation, the small/large distinction would
be similar to the practice-dependent/practice-independent distinction that I draw.
However, this is not how Scheffler wants to divide these values. Instead, he identifies
small-scale values as those that apply to micro-phenomena like interpersonal interactions.
By contrast, large-scale values are those that apply to macro-phenomena like patterns of
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distribution. For example, he identifies small-scale values with libertarian concerns over
interpersonal transactions and identifies large-scale values with utilitarian concerns for
total welfare. While Scheffler does not give an exact specification for which values are
small or large, he seems to have something like the micro-phenomena/macro-phenomena
distinction in mind. Instead of being focuses on micro/macro-phenomena, I rely on a
distinction between ethical considerations that are relevant within an institutional context
contrasted with those considerations relevant for evaluating the institutions that establish
that context.
What makes my distinction possible is the way in which institutions establish
obligations, rights, and powers. What makes Scheffler’s distinction possible, is a
commitment to value pluralism. His distinction matters because we have a plurality of
irreducible fundamental values, some of which more directly apply to micro-phenomena
and others which apply to macro-phenomena. Now, it is important to identify the specific
kind of pluralism that Scheffler here appeals to because there are at least three ways in
which we tend to use the phrase. First, we might recognize “principle pluralism,” which
holds that there are distinct principles that legitimately apply to different subjects. Both
my argument and Scheffler’s support “principle pluralism.” After all, we both seek to
explain why the evaluation of the basic structure is distinct from the evaluation of
individual conduct. Neither of us, however, argue from principles pluralism because that
would be begging the question. Principle pluralism is the conclusion and not a premise.
Second, another kind of pluralism is

“pluralism of the good,” which holds that (a)

different people can hold different conceptions of what matters in life and (b) these

153

different conceptions can be equally worthy of respect. Scheffler, myself and Rawls all
accept pluralism of the good. However, our acceptance of this pluralism is unrelated to
current arguments. This variety of pluralism has much more to do with an argument for
liberalism than with an argument for the division of labor. Third, the last kind of
pluralism is “meta-normative pluralism,” which holds that our moral and ethical
justifications are ultimately grounded in a plurality of fundamental values. According to
this view, our justification ultimately bottom out in a plurality of irreducible value. Now,
neither myself nor Rawls argues from meta-normative pluralism, but Scheffler does. It is
his commitment to meta-normative pluralism that grounds his moral division of labor. He
supposes that there are a plurality of principles and the moral division of labor is justified
because it best allows us to respect our different values without reducing them to one
another. This justificatory strategy requires a commitment to pluralism that neither mine
nor Rawls’s own strategy require.
For this reason, Scheffler’s approach requires more substantive presuppositions
than my own argument requires. I only need claim that our institutions establish
obligations, rights, and powers whereas Scheffler needs meta-normative pluralism to be
the best account of ethics. Even if this is not a significant advantage for my argument--as
I think it is--it is nonetheless a clear contrast between our approaches.
To better understand this contrast, we should recognize the ways in which metanormative pluralism relies on a set conception of our values whereas I argue that many of
our values are dependent on our social context. The fact that we live in a specific social
world will tend to bring out certain values that would not be the same in another social
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world. How we ought to act will be sensitive to those context-dependent values, and not
merely the set conception of values with which we began. I suspect that any fundamental
values that Scheffler might appeal to would be too abstract and amorphous to adequately
function in our deliberation and justifications. To take a Hegelian point, our abstract
values always need to be made real, and they are only made real to us within a particular
social structure. We need a linguistic community to differentiate values, to identify them
with concrete particulars, and to discuss their nuances with. We need shared practices and
activities through which to mutually understand one another. Only within a social world
does it make sense to identify some abstract and amorphous value without the boundaries
of a particular word or practice. For that value to function as part of a justification, it
needs to be given a content that can only exist in a social world. In different social
worlds, the particular and real values that are the shared objects of deliberation will be
different--even if those real values are ultimately explained as valuable due to their
connection with a set catalogue of abstract values. By contrast, Scheffler’s argument
presupposes that our values are sufficiently specified prior to a social context such that
they could themselves justify a moral division of labor. It seems to me that such a
justification requires a much more concrete conception of values than would be available
independent of a social context.
To see the present point in a specific example. It seems that Scheffler would like
to include the values we associate with specific relationships within the range of smallscale values. In this regard, he might include the relationship between parent and child,
between husband and wife, between sisters or between old friends. When we use these
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relationships as justifications, we appeal to the value of these specific relationships. We
appeal to parent-child relationships or the nature of friendship. Yet, in many ways, these
relationships are based on conventional terms. The fact that the family or friendship takes
the form that it does is not a necessary aspect of human life, but exists within the
particular form of life that we occupy. Accordingly, there is a clear way in which the
contours of our social structure shape those values we think relevant for individual
choices. It is not that there was a value of family prior to and always independent of
social structure such that it can be used to justify the shape of our social and normative
life. Instead, the shape of the social world makes the family values we care about
particularly understandable and valuable. It is true that the value of such relationships is
crucially important for personal choices in a way that it is not important for the
assessment of institutions, but we cannot say that is because there is some determinant
value of friendship that is always important such that we should structure social life to
make it part of personal choices.
So, the core problem with the division of labor argument provided by Scheffler is
that it appeals to meta-normative pluralism with a static conception of fundamental
values. He justifies the division of moral labor--and a normative/institutional scheme
more generally--by the joint accommodation of a determinate and static set of values. Yet,
the values that serve as justifications for us are much more dynamic. They change with
the social structure, with culture and with the existing normative structure. The argument
that I appeal to is much more fitted to recognize such dynamic values.
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We live in a particular social world, and in the particular social world there are
certain specific things that matter to us and the people around us. Accordingly, the
justification of actions within that social structure will need to take the specifics of our
social world into consideration. If it does not do so, it ignores the thick and nuanced ways
in which we live ethical life. This will differentiate the ethical assessment of actions
within our social structure from the ethical assessment of actions outside of that structure.
Within the structure, we need to pay attention to the particular form that our values take,
but outside of that structure it would not be as appropriate to do so. Insofar as Scheffler’s
account relies on a conception of values that are fully independent of our social structure,
his account seems problematic.
3.4 Moral Distinctiveness
In the introduction, I set three tasks for my account. First, it needed to explain what the
basic structure is. Second, it needed to explain why the assessment of the basic structure
is morally indispensable. Third, it needed to explain why the assessment of the basic
structure is morally distinct. Accomplishing these three tasks will show why the basic
structure is a centrally important ethical subject without relying on any claims about the
nature of justice. The first two chapters accomplished the first two tasks, and this chapter
accomplishes the third. In summary, the assessment of the basic structure is morally
distinct because we need to differentiate the assessment of actions (and institutions that
are within a moral context established by systems) from the assessment of the practices
those actions happen within. Since the particularities of the basic structure institutions
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establish much of the moral context for assessing individual action and the non-basic
institutions, we need to differentiate the assessment of the basic structure.
These arguments should be widely acceptable across any moral theory that
recognizes how practices can establish an institutional context. Most simply, we need to
recognize that our ethical life is best understood as embedded within a complex of
practices. The assessment of actions needs to be sensitive to the particularities of the
practices they occur within, and the assessment of practices needs to be sensitive to the
particularities of the practices that those systems are formed within.
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Chapter 4
Limited Conventionalism, Primacy, and the Local
“That principles for institutions are chosen first shows the social nature of the virtue
of justice, its intimate connection with social practices so often noted by idealists.
When Bradley says that the individual is a bare abstraction, he can be interpreted to
say, without too much distortion, that a persons’ obligations and duties presuppose a
moral conception of institutions and therefore that the content of justice institutions
must be defined before the requirements for individuals can be set out.”
- John Rawls, Theory of Justice, 95

The three preceding chapters have sought to show (1) what the basic structure of society
is, (2) why it is indispensable as a moral subject, and (3) why its evaluation is distinct
from the evaluation of other subjects. I argued that the basic structure is the set of
institutions that establishes our obligations, rights, and powers as members of society. In
order to evaluate our actions, we often need to evaluate the practices that those actions
contribute to. Likewise, in order to evaluate our practices, we often need to evaluate the
systems that those practices contribute to. The institutions that belong to the basic
structure constitute the system that specifies our role as member of society, so we will
need to evaluate the basic structure as a whole in order to properly evaluate the
institutions that belong to it. How we evaluate these institutions should be quite different
from how we evaluate individual action because individual actions occur within the
social context established by these institutions. Our evaluation of individual action should
be sensitive to this social context whereas our evaluation of institutions should not be.
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Recently, the focus on the basic structure seems to have fallen out of favor
amongst political theorists, many of whom have been convinced by G.A. Cohen’s
criticisms of Rawls. Now, Cohen offers a number of arguments and there is no single
response that shows all of them to be mistaken. However, the arguments of the last three
chapters both provide responses to many of Cohen’s arguments and present a perspective
from which to respond to others. First, Cohen challenges the possibility of distinguishing
the basic structure from aspects of the informal structure such as an egalitarian ethos. In
response, Chapter 1 showed the way in which to distinguish them. Second, Cohen seems
to think that there is no reason to focus exclusively on the basic structure if justice--as an
ideal--does not uniquely adhere to the basic structure. In response, Chapter 2 shows why
an evaluation of the basic structure is morally indispensable regardless of one’s
conception of justice. Third, Cohen often claims that we cannot distinguish the
fundamental principles that evaluate the basic structure from those that evaluate
individual action, but Chapter 3 shows a deep difference between the evaluation of
institutions and the evaluation of individuals.
The value of these arguments, however, does not lie exclusively in their reply to
Cohen. The arguments also give a broader perspective for the importance of the basic
structure of society in moral and political philosophy. Even when we recognize a
universal or absolute foundation for our moral claims and obligations, we should still
appreciate how our contingent practices affect the particularities of ethical life. In order to
appreciate our particular place---with its specific obligations, claims, powers, virtues,
relationships and values--we need to appreciate the significance of our participation in
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social practices. In order to properly evaluate our choices within these practices, we also
need to evaluate these practices. This perspective shows why it is important to focus on
the basic structure as subject. To evaluate some of the most influential practices--those
that establish our claims as members of society--we need to evaluate the basic structure
that they are part of.
The goal of this chapter is to better motivate this broader perspective in moral
theory and thereby further support my claim that we should focus on the basic structure.
In §4.1, I want to better specify (a) what my core argument relies on, (b) it’s core
conclusion, and (c) how it differs from similar arguments. Then, in §4.2, I will emphasize
the range of moral theories for which my arguments are relevant. There are undoubtedly
some moral theories, like Act Consequentialism, that deny the premises upon which my
arguments rely. However, my argument fits with a broader range of moral theories than it
might at first seem. Following this, I give a broader motivation for the perspective that I
advocate. In §4.3, I argue that treating the basic structure as moral subject can contribute
to a reconciliation between two seemingly opposed impulses in moral and ethical theory.
The arguments of this dissertation provide a way to respect both the universal and local
features of moral and ethical life. In recognizing the way in which our practices specify
the particularities of our ethical life, I respect the local features of morality. However, I
also respect the universalizing features in requiring that these practices stand in need of
justification outside of an institutional context.
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§4.1. What do I claim?
To summarize my core argument in a sentence, we can say “those who accept a limited
form of moral conventionalism should recognize the primacy of the basic structure as a
distinct moral subject.” In §4.1.1, I explain what I mean by “a limited form of moral
conventionalism.” One accepts “conventionalism” if they recognize that moral demands
or claims can be established by contingent practices. Conventionalism has a bad name in
moral theory because people think that it either (a) seeks to explain all our obligations
and claims as part of social practices, or (b) is some form of relativism. Yet, the form of
conventionalism that I argue from accepts (a1) only some of our obligations and claims
are explained as part of social practices, and (b1) that those practices be morally justified
by appeal to practice-independent values. In this way, I argue from a limited form of
conventionalism.
In In §4.1.2, I argue from limited conventionalism to the “primacy of the basic
structure as a distinct moral subject.” As I use the phrase, a moral problem has “primacy”
when we must first address that moral problem in order to fully address other moral
problems. I argue that the basic structure has primacy because we need to evaluate it
before we can fully evaluate certain individual choices and institutions. The basic
structure is a “distinct” subject because we cannot evaluate the basic structure with the
same principles used to evaluate all others subjects.
Finally, in §4.1.3, I will show how the argument from limited conventionalism to
the primacy of the basic structure differs from similar arguments for the Rawlsian focus
on the basic structure. First, I return to a claim made in the introduction that my argument
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does not rely on any conception of justice. Second, I explain how my argument differs
from the “moral division of labor” argument offered by Scheffler and Nagel. Third, I
differentiate my view from one which identifies the basic structure as instrumentally
necessary for social cooperation. While I do not make any claim that these arguments are
wrong, I think they require more contentious commitments than my own arguments.
4.1.1. What does the arguments rely on?
My arguments rely on a commitment to, what I call, “limited conventionalism.” Here, I
characterize conventionalism as the view that social practices can determine the
particularities of moral and ethical life. While there is a tradition that exclusively uses the
phrase “convention” to refer to strict coordination games, I use it in the broader sense to
refer to any practice structured by rules. So understood, there can be a wide range of
conventionalist theories. Some are fully relativist in that there is no part of ethical or
moral life beyond our contingent way of life. My argument relies on a very different form
of conventionalism. In this section, I want to better explain what this limited form of
conventionalism requires
First, I do not claim all obligations, rights, and powers are practice-dependent. For
example, the argument is consistent with practice-independent obligations to tell the
truth80 or to help others.81 Whether any particular aspect of ethical life is practice80

Of course, we could recognize assertion as a social practice and then asserting what you take to be true or
what you take to be false would be practice-dependent in some sense. Yet, even if assertion is practicedependent, this does not mean that every form of indicating beliefs is practice-dependent, so lying (or
indicating that you have beliefs that you do not have) could perhaps exist without assertion or other social
practices.
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For more on this perspective, see Herman, Barbara. "The Scope of Moral Requirement." Philosophy &
Public Affairs 30.3 (2001): 227-256.
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dependent will always be open to debate. For example, the demands of promise-keeping
and the family may or may not be practice-dependent. The demands involved in linewaiting seem to be conventional but there is always the possibility of an argument that
they are not.
My argument need not show exactly which features of moral and ethical life are
or are not practice-dependent. However, I do suppose that a property system, legal
system, political constitution and economic structure are examples of practices that
establish obligations, rights, and powers. Whether our practices create these demands and
claims ab nihilo or whether they specify our vague pre-existing rights does not need to be
settled by my current claim. I do not need to claim that all obligations, rights and powers
are established by social practices in order to claim that these institutions establish new
obligations, rights, and powers.
Second, I do not claim that “if a practice gives rise to new claims, then it is part of
the basic structure.” I recognize the possibility of practices, like line-waiting, that are
morally significant and are not assessed as part of the basic structure. Whether linewaiting is a good practice does not depend on how it contributes to the system of claims
we have as members of society in the way that the major social institutions do.
Third, I have not claimed that there is one and only one moral theory that can
ground practice-dependent claims. I have not exclusively appealed to the principle of fairplay, a consent theory, or a conception of our roles82 in order to ground practice-
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dependent claims. Instead, my arguments are consistent with any of these ways to ground
practice-dependent claims and many others. So long as a theory can explain why
practices change our moral demands, that is sufficient for the view I hold.
All together, a moral theory is “conventionalist” insofar as it recognizes that social
practices can give rise to new moral demands, and it is “limited” insofar as it recognizes
that there are features of moral and ethical life that are not explained by social practices.
My argument relies only on limited conventionalism as a feature of complete moral
theories and it does not itself require a particular moral theory. Kantians, Intuitionists,
Hegelians and even some varieties of consequentialism might accept limited
conventionalism, and my argument will apply to those theories.
4.1.2 What is the core conclusion?
From a commitment to limited conventionalism, I argue that the basic structure has
primacy as a distinct ethical subject. The “primacy” of the basic structure refers to the
way in which we must evaluate the basic structure in order to evaluate the actions and
practices that are part of the basic structure. In this section, I will better explain how the
arguments of Chapters 2 and 3 support the primacy of the basic structure as a moral
subject.
In Chapter 2, I argued that in order to fully evaluate individual action, we often
need to evaluate the practices of which that action is a part. If this is the case, then the
evaluation of the practice has primacy over the evaluation of the individual action that is
part of the practice. In this sense, primacy identifies an “order of evaluation;” in order to
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fully evaluate individual action, we first need to evaluate practices. Likewise, in order to
fully evaluate certain practices, we first need to evaluate the systems of which they are a
part. The major social institutions are part of the system that is the basic structure, so the
basic structure has primacy in the order of evaluation. First, we evaluate the basic
structure, which allows us to fully evaluate the major social practices, which in turn
allows us to fully evaluate the actions that are part of these institutions. The basic
structure has this kind of primacy, and it is because it has this primacy that it is an
indispensable subject.
Importantly, this order of evaluation is only needed for a “full evaluation” of
individual action. We can surely assess action in some way without assessing the practice
of which it is a part, but any such evaluation would be incomplete. For a full evaluation
of the individual action we need to see how it contributes to the social practices it is part
of. Since these practices will have moral effects that are not reducible to the moral effects
of individual action, we need be concerned with how individual actions contribute to
these practices. Likewise, an evaluation of practices will be incomplete if we do not
consider how that practice fits with others in a system. In order to properly evaluate
actions and practices, we need see them as contributing to broader practices and systems.
To see the significance of the primacy of the basic structure, I want to return to an
issue discussed in Chapter 3. G.A. Cohen has recently argued that those who hold
equality to be an important aspect of social justice should be concerned with how
individual actions (and not only institutions) impact equality . Many egalitarians have
jobs that provide them with incomes that far exceed a society’s median income. In

166

accepting these wages, we seem to be contributing to inequality in some way. If persons
were willing to forgo these inegalitarian incentives, wouldn’t we have a more equal
world? Doesn’t our concern for equality give us reason to reject higher wages when our
receiving those wages does not promote equality?
According to my argument, we cannot merely look at the individual choice to
accept inegalitarian incentives and then evaluate it outside of its social context. Our
decision to accept higher wages is situated within a set of institutions, the most prevalent
of which is a labor market. In theory, A labor market promotes efficiencies by (generally)
distributing labor to the places where it can produce the greatest monetary value. If
persons generally refused inegalitarian wages, it is not clear that a labor market could do
this as well.83 This raises questions about the role of a labor market in society. Is it a
justified institution? Do its advantages in efficiency justify its inegalitarian effects? Is the
individuality that it encourages an advantage or disadvantage? When our action, as part
of a well-functioning labor market, is ultimately justified depends--in part--on our moral
assessment of the labor market. Moreover, we cannot adequately assess the labor market
in isolation. Instead, we need to see how it works alongside our educational system,
unemployment system, tax system, and much else. A labor market in one society might
be morally heinous whereas it’s bad effects might be offset by other institutions in
83

Even if we assume--as Joseph Carens does in Equality, Moral Incentives, and the Market: An Essay in
Utopian Politico-Economic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981)---that persons were fully
motivated by a concern for equality, then we would still need competition amongst workers to secure the
greatest income. There are informational advantages involves in a well-functioning labor market, and those
who want to work where their work best promotes the position of the worst off might not know how they
can do so. That is why Carens supposes that our obligation to help meet social needs manifests itself as a
obligation to maximize pre-tax income, which is then redistributed as equal shares of income. Our question
would then be whether a Carens-system would be morally better than a system in which persons received
an income more associated with the price of their labor.
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another society. Accordingly, our moral assessment of the labor market depends on our
evaluation of the basic structure of which it is part. It is in this sense that the basic
structure has evaluative primacy. In order to fully evaluate our actions in the labor
market, we need to first evaluate the labor market of which it is a part. In order to fully
evaluate that labor market, we need to first evaluate the basic structure of which it is part.
With this example, we can also return to the distinctiveness of the basic structure
as subject. Our evaluation of individual action should be sensitive to the social context
determined by institutions like the labor market. Whether a person acts rightly depends
on the obligations, rights, and powers established by institutions. Our evaluation of
certain practices should be sensitive to the social context in which those institutions are
situated. Our evaluation of the labor market, for example, needs to be sensitive to other
features of the basic structure. By contrast, our evaluation of the basic structure should
not be sensitive to such social context. Since it influences so much of our social context,
it needs to be justified separately from this context. In this sense, it should be distinct
from our assessment of individual actions and practices that are part of systems.
This argument only puts a minimal bar on the ways in which the basic structure is
distinct as a moral subject. Given the normative structure of social practices, we should
distinguish the assessment of the basic structure from the assessment of particulars that
are part of practices or systems. There will be other reasons to distinguish the basic
structure even further as a moral subject. These further reasons, however, will be specific
to particular moral theories. Depending on what one thinks is important, the basic
structure might be importantly distinct in other ways. If, for example, one thinks that
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coercion is a distinct moral problem, we should recognize that that use of coercion is part
of (not a defining characteristic of) the basic structure. Our coercive institutions would be
justified as part of the basic structure, and the basic structure would be distinct for that
reason as well.84 If one is concerned with, say, society progressing according free and fair
agreements between persons, then one will be concerned with background fairness.85
Insofar as the basic structure uniquely effects background fairness, the basic structure will
be a distinct moral subject for that reason as well. If one has a particular conception of
justice that identifies the basic structure as a particularly important site of distributive
justice, then that is another reason for the basic structure to be distinct. My argument
does not exclude these additional reasons to distinguish the basic structure. They are
merely more specific to particular moral theories than my argument is.
If one is committed to limited conventionalism, then one should accept the
primacy of the basic structure as a distinct moral subject. In order to fully evaluate
individual actions and major social institutions, we need to first evaluate the basic
structure of society. This makes the basic structure a crucially important moral subject for
addressing a broader range of moral problems. Moreover, how we should evaluate this
subject is distinct from how we should address these other moral problems in at least one
respect; the basic structure should not be assessed as within a particular social context.
4.1.3 How Does this Argument Relate to Similar Arguments
84

In this way, I suggest that those who see the primary problem of political philosophy as the justification
of coercion should see the evaluation of the basic structure as even more primary. In order to justify state
coercion, we need to evaluate it as part of the larger social system that it coerces the rules of.
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There have been a range of recent arguments made on behalf of the Rawlsian focus on
the basic structure, but the above approach is unique in relying on claims about the
normative structure of social practices. I do not need to show that these other arguments
are wrong to show why mine is correct, but I nonetheless want to draw a contrast with
three recent alternatives. For each, I want to highlight the additional assumptions that the
alternative approach needs to succeed.
The most typical argument for the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure relies on
claims about the nature of justice. These arguments develop a conception of justice that is
explicitly institutional. Arguments claim, for example, that justice is an institutional
virtue or that publicity is a condition on justice.86 Implicit in these views, as I understand
them, is an understanding that (a) the basic structure is morally indispensable because
justice is morally indispensable and (b) the basic structure is morally distinct because
justice is morally distinct. Accordingly, the basic structure has primacy as a distinct moral
subject because justice has primacy as a distinct moral concern.
I offer this as the most “typical” argument because it is the one that I think is most
often ascribed to Rawls as the basis of arguments.87 It is also the interpretation of Rawls
that I take Cohen to be primarily concerned with. Accordingly, it seems to form a sort of
“starting point” for both criticisms and defenses of the focus on the basic structure.
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Persons take the claim “Justice is the first virtue of social institutions” to be a claim about the identity of
justice rather than a claim about what ideal we should use to evaluate institutions. Given the context, this
can be a strange claim. After all, Rawls immediately compare justice to truth in saying “as truth is [the first
virtue] to systems of thought.” We do not take this later claim to be a definition of what truth is, yet persons
are willing to take Rawls’s remark at a definition of justice.
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Defenders might try to show why an institutional conception of justice is appropriate
while critics show it to be inappropriate.
My argument does not rely on any conception of justice. In this way, it tries to go
beyond the more typical argument. It is possible that someone will object to my view
from a particular conception of justice, but I leave that issue until Chapter 6. My
argument transcends a particular conception of justice because it shows the importance of
the basic structure as a moral subject regardless of what one’s conception of justice is.
Whether justice is a concern relevant for or the regulative ideal for the basic structure
does not change the fact that the basic structure has primacy as a moral subject. The
importance of the basic structure does not depend on whether justice is specifically an
institutional virtue.
I have avoided making an argument from a conception of justice because I doubt
that those with substantively different moral views will agree on a such a conception.
What determines whether one thinks that a particular conception of justice is the correct
conception will depend on how that conception fits with their broader views on moral
methodology, on the nature of justification, and on their substantive convictions. It is
undoubtedly an important part of moral and political theory that we argue about what
justice requires. At the least, it facilitates discussion between persons with wholly
different approaches. However, I doubt that I will be able to convince the reader about the
primacy of the basic structure on the basis of a conception of justice. Instead, I think it is
better to show how the primacy of the basic structure fits with more widely acceptable
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views. I think I am more likely to get agreement on limited conventionalism than I am
about a particular conception of justice.
A second approach that has been used to defend the Rawlsian focus on the basic
structure is an argument from a “moral division of labor.” Both Thomas Nagel and
Samuel Scheffler have developed versions of such an argument, each relying on remarks
that Rawls makes in “The Basic Structure as Subject.” According to both versions of this
argument, not all of our values are best applied to all moral problems. Rather, some
values are best understood as applying to institutions whereas other values apply to
individuals.
For Nagel, the difference is between personal values, which are recognized from
our first-personal perspective, and impersonal values, which are recognized from a thirdpersonal perspective. We best reconcile these two moral perspective when we assess
institutions in terms of impersonal values and assess individual choice in terms of
personal value. For Scheffler, the difference is between small-scale and large-scale
values. He sees the failure of utilitarianism as trying to explain small-scale values in
terms of large-scale values, and he sees the failure of libertarianism as trying to explain
large-scale values in terms of small scale values. By contrast, he recommends the liberalegalitarian perspective that can respect both kinds of value without reducing on to the
other.
The moral division of labor argument works particularly well to explain why the
principles that apply to the basic structure of society would be distinct from those that
apply to individual action. That is why I drew an extensive contrast with these views in
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Chapter 3. The division of labor argument claims that principles should be distinct
because the values that apply to these subjects are fundamentally distinct. On its own,
however, the argument is incomplete in two ways. First, it does not identify what the
basic structure is in a way that distinguishes it from other institutions. After all, even if
we recognize a distinction between institutional and individual principles, why should we
distinguish institutional principles that apply to the basic structure from principles that
apply to other institutions (including global institutions)? Second. the moral division of
labor argument does not show why the basic structure is indispensable as a moral subject.
It shows why the principles that apply to it would be distinct from principles for
individual action, but it does not show why we need principles for the basic structure as a
moral subject.
However, one interpretation of the moral division of labor argument does address
this second gap. If we understand the moral division of labor argument as showing us (a)
that justice is an institutional value, and (b) that the basic structure is uniquely related to
justice, then this argument would show that the basic structure is indispensable as a moral
subject. The moral division of labor argument would then be a type of the “conception of
justice” argument. It would be an argument for why justice is specifically an institutional
value. Insofar as one wants to interpret the moral division of labor argument as an
argument for the primacy of the basic structure as moral subject, this is the way in which
I think it should be interpreted. It gives us clear reasons to think of justice as uniquely
tied to the assessment of institutions, and it is because the basic structure is uniquely tied
to justice that we should focus on the basic structure.
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Yet, I do not advocate the “moral division of labor argument for a conception of
justice” approach. Such an argument might add additional support to my argument
through an accompanying conception of justice, but I do not need such an argument.
Specifically, I do not need to claim anything about a fundamental distinction in our
values. Instead, I merely claim that social context is important for the evaluation of
actions and practices. I claim that a proper evaluation of individual action will oftentimes
require seeing that action as part of a social practice and evaluation of such practices will
oftentimes require seeing those practices as parts of a system. It might also be the case
that the proper evaluation of individual action is sensitive to individual values and the
proper evaluation of institutions should be sensitive to institutional values. That seems
completely feasible to me, but it goes beyond the requirements of my argument. Instead, I
only need to claim that our practices/systems make certain considerations relevant for
evaluating actions or practices that would not be relevant outside of that practice/system.
A third approach for defending the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure is the
idea that the basic structure is understood as the set of institutions that are instrumentally
necessary for social cooperation. The importance of social cooperation as an end then
explains the importance of the basic structure as necessary for bringing that end about. As
an example of this argument, one might read Samuel Freeman as offering an
interpretation of Rawls that appeals to this “instrumental-necessity” reading. Freeman
writes that,
“it’s not the coercive enforcement of social rules themselves that
distinguishes basic institutions from other institutions. After all, if
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everyone freely accepted the application of the rules all the time, coercion
might never be needed. Rather it’s the reason for coercion, namely that
basic institutions are essential to social life. The distinctive feature of the
basic social institutions that constitute the basic structure is that they are,
in some form or another, necessary for productive social cooperation, and
hence for the continued existence of any society, particularly any
relatively modern one.”88
In this passage, Freeman distinguishes a concern with the basic structure from a concern
with coercion, and he does so on the basis of the relationship between productive
cooperation and the basic structure. Aresh Abizadeh explicitly reads Freeman as offering
this “instrumental necessity” interpretation in “Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and
Coercion.” There, Abizadeh argues that such a justification cannot justifiably limit a
concern with distributive justice to a domestic basic structure.89
However, I do not think that this “instrumental necessity” interpretation is the
only way to understand the relationship between the basic structure and social
cooperation. The phrase “necessary” in Freeman’s remarks might be read in two different
ways. First, it might be that the basic structure is instrumentally necessary for social
cooperation; it is because the basic structure creates certain conditions that people can
engage in social cooperation. Second, it might be that the basic structure is conceptually
necessary for social cooperation; we understand “social cooperation” as the kind of
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cooperation that persons who live in a society engage in with one another. In this way,
whether Freeman understands the basic structure as instrumentally necessary for social
cooperation depends on how we understand “necessary.”
In §1.6, I argued for the view that the basic structure is conceptually necessary for
social cooperation. Social cooperation consists in the cooperation between members of a
society in following the rules of the major social institutions. It is because we understand
“social cooperation” as this specific kind of cooperation that we recognize a basic
structure as conceptually necessary for social cooperation. One cannot have social
cooperation without a basic structure to cooperate in following the rules of.
The challenge in thinking that the basic structure is instrumentally necessary is
that one must articulate a conception of social cooperation that requires there to be a
basic structure. How should we think of social cooperation? If social cooperation is
coordination on fair terms, then we do not need the basic structure to cooperate on fair
terms. If social cooperation is coordination between strangers, then social norms alone
may be sufficient for that. Moreover, does this view identify the basic structure as only
those institutions that are necessary for social cooperation? After all, there could be
seemingly justified institutions--such as universal health care--that are not necessary for
social cooperation but might nonetheless be part of the basic structure.
Importantly, I recognize that these challenges to the instrumentally-necessary
approach could be overcome, but they do highlight a contrast with the conceptuallynecessary approach that I advocate. I have tried to present a view that sees social
cooperation as the kind of cooperation that results in society. This cooperation creates
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obligations, rights, and powers for persons as members of society. The complex social
world in which we live takes these obligation, rights and powers as setting the
background for free interaction. Our following these rules allows us to live and plan more
stable lives. We define the basic structure as the institutions that persons follow the rules
of as members of society. In this way, the basic structure is conceptually necessary for
social cooperation.
Altogether, I claim that it is limited conventionalism that explains the primacy of
the basic structure as an ethical subject. It is not a particular conception of justice, a
division of moral labor, or the independent importance of social cooperation. It is because
the major social institutions establish new obligations, rights, and powers for individuals
as members of society. In order to fully evaluate these institutions and the actions that
occur within them, we need to first evaluate the basic structure of society.
§4.2. The Scope of the Argument across Moral Theory
My argument relies on limited conventionalism, which not all moral theorists will accept.
However, a much broader range of moral theorists can (and should) accept limited
conventionalism than one might think. In §4.2.1, I explain the conditions under which a
foundationalist moral theory is consistent with my arguments. In §4.2.2, I focus on the
deeper significance that my arguments have for constructivist moral theories. All this will
set the stage for the broader arguments offered in §4.3, which seeks to better motivate the
approach that this section claims is widely accessible across moral theories.
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§4.2.1 First principles and limited conventionalism
As I understand “foundationalism,” it is the view that all justifications must ultimately
appeal to some first principle or set of first principles. With such a view, the primary task
of moral theory is to identify the first principles and then determine how they relate to
particulars. There is not anything about foundationalism, per se, that necessarily supports
or undermines the argument I offer. Whether foundationalism is consistent with limited
conventionalism will depend on the specific foundational principles that one advocates.
Certain foundational principles will allow institutions to establish obligations, rights and
powers. Other foundational principles will not. In this section, I want to better explain the
difference.
To begin, let me give two toy examples of foundationalist theories that are
consistent with limited conventionalism. First, imagine a moral theory that identifies selfrealization as the end of all ethics, however, the self that is realized is a sociallydetermined self in a specific social world. This moral theory resembles the view that
Bradley sketches in the “My Station and Its Duties” chapter of Ethical Studies. Here,
there is a single foundational moral principle: realize your self. Yet, the institutional
context created by our institutions is centrally important in specifying the self that needs
to be realized. At least part of ourselves is determined by our role in social life, so the
specifics of our role are significant for morality and ethics. Second, imagine a theory that
consists of a number of foundational principles, one of which is the Principle of Fair Play.
This principle requires individuals to follow the rules of those social practices that are (a)
fair to each participant, and (b) advance their interests. According to this moral theory,
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what particular obligations we have will be partly determined by which social practices
exist in our society. In this way, the particular institutions that exist will affect what
obligations we have. In either of these two examples, we have moral theories that
ultimately justify any judgment on the basis of foundational principles and are consistent
with limited conventionalism.
What allows these theories to support limited conventionalism is that some
particular judgments are justified indirectly (rather than directly) by the foundational
principles. For example, if my particular social role includes being a participant in a
democracy, then either example theory could (potentially) explain why I have an
obligation to vote. According to the first, we could explain my role as citizen as part of
my identity. Realizing my self would then require that I fulfill the part of my identity that
is consistent with being a citizen, and I should then take up the duties of citizenship. If I
were to live in a different form of government, however, I would not have these same
duties. According to the second view, we can understand a democratic form of
government as a particular social practice that advantages the citizenry. In order to
support this practice, I owe a contribution that is specified by the rules of the practice. If
the political system requires citizens to vote, then I should vote in order to support the
system. Again, if there were a different political system, I would not have these same
obligations. In both cases, I have obligations that are particular to my social context, and
these obligations are grounded indirectly by fundamental principles of self-realization
and Fair Play that are applied to my particular political structure.
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By contrast, there are also versions of foundationalism that are inconsistent with
limited conventionalism. For example, Act-Consequentialism (AC) does not explain how
social practices could establish obligations, rights, or powers. For the sake of argument,
let us define AC as the view that an action is right if that action promotes the best
consequences. Undoubtedly, AC can recognize that a practice can change which actions
are those that promote the best consequences. In this way, the fact that an action takes
place within an institutional context can change our evaluation of that action. However,
our evaluation is not changed because the action is part of a practice but because the
prevalence of a practice has changed the causal path by which we can promote the best
consequences.
To see this point more clearly, recall that AC does not really recognize an
obligation to follow the rules of property. It can say that we should often follow the rules
of property, but it is not because we have an obligation to follow the rules. Rather, we
should only do that which a property system requires when we promote the best
consequences by doing so. When we do not promote the best consequences, we do not
have moral reason to follow the rules of property. According to AC, it might be good that
persons think they have such an obligation, and it might also be good that persons have a
disposition to follow the rules. AC can even claim that it is good that property rules are
coercively enforced and good when coercion is used against someone who acts rightly in
breaking the rules of property. All these claims are consistent with AC, but it is not
consistent with AC to claim that we have an obligation to follow the rules of property.
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AC would reject limited conventionalism because, according to AC, practices do
not change our obligations, rights, and powers. Practices can change the causal paths by
which to satisfy our single obligation, but it does not change our obligations. According
to AC, thinking that our obligations change is a fundamental mistake. Perhaps we take
our laudable dispositions too seriously or have bought into a noble lie. The feature of AC
that explains why it is inconsistent with limited conventionalism is its view that whether
any particular action is right is determined by directly appealing to the foundational
principle.
Act-Consequentialism is not the only version of foundationalism that is
inconsistent with limited conventionalism. We can imagine any number of foundational
principles that do not make a social context morally relevant. If all particular judgements
are justified by direct appeal to foundational principles, then social context will be
irrelevant in the way that it is irrelevant for Act-Consequentialism. Suppose I recognize
four foundational principles; (1) promote autonomy, (2) promote well-being, (3) promote
equality, and (4) promote knowledge. Suppose that any particular judgement is justified
by directly applying these four principles. Whether a person is good or bad will depend
on whether they promote autonomy, well-being, equality, and knowledge. Whether an
action, institution, practice, or disposition is appropriate will likewise

depend on

promoting these four values. This form of pluralist foundationalism will also be
inconsistent with limited conventionalism unless promoting one of these values explains
how social practices establish obligations, rights, and powers.
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If a version of foundationalism conflicts with limited conventionalism, then
whether we should accept foundationalism or my argument will be determined by much
more holistic considerations. I doubt that any single argument can show such a version of
foundationalism to be wrong, and I do not attempt to give one here. After all, a fully
committed foundationalist could even give up their commitment to the truths of logic if
they needed to. Instead, the best argument for or against any moral theory will be holistic.
How does the theory really fare as a whole? My arguments only show a moral theory to
be wrong insofar as the approach seems to better provide what we want from a moral and
political theory.
Yet, even if some forms of foundationalism can accept the primacy of the basic
structure, this might seem like a trifling conclusion for the foundationalist. What matters
for the foundationalist is ultimately first principles, which are then applied to all moral
problems--including the evaluation of the basic structure. For any moral problem, we
look to see how the fundamental principles bear on that problem. What, then, is the
significance of saying that we should “focus” on the basic structure?
For versions of foundationalism that accepted limited conventionalism, the focus
on the basic structure is quite significant. It identifies a particular moral problem to which
only foundational principles are applied. The evaluations of practices and actions within
the basic structure will need to be sensitive to those non-foundationalist considerations
that are determined by an institutional context. By contrast, there are no nonfoundationalist considerations that are relevant for evaluating the basic structure. This
makes the distinctiveness of the basic structure as moral subject significant even for the
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foundationalist. It is a subject to which foundational principles are not applied indirectly,
but only directly.
Of course, the distinction between the basic structure and other moral problems
might be significant for other reasons beyond this. Versions of foundationalism might
recognize some foundational values as relevant for evaluating the basic structure that are
not relevant for evaluating individual practices or actions. As I understand it, the Division
of Moral Labor argument advocates for such a version of foundationalism. The argument
understands justifications as appealing to foundational values, but it also supposes that
some foundational values are appropriate for evaluating institutions whereas others are
appropriate for evaluating individual conduct. According to this form of argument, the
distinctiveness of the basic structure will be significant for two reasons. First, only certain
foundational values apply to the basic structure. Second, the foundational values that
apply to the basic structure apply to it directly rather than indirectly.
I suspect that both Nagel and Scheffler would want their views to be consistent
with limited conventionalism, but they do not argue from such a commitment. The
argument of this dissertation differs from theirs in arguing from limited conventionalism
rather than a particular form of foundationalism. I do not need to claim that a particular
form of foundationalism is the true moral theory but only that the true moral theory,
whatever it is, needs to accept limited conventionalism. I think this is especially
important for understanding Rawls’s own argument for focusing on the basic structure
because he is not a foundationalist. Instead, he is a constructivist. In the next section, I
want to emphasize the deeper significance of my argument for constructivist theories.
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§4.2.2 Constructivism and limited conventionalism
Foundationalism may be the most intuitive form of moral theory, but it is not the only
form. Rawlsian Constructivism is one example of a non-foundationalist moral theory, and
the conclusions of my argument are much more significant for such non-foundationalist
theories. To draw this out, I want to first highlight a feature of Rawlsian constructivism;
the procedure that warrants principles is “problem-dependent.” By this, I mean that
constructed principles are always constructed to address a particular moral problem
(rather than providing general first principles). Insofar as constructivism’s procedures are
problem-dependent, the primacy of the basic structure will be even more significant.
To see this point, we should notice that some versions of constructivism will be
foundationalist. By this, I mean that the relevant procedure (or perspective) will be
constructed to warrant a foundational principle or set of principles. 90 For example, there
are attempts to justify act-utilitarianism91

and rule-utilitarianism92

by appeal to

constructivist reasoning. Likewise, a constructivist reading of Kant would identify him as
using a constructed procedure to warrant the categorical imperative, which some might
read as being a fundamental principle. In these cases, constructivism is used to warrant
foundationalism. Whether they are consistent or inconsistent with limited
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conventionalism will then depend on the specific foundational principles as I discussed
above. In this section, I am concerned with forms of constructivism that are not
foundationalist.
Rawls’s considered view is the most prominent example of non-foundationalist
constructivism. Persons in the original position do not agree to a set of principles that
settles all moral questions. Rather the original position is designed to settle a particular
moral problem; “what are the fair-terms of social cooperation?” The arguments of Theory
of Justice and Political Liberalism are directed towards this particular problem, and
Rawls says relatively little about how the constructivist approach would be applied to
different problems. However, Rawls does develop a different constructive procedure in
Law of Peoples, and that procedure is specified for a very different problem than
determining the fair terms of social cooperation. Likewise, Rawls also suggests that
different procedures would be necessary to settle questions about justice in associations.93
The few remarks we get about Rawlsian constructivism suggest that any
legitimate procedure will need to generate principles that (a) respect persons as free and
equal and (b) satisfy a practical need. In a slogan, Rawls suggests that, according to his
view, “free and equal moral persons are to construct reasonable and helpful guidelines for
moral reflection in view of their need for such organizing principles and the role in social
life that these principles and their corresponding subjects are presumed to have.”94 In this
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articulation, principles are always constructed with the “need for such principles” and
their “social role” in mind. This is what I meant to refer to in saying that the procedure
that warrants principles is “problem-dependent.” The specifics of the procedure are
determined by the particular problem that principle is developed to address. The
construction that warrants the two principles of justice, for instance, was constructed
specifically for the problem of identifying the fair terms of social cooperation.
When a form of constructivism is problem-dependent in the way that Rawlsian
Constructivism is, the primacy of the basic structure as a distinct subject has a greater
significance for two reasons. The rest of this section will be spent explaining the two
ways in which my conclusions are especially significant for such views.
First, the nature of the basic structure as subject influences the content of the
principles that apply to it. When a form of constructivism is problem-dependent, the
principles that evaluate the basic structure are developed specifically to apply to the basic
structure. Accordingly, the particularities of the basic structure are crucially important for
the development of the principles. We do not merely apply first principles to the
identified subject. Instead, the nature of the subject determines the principles.
This feature of Rawlsian constructivism is well-represented in the phrase, “the
correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of that thing.” Rather than
merely applying a fundamental principle to a particular subject, Rawls means to develop
principles in ways that make them suited to that subject. This phrase appears in Theory of
Justice when Rawls offers a quick rejoinder against the utilitarian conception of justice;
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“whereas the utilitarian extends to society the principle of choice for one
man, justice as fairness, being a contract view, assumes the principles of
social choice, and so the principles of justice, are themselves the object of
an original agreement. There is no reason to suppose that the principles
which should regulate an association of men is simply an extension of the
principle of choice for one man. On the contrary: if we assume that the
correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of that
thing, and that the plurality of distinct persons with separate ends is an
essential feature of human society, we should not expect the principle of
social choice to be utilitarian”
In Theory, this is only a brief and relatively unexplored contrast between justice as
fairness and utilitarianism, but I think that it is an important one. It argues that, given a
certain methodological perspective, we can see a central problem for the utilitarian.
Utilitarianism is modeled on the rationality of a single individual in maximizing their
own utility, which is extended to model the rationality of a social choice to maximize
total utility. Yet, the choice over how society is structured is distinct from how a single
individual ought lead their life, so it seems odd to suppose that one can be addressed by
merely extending the other. A utilitarian conception of justice seems to violate the
methodological perspective that any regulative principle should depend on the nature of
that which it regulates. For Rawls, our recognition of the basic structure as a distinct
moral subject is significant because our conception of the subject influences the
principles that appeal to that subject. In moral theory, our principles should fit with our
understanding of a moral problem. We should not try to make our understanding of the
problem fit our principles.

187

The second reason why the primacy of the basic structure has a greater
significance for problem-dependent forms of constructivism is due to a way in which
such theories can explain moral unity. One might think that a problem-dependent form of
constructivism is condemned to disunity amongst its principles. If we accept
foundationalism in some form, then it is easy to see how our various judgements form a
unity; they all express our commitment to foundational principles. Yet, there is no such
unity for a problem-dependent form of constructivism; each principle is developed for the
specific problem it addresses. This might seem to result in a hodgepodge of principles,
each principle merely meeting the conditions for its own use and failing to express any
deeper moral vision.
In “The Basic Structure as Subject,” Rawls recognizes this problem in a section
titled “Unity by Appropriate Sequence” and offers a solution. He writes,
At first sight the contract doctrine may appear hopelessly unsystematic:
for how are the principles that apply to different subjects to be tied
together? But there are other forms of theoretical unity than that defined
by completely general first principles. It may be possible to find an
appropriate sequence of kinds of subjects and to suppose that the parties to
a social contract are to proceed through this sequence with the
understanding that the principles of each later agreement are to be
subordinate to those of all earlier agreements, or else adjusted to them by
certain priority rules. The underlying unity is provided by the idea that
free and equal moral persons are to construct reasonable and helpful
guidelines for moral reflection in view of their need for such organizing
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principles and the role in social life that these principles and their
corresponding subjects are presumed to have. 95
In this passage, Rawls supposes that contractualist theory can still be unified through an
“appropriate sequence.” This is a methodological sequence as principles are agreed to by
appeal to principles that have been previously developed. For each principle in the
sequence, the principles are those that free and equal moral persons would agree to. If
such a process were completed, a problem-dependent form of constructivism would
express a kind of unity. 96
Rawls does not say much more about how this sequence would proceed beyond
this passing remark. However, there are two features of Rawls’s theory that seem to fit
well with this perspective towards unity. First, he orients questions about global justice
and justice between generations as being addressed after developing an account of
domestic justice. In “Law of Peoples,” he writes
Typically, a constructivist doctrine proceeds by taking up a series of
subjects, starting, say, with principles of political justice for the basic
structure of a closed and self-contained democratic society. That done, it
works forward to principles for the claims of future generations, outward
to principles for the law of peoples, and inward to principles for special
social questions. Each time the constructivist procedure is modified to fit
95
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the subject in question. In due course all the main principles are on hand,
including those needed for the various political duties and obligations of
individuals and associations.”97
In this passage, Rawls appeals to his methodology of approaching a range of subjects in
an appropriate sequences; first, principles of justice for a closed society, then global
justice and justice between generations, and eventually explicating personal obligations
as members of political organizations or associations. Likewise, in Theory of Justice,
Rawls appeals to a four-stage sequence in addressing questions of justice for a closed
society. A conception of justice does not itself determine the answers to all the relevant
political questions. We not only need first principles of justice, but must also appeal to
those principle that (a) evaluate constitutional arrangements, (b) evaluate legislation and
policies, and (c) evaluate particular instances. For each question, Rawls constructs an
appropriate perspective from which to reason about the relevant issue, but each
perspective is constrained by acknowledgment of the principles decided in earlier stages.
For instance, he writes, “In framing a just constitution, I assume that the two principles of
justice already chosen define an independent standard of the desired outcome. If there is
no standard, the problem of constitutional design is not well-posed.”98 Likewise, one
cannot judge the justice of law without knowledge of the constitutional procedures within
which they are developed and one cannot judge particular acts without knowledge of the
laws from which they follow. As such, the four-stage sequence models the way in which
principles are developed for specified contexts in a way that relies upon prior principles,
97
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but does not suppose that the prior principles can be easily applied to new contexts.
Instead of an appeal to an overarching general principle that addresses each of these
diverse concerns directly, Rawls appeals to developing these principles in an appropriate
sequence, each relying on the preceding development of principles.
Yet, what is it that makes an appropriate sequence appropriate? With the fourstage sequence, it makes sense why this sequence would be as it is. At each level, the
relevant contractors have more and more information about the society in which they
live, so there is a natural order to the progression. Yet, what would make any particular
sequence more appropriate than another beyond this? What makes certain subjects the
ones that should be addressed before others? We cannot appeal to moral principles to
settle this issue because the order of the sequence will likely influence our moral
principles. We cannot appeal to moral facts because the constructivist denies such moral
facts. How should the appropriate sequence proceed? The answer to this question is far
from apparent in Rawls’s own writings. What would be an appropriate argument to show
that one starting place is more appropriate than another?
I take the argument of this dissertation to show why we would think that the basic
structure has primacy in such an appropriate sequence. I do not think it shows that the
basic structure is the first subject in such a sequence, but it does show why it should
precede other subjects. Perhaps it only shows why the basic structure is the primary
subject of justice. 99 To appropriately evaluate particulars, we often need to evaluate them
within a particular social context. This requires that we have some prior way to evaluate
99
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the social context. This gives a reason for the primacy of the basic structure that does not
appeal to moral principles or to moral facts. Instead, it appeals to intuitions about the
normative structure of social practices. Those who accept limited conventionalism have
reason to accept the primacy of the basic structure in an appropriate sequence.
§4.3 A Mooring for Ethical Life
So, those who accept forms of foundationalism and constructivism can accept the
primacy of the basic structure as subject. In this section, I want to better motivate both
limited conventionalism and the deeper moral importance of the basic structure. Instead
of showing the relationship between limited conventionalism and the basic structure, I
want to show how a central concern with the basic structure provides a way to reconcile
the localizing and universalizing impulses in moral theory.
There is a consistent conflict between those who see ethical life as grounded in
universal principles that apply to all and those who see ethical life as particular to social
context. We can see this conflict between universal and local in arguments from Plato and
Aristotle, Kant and Hegel, Sidgwick and Bradley, and Rawls and Walzer. While I would
not claim a focus on the basic structure settles this conflict, I do believe it can contribute
to a moral theory that respects both the universal and local in moral and ethical life. I
want to motivate my approach by showing how it combines the best features of both
perspectives.
Limited conventionalism recognizes that our moral obligations, rights, and
powers are often grounded by contingent social practices. In §3.2.3, I argued that such
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practices likely influence our values, virtues, relationships and self-conceptions. The view
does not, however, require that all values, virtues, relationships, self-conceptions, rights
and obligations are grounded by such practices. In fact, limited conventionalism needs to
appeal to some universal principles in order to explain why practices have this influence
on moral and ethical life. Accordingly, there is already some balance between the local
and universal in the theory. Some moral demands and claims will be particular to our
social context whereas others will be universal across social contexts. Which are which is
an issue that needs to be settled by a moral theory.
Limited conventionalism also recognizes that, in order to change our moral
demands, social practices must be morally justified. Not every practice can establish new
obligations; only morally justified practices can. At times, whether a practice is justified
will be determined by universal principles. At other times, a practice will be justified by
its social context. According to the view here, when a practice is part of a system, we will
need to evaluate the system in order to evaluate the practice that it is part of. This adds
another way in which our evaluation is particular to a social context. Whether a practice
is justified will often depend on the social context that practice occurs within.
With this view, the basic structure of society is a moral subject at the nexus
between the local and the universal. Many of our particular claims will be explained by
the practices that they belong to. For many practices, whether they are justified and give
rise to genuine claims will be determined by how they fit within a basic structure. So, the
basic structure is quite central for our local evaluations--we often need to evaluate
practices by how they fit within a basic structure. However, the evaluation of the basic
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structure itself does not appeal to our social context. There is no larger practice or system
that the basic structure is part of. Instead, it is evaluated by appeal to more universal
principles.
To show how this approach can reconcile the localizing and universalizing
features of ethical life, I will rehearse one of the most appreciated Hegelian objections to
Kantian moral theory. This will allow me to contrast a concern with the practicedependent aspects of ethical life with a concern for the practice-independent aspects.
Then, I will suggest a middle ground that recognizes the importance of both these aspects
of ethical life. Since a focus on the basic structure is part of this middle ground, such a
focus respects both the practice-dependent and practice-independent features of ethical
life.
4.3.1 The Hegelian criticism
Hegel’s most (in)famous criticism of Kant has been the claim that his argument for the
categorical imperative amounts to nothing but an empty formalism. In §135 of
Philosophy of Right, Hegel writes,
“However essential it is to give prominence to the pure unconditioned
self-determination of the will as the root of duty, and to the way in which
knowledge of the will, thanks to Kant’s philosophy, has won its firm
foundation and starting-point for the first time owing to the thought of its
infinite autonomy, still to adhere to the exclusively moral position, without
making the transition to the conception of ethics, is to reduce this gain to
an empty formalism, and the science of morals to the preaching of duty for
duty’s sake. From this point of view, no immanent doctrine of duties is
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possible; of course, material may be brought in from outside and particular
duties may be arrived at accordingly, but...no transition is possible to the
specification of particular duties.”
For Hegel, true freedom occurs only when we recognize that our freedom is not a
freedom of indeterminacy but a freedom as a particular individual, an individual who is
understood as occupying a particular social position. We are raised within a particular
social atmosphere and our own identity and interests are reliant upon the particularities of
that social atmosphere. Accordingly, the material through which we determine our duties
and goals is drawn from that atmosphere. To abstract away from this material is to
abstract away from all material that could establish our duties. An ethical theory that
arises from the idea of the will as pure indeterminacy will be empty and formal, but an
ethical theory that arises from the idea of a will as embedded in a social position will
have the material through which to recognize the fullness of ethical life.100
Now, there are many related and overlapping aspects to Hegel’s criticism, and I
do not mean to address them here in full. Much of the literature hangs on Hegel’s internal
criticism of Kant that the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) cannot warrant any moral
judgment on its own. Much has been written about whether this criticism shows a
mistake in Kant’s reasoning, but my concern is with Hegel’s point as an external
criticism. Is Hegel right to think that any account of ethics is inadequate if it ignores the
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particularities of our social atmosphere? The FUL might not be empty, but Hegelians will
still argue that Kantian theory is flawed because it ignores the importance of our being
socially embedded. Most specifically, Hegelians can argue that no Kantian view
adequately represents individual freedom. The individual will is not a pure abstraction of
indeterminacy but a particular will embedded in a social environment. For a particular
will to truly be free, it needs not will any arbitrary ends but will the ends that are
identified as its own particular ends.
A similar external criticism is used by many of the contemporary Communitarian
thinkers, but they need not be tied to Hegel’s own metaphysical and methodological
commitments. These thinkers have focused specifically on the ways in which the self is
socially embedded without taking the detour through the conditions for freedom or the
claim that the FUL is empty.
For Hegel and Kant, the contrast between them is well-represented in their
differing conceptions of freedom, but the contrast between communitarians and liberals is
not as clear. As Will Kymlicka points out,101 the contemporary Liberal does not deny that
the self is socially embedded. Instead, liberals only deny that there is no single socially
determined feature of ourselves that is not open to possible revision. The woman raised in
a misogynistic society might see herself as lesser than the men around her, but she has the
capacity to critically engage with that view and change her self-conception overtime.
Alternatively, a religious person might fundamentally identify himself with his religion
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and remain orientated around it throughout his life, but he could revise his commitments.
His commitment is made more significant by the fact that he could change it and does
not.
So, all sides in the contemporary dispute can recognize that selves are socially
embedded, so that cannot be where the dispute really lies. Even Kantians can recognize
that the self is socially-embedded and merely maintain the freedom consists in rational
willing rather than self realization. What, then, grounds the conflict between
communitarian and liberal views?
I want to suggest that these two perspectives differ in their identification of the
source of ethical ends and principles. Both sides might recognize that the self is socially
embedded but they significantly differ in interpreting how this matters for morality and
ethics. For the Communitarian, what determines the content of ethics and morality are the
particularities of our social structure and culture. Rather than distinguishing themselves
by appeal to the claim that the self is socially embedded, I suggest that they distinguish
themselves by the claim that the content of ethical life is dependent upon the particular
practices of a society. In short, Communitarians claim that ethical life is substantially
practice-dependent.
The Hegelian agrees with this Communitarian commitment, though Hegel
understands there to be a rational development of ethical life through time. For him, the
content of ethical life is practice-dependent, but the practices of our society can be
explained by the rational development of human freedom. Despite this difference, the
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Hegelian and Communitarian are in agreement that the content of ethical life and
morality is predominantly practice-dependent and local.
4.3.2 The Reconciliatory Response
To say that the two sides are divided by the extent to which they identify the content of
ethical life as practice-dependent or practice-independent undoubtedly seems too rough;
it ignores the nuance on the two sides. However, a rough contrast can nonetheless be
helpful and track a real difference. The contrast can help highlight a better view by seeing
the inadequacies of these two contrary positions. We should not think that the sole source
of our ethical ends and principles is our local particularity, and we should not think that
the sole source is an independent ethical perspective. The former would ignore any
objective grounding for the importance of socially determined concerns, and the later
would ignore the richness of ethical life provided within a community.
To transcend the inadequacies of either view, we need only combine them. We can
recognize that the source of some ethical ends and principles is the social structure, and
the source of other ethical ends and principles is an independent ethical perspective. In
short, we should recognize that there are practice-dependent values and practiceindependent values. We can accept a kind of limited conventionalism. Any adequate
ethical theory need recognize both. I think that most Hegelians, Communitarians,
Kantians and Liberals recognize this. Limited conventionalism provides a form for this
reconciliation.
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The way in which to recognize both aspects of ethical life is to recognize that the
contingencies of our social practices have a profound effect on ethical life, but the noncontingent aspects of ethics and morality do as well. While many of our values, virtues,
relationships and obligations will be explained by particular features of our social
context, others will not be. For instance, it is due to conventional aspects of our
professional structure that we have the kind of relationships with co-workers that we
have. It is because of our particular form of government that we have the political
obligations we have. Yet, one might think that we should not deceive others regardless of
the particularities of society. Or, one might think that knowledge is always valuable.
Which aspects are explained by which is not easily decided, and different theories will
explain different aspects. What matters is that we can recognize contingent features of
our social context as determining some aspects of ethical life just as we can recognize
non-contingent aspects as well.
Most importantly for my concern, practice-independent principles or values will
have a central role in evaluating our social context itself. Even if the content of ethical
life was predominantly determined by contingent social practices, practice-independent
values would have a role in assessing those practices. To support the communitarian
aspect of his view, F.H. Bradley appeals to a quotation from Hegel that is actually more
aligned with my conclusions than Bradley there recognizes. The full quotation comes
from §153 of The Philosophy of Right;
“to be moral is to live in accordance with the moral tradition of one’s
country; and in respect to education, the one true answer is that which a
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Pythagorean gave to him who asked what was the best education for his
son, If you make him the citizen of a people with good institutions”
In this we can recognize that living a good life means living the life of a member of
particular society, and the particularities of a people determine the specifics of how one
should live. Even when Hegel recognizes that our ethical life is partly determined by our
social context, he recognizes that it is important to have good institutions. To determine
which institutions are good, I maintain that we need some practice-independent
perspective. So, practice-independent values are important not only as part of the content
of ethical life, but in assessing those practices that determine the content of ethical life.
Hegel is likely referring to an actual Pythagorean in the above passage, but his
additional comments show that he also had Rousseau in mind. Rousseau did not dispute
the ways in which a social context had a profound and pervasive influence on a people’s
aims, relationships and values but he was not fully communitarian in his outlook. Instead,
he reached towards features of human nature that were independent of any particular
social context as part of a social critique. Likewise, even while Bradley argues that
ethical life consists partly in fulfilling one’s “stations and its duties,” he can recognize
that it is only the stations and duties of a good society that we should honor. Here, the
good society is one that is justified by appeal to values that are independent of that
society. For Rousseau, that was human nature. For Hegel, it was human freedom. In this
way, the quotation that Bradley used to support his view comes closer to that which I
argue for. I merely emphasize that we need a way of determining what counts as a “good”
institution, and that is done by appeal to practice-independent values.
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From this perspective, we can agree with Hegelians that an account of ethics that
is fully reliant on a formal conception of the self would be inadequate for ethical life. We
can recognize that much of the substance of our values, virtues, relationships, selfconception and obligations come from the particularities of our social context. Yet, this
recognition does not lead us to think that there is no practice-independent ethical values,
instead those practice-independent values are merely insufficient. Hegel was right to
suppose that a practice-independent perspective would be insufficient but a practiceindependent perspective is still necessary for a full grounding of ethical life. In particular,
practice-independent principles are appropriate for evaluating our social structure, which
grounds the particularities of our form of ethical life.
It is with this view in mind that we can see how a concern with the basic structure
of society can respect both the practice-dependent and practice-independent aspects of
ethical life. First, it respects the practice-dependent parts of ethical life by recognizing the
profound and pervasive influence of the basic structure. We recognize that our values,
virtues, self-conception, relationships and obligations change. Second, it respects the
practice-independent parts of ethical life by both holding the basic structure up to
appraisal by practice-independent values and by recognizing that not all of our values,
virtues, self-conception, relationships and obligations are practice-dependent.
It is in this way that a morally justified basic structure acts as a mooring for
ethical life. In living with others, our particular form of life will be influenced by the
contingencies of our culture and history. Like a boat atop the water, we will be moved in
one direction or the other by the winds and tides. A form of ethical life that is evaluated
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only by it’s local and practice-dependent values is adrift, but a society with a justified
basic structure is bound to solid ground. We will still move with the winds and tides of
culture and history, but our drift will have limits. Ethical life will always be sensitive to
the particular practices we live within, but living within a justified basic structure keeps
us tethered to the solid ground that our practice-independent values provide.
4.4 What is Still to come
In the remaining two chapters, I want to address two potential criticisms of my argument.
I have chosen to address these two objection specifically because each draws on deeper
convictions that might lead to a philosophical impasse. By discussing these objections, I
hope to bring these deeper convictions to the surface and explicitly address them. The
objection of Chapter 5 appeals foundational commitments regarding the role of moral
principles, and the objection of Chapter 6 appeals to convictions about justice as an ideal.
As I argued in 4.1, it is no problem if a moral theory rejects limited
conventionalism. While there will then be a conflict between that moral theory and my
conclusions, we then need to settle whether that moral theory or one that accepts limited
conventionalism is the best moral theory. What is a problem is an argument that shows a
fundamental problem with limited conventionalism. In Chapter 4, I introduce an
argument that tries to show this. This argument seeks to show that all justifications must
appeal directly to first principles that are fully general across moral subjects. I call such a
view a commitment to “generalism.” If generalism is right, then limited conventionalism
is wrong. Limited conventionalism requires that some justifications appeal to an
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institutional context and thus indirectly to first principles. Insofar as generalism supposes
that all valid justifications appeal directly to first principles, those who are committed to
limited conventionalism are mistaken. Accordingly, I argue against a commitment to
generalism in Chapter 5.
From the introduction, I have contrasted my argument for a focus on the basic
structure with an argument that appeals to a particular conception of justice. One might
try to show the identity, moral indispensability, and moral distinctiveness of the basic
structure by arguing that justice is uniquely related to the basic structure. Such an
argument uses the indispensability and distinctiveness of justice to ground the
indispensability and distinctiveness of the basic structure. I did not argue against this
approach except to suggest that we are unlikely to settle our disagreement by appeal to a
conception of justice alone. We need to argue to--and not from--a conception of justice.
By contrast, the objections that I am concerned with in Chapter 6 start from a
particular conception of justice. First, one might claim that my approach necessarily
misrepresents the nature of justice. Insofar as we take the principles that apply to the
basic structure as principles of justice, we then represent justice as consisting of that
principle. If the demands of justice are wider than this, we misrepresent justice by taking
its total demands to be those that are specific to the basic structure. Second, one might
claim that we can only determine how the basic structure should be if we first determine
what justice requires. Accordingly, this objection supposes that I have confused the order
of evaluation. In Chapter 6, I will respond to these two objections.
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Excursus: Rawls, Hegel and the basic structure as subject
As a final note, I want to better support the argument of §4.3.2 through an interpretation
of Rawls’s own reason for taking the basic structure as subject. There is good reason to
suppose that Rawls saw his focus on the basic structure as providing a response to
Hegel’s criticism of liberalism much as I suggest such a focus can reconcile the local and
universalizing impulses in moral theory. In discussing Hegel in his Lectures on the
History of Moral Philosophy, Rawls writes,
A second criticism of liberalism is that it fails to see, what Hegel certainly
saw, the deep social rootedness of people within an established framework
of their political and social institutions. In this we do learn from him, as it
is one of his great contributions. But I don’t think that a liberalism of
freedom is at fault here. A Theory of Justice follows Hegel in this respect
when it takes the basic structure of society as the first subject of justice.
People start as rooted in society and the first principles of justice they
select are to apply to the basic structure.
In this passage, Rawls recognizes that Hegel is correct to focus on the social-rootedness
of persons, and argues that his own theory does this as well. Specifically, it does so by
developing principles for the basic structure of society.
What is clear from this passage is that Rawls thinks treating the basic structure as
subject properly recognizes the social rootedness of persons, but what is less clear is why
he thinks this. His additional remarks in the lecture do not help, but he does spend more
time on this issue in an unpublished lecture titled, “The Contingencies of Social
Dependence.”102 In a revealing passage, Rawls starts with the fact of social rootedness.
102

Papers of John Rawls; Harvard Archives, HUM 48, Box 28, Folder 9

204

He argues that our conception of ourselves, our aims, our relationships and our values are
all influenced by our social context. Following this, Rawls concedes the typical
communitarian point that these aspects of our personality are not chosen, but he them
explains why this does not undermine liberalism. For Rawls, our freedom is a capacity to
survey and revise our ends, which does not require radical self-determination. He goes on
to argue that--given the fact of social rootedness--any adequate conception of social
justice must establish the social conditions within which that conception of justice is
acceptable to citizens. It is for this reason, he argues, that we should take the basic
structure as the first subject. In advocating principles for the basic structure, we recognize
the importance that our social context plays in shaping our character and self-conception.
Insofar as a conception of justice is feasible only when the basic structure supports a
social milieu in which persons accept that conception, we ought be primarily concerned
with developing principles for the basic structure to support that social milieu.103
What Rawls does not make explicit--but follows from this argument--is that the
fact of social rootedness makes it appropriate to use the abstract (Kantian) conception of
the person to develop principles for the basic structure. Yes, the Kantian conception of the
person is abstract and does not represent determinate individuals in all their particularity.
However, given that the contingencies of the basic structure profoundly effect the
particularity of persons, it would be inappropriate to determine how the basic structure
103
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ought to be on the basis of the particular interests and values of persons within a
determinate social context. As Rawls writes in 1977, to allow the determinate interests of
individuals to effect the principles of justice would be “to allow the disparate and deep
contingent effects of the social system to influence the principles adopted.”104 In order to
develop principles that are free of an idealogical justification, their determination ought
reach beyond the particularities of the social structure they are to be applied within. For
this to occur, we must represent persons in the original position abstractly. Insofar as we
recognize persons as free and equal persons with the two moral powers, then we model
them only as free and equal persons with the two moral powers. While the moral
construction does not recognize persons as determinate individuals, the profound and
pervasive effects of the basic structure so affect the content of our identities that it would
be inappropriate to use a less abstract conception of the self.
The final step of the analysis is to point out that what is inappropriate for
determining principles for the basic structure is not inappropriate for determining
principles for other subjects. The fact that Rawls appeals to a Kantian conception of the
person for assessing the basic structure does not commit him to appealing to this abstract
conception for all ethical questions. In determining principles that apply within a
particular social structure, it will be more appropriate to appeal to the particularities
within that social structure. The principles for interpersonal interaction, for example, will
need to be sensitive to the particular ideals, virtues, relationships and conventional
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obligations in that society. In specifying his “four-stage sequence” for applying the
principles of justice, Rawls makes this clear. While we start from principles in an original
position under a thick veil of ignorance, the following stages include more and more
information about the particular society that the principles apply to. In this way, the
particularity of a social context bears more and more importance as the stages of the
sequence proceed.
This all gives Rawls the tools to address the Hegelian criticism because he can
cede the Hegelian’s point without effecting his own theory. It might very well be the case
that the Kantian conception of the person would not be adequate for addressing all the
concerns of ethical life. In our personal life, we would need a moral theory that respects
our particularity; it needs recognize our social place and individual character. Since
Rawls does not claim that his version of Kantian Constructivism appeals to the Kantian
conception of the person for addressing all these concerns, he need not show that the
Kantian conception of the person is fully sufficient. For Rawls, the principles we ought
follow are determined by a construction that treats persons as free and equal. If we
integrate his comments from “The Contingencies of Social Dependence,” we see that the
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construction treats persons as free, equal and determinate.105 We are not noumenal beings
but social creatures within a particular social world. In developing principles for the basic
structure, what it means to develop principles that express our nature as free, equal and
determinate persons is that the construction abstract from our particularities. In other
cases, principles can only express our nature as free, equal and determinate persons by
representing us in our particularity. When our particular ideals, virtues, relationships and
obligations bear on the choice, then ignoring our particularity would not treat us as
determinate persons.
If this is all correct, then we ought treat the principles that apply to the basic
structure of society differently from other moral subjects. The principles that apply to the
basic structure ought not be specific to the particularities within a social context, whereas
many other principles ought be. The difference between these principles is not explained
by a difference between individual and institutional principles, but between principles
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originate at some definite social place in their society and with certain endowments.
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content. See Lectures in the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. Barbara Herman (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA. 2000), 173-176.
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that influence the particularities of a social context and principles that apply within those
particularities. As Rawls writes in Theory of Justice,
“That principles for institutions are chosen first shows the social nature of
the virtue of justice, its intimate connection with social practices so often
noted by idealists. When Bradley says that the individual is a bare
abstraction, he can be interpreted to say, without too much distortion, that
a persons’ obligations and duties presuppose a moral conception of
institutions and therefore that the content of just institutions must be
defined before the requirements for individuals can be set out.”
In this passage, we see Rawls emphasizing the relationship between the primacy of the
basic structure, the Hegelian criticism of a Kantian conception of the person, and the way
in which social institutions shape our obligations and duties. Rawls recognizes the “social
nature of the virtue of justice” by first developing principles that apply to the basic
structure.
Now, one need not be a Rawlsian to appreciate the distinction that Rawls is
making between principles that apply to the basic structure and principles that apply to
other subjects. This is a distinction that any moral theory can recognize the importance
of, and it is the distinction that I think is important to take away from Rawls’s argument.
Any moral theory has reason to recognize the difference between moral judgments within
the structure of ethical life and judgments of the structure of ethical life, so any moral
theory has reason to treat the basic structure differently. We can hardly imagine making
personal moral decisions without thinking about our social context. The particular values,
virtues, relations and obligations that characterize our social context as central for
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understanding morality and ethics. In distinguishing the basic structure from other moral
subjects, we respect this aspect of morality. The basic structure of society has profound
and pervasive effects on the structure of ethical life, so it ought be treated differently than
those moral subjects that are relevant within ethical life. Both within and without
Rawlsian theory, this gives us reason to distinguish principles that apply to the basic
structure from principles that apply to other subjects--and this justification relies neither
on creating space for self interest nor a pluralist division of moral labor.
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Chapter 5
Against Generalism
The fallacy in these versions of the same idea is perhaps the most pervasive of all
fallacies in philosophy. So common is it that one questions whether it might not be
called the philosophical fallacy. It consists in the supposition that whatever is found
true under certain circumstances may forthwith be asserted universally or without
limits and conditions. Because a thirsty man gets satisfaction in drinking water, bliss
consists in being drowned”
-John Dewey, Human Nature and Social Action, p. 175

As mentioned in the last chapter, my argument relies on a commitment to limited
conventionalism, and not all moral theories will accept this commitment. So, not all
moral theories will accept my arguments. That, in itself, is not problem. What would be a
problem is an argument that showed that limited conventionalism must be false. If
someone could disprove limited conventionalism, then much of my argument would be
disproved along with it.
In this chapter, I want to focus on a possible argument that claims to disprove
limited conventionalism. The argument seeks to show that a particular perspective
towards justification must be correct, and then to show that limited conventionalism
conflicts with that perspective towards justification. I identify this perspective as a
commitment to “generalism.” According to generalism, any adequate justification appeals
directly to first principles that are applied generally across all moral problems. The
arguments that I am concerned with in this chapter seek to show that generalism must be
true. They seek to show that any justification must appeal directly to fully general first
principles.
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Generalism conflicts with limited conventionalism because it leaves no room for
institutional context. Limited conventionalism claims that we should often look towards
the particular practices and systems we act within to justify a particular judgement. It is
because our practices affect the content of ethical life that we need to differentiate the
principles that apply within a moral context from those that do not. First principles might
aid our understanding of ethical life, they might direct our reforms of the social world,
and they might settle some particular conflicts, but they do not settle all moral and ethical
conflicts on their own. In this way, limited conventionalism and generalism are opposed.
If an argument shows that we should be committed to generalism, then we should not be
committed to limited conventionalism.
The name, “generalism” refers to a family of foundationalist moral theories, but it
does not refer to all foundationalist theories. Act-utilitarianism is one view that is
committed to generalism; it explains legitimate justifications as appealing only and
directly to the fundamental principle that we should promote happiness. There are also
non-consequentialist versions of generalism. Such theories explain all legitimate
justifications as appealing to fundamental values like autonomy, equality, and
happiness.106 Not all versions of foundationalism, however, are committed to generalism.
As mentioned in §4.2.1, a moral theory might recognize the Principle of Fair Play as a
fundamental principle and thereby recognize legitimate justifications as those that appeal
to the particular rules of social institutions (and only indirectly appeal to the foundational

106

Oftentimes, G.A. Cohen seems to adopt such a pluralist foundationalism, but it is not clear whether he
would allow for indirect appeals to foundational values like those required by limited conventionalism.

212

Principle of Fair Play). Or, one might understand respect for autonomy as requiring that
we respect the particularities of persons as determined by their social environment. We
might even recognize a consequentialist form of conventionalism if it meets the right
conditions. Any of these views might be foundationalist but they would not be committed
to generalism.
In being concerned with arguments for generalism, I am specifically concerned
with those who are committed to the view that “institutional context cannot matter for
individual principles because all judgments are justified directly by first principles.” In
addressing generalism, I both address the consequentialist and non-consequentialists
versions. I mean to combat the view that all legitimate justifications must appeal directly
to fully general principles--whatever form those principles take.
My argument will proceed in four sections. In the first, I want to emphasize the
significance of a commitment to generalism by showing how it motivates Liam Murphy’s
objections to Rawlsian theory. I will first reconstruct Murphy’s argument from
“Institutions and the Demands of Justice” to show how it ultimately relies on a
commitment to generalism.107 With this set-up complete, §4.2 is concerned with a
historically significant argument used by J.S. Mill and Henry Sidgwick in favor of there
being one fully general principle that can directly settle all moral conflicts. §4.3 then
introduces three other arguments, each of which seeks to show that there must be a
plurality of fully general first principles. I argue that each of these four arguments fails to
show that legitimate justifications must appeal directly to first principles. With this
107
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defensive portion of my argument complete, I will transition to offense in §4.4. There, I
argue that the particularities of the social world are centrally important to who we are and
our relationships with others. Generalism fails as a moral theory because it fails to
recognize the moral significant of our social particularity.
Overall, this chapter should show why there is no reason to be committed to
generalism, and it will thereby show why any argument that assumes generalism is
question-begging. While few recognize it explicitly, a commitment to generalism is
predominant in ethical theory. In many ways, it mimics the model of physics; we seek to
find general ethical laws that justify the whole of our diverse ethical convictions. Given
the aims of ethical theory, it makes sense to look for such general principles because they
provide a clear way to simplify our ethical understanding. Given our sociology, this
model makes sense because of the close ties between philosophy, logic and science. Yet,
the goal of this chapter is to show why we should not be committed to generalism. We do
not need to treat ethics like physics.
5.1 Liam Murphy and Generalism
In “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” Liam Murphy criticizes the Rawlsian method of
political philosophy for separating individual and institutional principles.108 Murphy’s
concern is not that Rawlsians advocate guiding principles that apply to institutions and not
individual conduct but that they advocate fundamental principles that apply to institutions
and not to individual conduct. He claims that his view,
“is of course compatible with the existence of specifically political principles
of a non-fundamental kind, such as the principle that taxation should be
108
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levied according to taxpayers' “ability to pay.” What [I reject] is any defense
of such a principle by appeal to a fundamental one that does not also apply
directly to people's conduct. It should therefore be clear that monism does not
have the absurd implication that all morally defensible legal principles are
ipso facto valid moral principles.109
Murphy does not explain exactly what a “fundamental” principle is, but it seems that he
means a principle that has a foundational role in our moral, political and ethical justifications.
While it is an interpretive jump, I will assume that a “fundamental principle” is a principle
that is not justified by any further principles. In this way, Murphy argues that our
foundational principles--those from which all justifications proceed--must apply generally
across both institutions and individuals. For him “any plausible fundamental normative
principles for the evaluation of legal and other institutions” must also apply to “the realm of
personal conduct.”110

For ease of exposition Murphy distinguishes two views. “Dualism” is the belief
that “the two practical problems of institutional design and personal conduct require, at
the fundamental level, two different kinds of practical principles.”111 Alternatively,
“Monism” is defined as the denial of dualism. Using these terms, he wants to argue
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against dualism and thereby on behalf of monism.112 However, there are two problems
with this argument, which I address in §4.1.1 and §4.1.2 respectively. First, Murphy
implicitly uses a foundationalist model of justification that Rawlsians should reject.
Second, Murphy wrongly imputes a position to Rawlsians about what our individual
obligations are.
5.1.1. Fundamental principles?
One of the deeper challenges facing Murphy’s argument is that he appeals only to an
intuitive sense of what “fundamental” normative principles are. The ways in which he
uses the phrase seem to suggest that fundamental principles are of foremost moral
importance and that they have some methodological primacy. While one needs to make
an interpretive leap to understand Murphy here, it seems that fundamental principles are
moral principles that are not justified by any other--more fundamental--principles.
The problem with this view is that it cannot be squared with the Rawlsian view of
justification that Murphy argues against. Rawls does not justify principles by appealing to
more fundamental principles, instead he appeals to a broader sense of reflective
equilibrium. Whereas fundamental principles make sense within a foundationalist model
of justification, it is not clear what role they play in a more holist model. One might think
that the two principles of justice are fundamental principles that are applied to determine
112
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what institutions we ought to have, yet Rawls does not even accept that. Instead, the two
principles are applied through a “four-stage sequence” in which the principles that are
developed in the original position are then interpreted by representative citizens who
know more about their society than do those behind a veil of ignorance.113 Subsequently,
the particular laws that we should have are determined by representative citizens that
interpret both the two principles of justice and the constitution developed. There is no
strait-forward application of more fundamental principles in this broader story.
Given this complication, it is unclear exactly how one should interpret Murphy’s
arguments. If we take Murphy’s definition of dualism on its face, Rawls is not a dualist.
Murphy defines dualism as the view that “the two practical problems of institutional
design and personal conduct require, at the fundamental level, two different kinds of
practical principles.” Yet, since Rawls does not think that these problems require
fundamental principles at all, he would not be a dualist. 114 Of course, it is clear that
Murphy is trying to argue against Rawls, so this might seem like a nitpicky issue.
However, it is unclear how Murphy could make his point at all without appealing to the
idea of “fundamental principles.” If Murphy dropped the phrase “fundamental” from the
definition, then dualism would immediately be recognized as innocuous. After all,
Murphy does explicitly recognize “the existence of specifically political principles of a
nonfundamental kind.”115
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5.1.2. Non-Ideal Circumstances
Suppose that Murphy can overcome this difficulty, and he can articulate a view of
fundamental principles that is consistent with Rawls’s project and does not rely on a
foundationalist model of justification. Nonetheless, his argument against the Rawlsian
method is still problematic. He seeks to show that any fundamental institutional principle
must also apply to individual conduct. This argument relies on a supposed problem that
Rawlsians face in dealing with injustice in our actual world. As Murphy writes,
“It seems to me that any political theory that accepts Rawls's bifurcation
of the normative realm into one set of principles for institutions and
another for people will yield an implausible account of what people should
do in non-ideal circumstances. Thus there is a general reason to reject
dualism.”116
The problem with Murphy’s argument, however, is that a mere commitment to dualism
does not itself lead to an implausible account for non-ideal circumstances. In order to
claim that dualism leads to an implausible account, Murphy wrongly attributes an
additional commitment to dualists. This additional commitment does not follow from
dualism alone, so Murphy’s argument relies on a non-sequitur. To see why, we can
formalize Murphy’s argument into three simple steps.
1) A moral theory should not have implausible implications for non-ideal theory
2) Dualism has implausible implications for non-ideal theory
3) Thus, we ought to reject dualism

116

Murphy, “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” 279.

218

In this argument, I completely agree with (1) but disagree with (2), so I reject Murphy’s
conclusion, (3). It is surely true that some versions of Dualism might have implausible
implications, but it is not the case that a commitment to Dualism itself has such
implausible implications.
The support that Murphy gives for (2) is that dualism would mandate that
individuals in non-ideal circumstances can only promote justice by revising institutions
rather than addressing social problems directly. This, he argues, leads to implausible
implications;
“The case to focus on is of course a nonideal situation where it is not true
that the best way for people to alleviate inequality or promote well-being
is to promote just institutions. For here monism tells people to do what
they can to bring about an improvement directly. If injustice is about
inequality, people should do what they can to reduce it. If they can have a
great impact on inequality by aiming directly at its reduction than they
would if they directed their energies to institutional reform, this is what
they should do. Dualism tells a different story: even if the individual could
do more to reduce inequality, alleviate suffering, or whatever, by direct
action, this is not what justice requires her to do. Justice requires her to
promote just institutions even if she is sure that the aim of the just
institutions she is promoting would be better served if she herself pursued
that aim directly. How could this be right?”117
To again formalize Murphy’s argument, we can identify the following steps;
a) Dualism requires persons to advance justice by promoting just
institutions
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b) Just institutions are justified (at least in part) by accomplishing certain
aims
c) In non-ideal theory, those certain aims will sometimes be better
advanced by direct action than through institutions
d) Thus, in non-ideal theory, dualism would be self-frustrating
e) A theory that is self-frustrating is implausible
f) Thus, dualism has implausible implications for non-ideal theory.
The most important problem with this argument is that (a) is either false or does not lead
to the conclusion. To see what I mean, there are two ways of reading (a). First, we might
read it as:
(a1) Dualism strictly requires persons to advance justice only by
promoting just institutions
This reading would imply that there is no other appropriate way by which to advance
justice than by promoting just institutions. Second, we might read (a) as:
(a2) Dualism loosely requires persons to advance justice by promoting just
institutions along with other means ,
In this case, there are other permissible ways of advancing justice beyond promoting just
institutions, though promoting just institutions is one permissible way. While (a1) would
require that persons advance justice only by promoting just institutions, (a2) would not.
Instead (a2) makes the promotion of just institutions a part of the requirement of justice.
Now, while Murphy seems to have (a1) in mind, it is false. A person might very
well be a dualist and that person might be committed to only advancing justice through
institutions, but that does not mean that a commitment to dualism requires that justice can
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be advanced only by institutional means. It is false because it supposes that a
commitment to dualism implies some specific principle for individuals. Yet, the
commitment to dualism is silent on such issues. dualism itself is merely the distinction
between principles for institutions and principles for individuals, it does not say anything
about the content of the principles for individuals. Since (a) is a principle of individual
conduct, whether or not promoting just institutions is strictly required is determined by
the principles of individual conduct and not by a commitment to Dualism alone. Thus,
(a1) is false.
On the other hand, (a2) might be true just in case dualism would be implausible
without it.118 Yet, even if one must accept (a2), it does not warrant (d) because it might
allow people to advance justice by also promoting certain aims directly. Since Dualism
allows us to distinguish principles for individual conduct from principles for institutions,
it might be that individuals should not promote just institutions whenever they could
promote other more worthy moral ends. Thus, the argument to show that a commitment
to dualism leads to implausible implications does not succeed because (a1) is false and
the conclusion would not follow from (a2). Since Murphy cannot show that dualism leads
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to implausible implications, he cannot show that we ought to reject dualism. Murphy
mistakes a commitment to dualism with a commitment about what individuals ought to
do in non-ideal theory. Yet, since dualism involves no commitment to the content of
individual duties in ideal or non-ideal theory, his arguments fail.
Overall, Murphy’s argument fails because he confuses a commitment to dualism
with a substantive view about the content of individual obligations. He supposes that
what distinguishes principles for institutions from principles for individuals implies
something about what our individual obligations are. There is no doubt that someone who
is committed to dualism might have implausible commitments about individual duties,
but a commitment to dualism does not entail such commitments.
5.1.3 Murphy’s Defensive Arguments
Perhaps the most impressive aspect of Murphy’s essay is the arguments he uses against
the various theorists who, up to that point, had argued on behalf of separating individual
principles from institutional principles. Against Nagel’s division of moral labor, he claims
that such a perspective might aid us in building institutions that best promote justice, but
it does not give us a reason to distinguish principles for institutions from principles for
individuals at any fundamental level.119 Against Thomas Pogge, he claims that the idea of
causing harm to those involved in our institutions is insufficient for distinguishing our
concern with institutions. 120 Against Dworkin, he argues that a division between the
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claims on a political community and the claims on individuals is too stark.121 Even if
Murphy errs in the ways expressed in §4.1.1 and §4.1.2, these arguments against Nagel,
Pogge, and Dworkin might seem to maintain their force.
Yet, Murphy’s arguments themselves suffer from two mistakes that limit their
effect. First, the argument against Dworkin supposes that dualism implies views about
how individuals should act, which §4.1.2 has shown would not be implied by dualism
alone. Second, his arguments against Nagel and Pogge rely merely on shifting the burden
of proof. He claims that these views are not sufficient to justify a fundamental distinction
between institutional and individual principles. Yet, given the failures of his own
argument outlined above, he does not offer any adequate argument to show that all
fundamental principles must apply to both institutions and individuals. It is only if we
suppose that Murphy has the default view that the claim that any argument is insufficient
proves the conclusion of that argument wrong. Without an argument for his default
position, Murphy does not give us any reason to deny that institutional principles and
individual principles are morally distinct.
The arguments of the previous chapters remain untouched by Murphy’s
arguments. My claim is that the principles that apply to the basic structure should be
morally distinct because the principles that apply to it should be insensitive to moral
context, whereas principles for individual action and many other institutions should be
sensitive. This claim does not rely on any claims about differences in demands on moral
agents, as (Murphy’s reconstruction of) Nagel’s argument does. It does not rely on any
121
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views about the unique ways in which we cause harm to persons through institutions, as
Pogge’s argument does. Likewise, it does not rely on views about the unique moral
relationship between members of a political community, as Dworkin’s does. In this way,
the arguments I give are resistant to all of Murphy’s defensive arguments.
5.1.4 The Underlying Motivation
There remains one larger point behind Murphy’s argument even after we recognize the
problematic presupposition involved in appealing to fundamental principles, after we
show that Murphy’s argument against dualism fails, and even after we see the problems
in his arguments against Nagel, Pogge, and Dworkin. Murphy also makes an intuitive
claim that motivated his argument against separating individual and institutional
principles. Put simply, whatever we are concerned about with institutions, we should also
be concerned about for individual action. For instance, the fact that equality seems
relevant for both assessing institutions and individual conduct seems to give us reason to
treat both institutions and individual conduct as applications of a more general principle
that expresses the importance of equality. Whatever the faults of his explicit argument,
this core motivation might still stand. Does the fact that we care about some of the same
things for institutions and for individual conduct rightly dissolve the distinction between
individual principles and institutional principles?
This motivating point only reveals Murphy’s implicit commitment to, what I have
called, generalism. For his arguments to succeed, Murphy needs it to be the case that the
concerns we have about our institutions are the same as those about our individual action.
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This would only be a challenge to my argument if fully general first principles directly
settled all moral and ethical conflicts. In appealing to “fundamental principles,” Murphy
is implicitly referring to a generalist model of morality in which conflicts are settled by
first principles. Murphy’s arguments would only bear out if he had a view like that of the
act-utilitarians wherein our first principles directly applied to all moral concerns.
Without an argument for generalism, Murphy’s claims amount to mere burdenshifting. He means to show that previous arguments for the separation between
institutional and individual principles fail. It is no surprise that those who are committed
to a form of generalism will not find those previous arguments adequate. Murphy gives
no more reason to accept generalism than to reject generalism. In this chapter, I mean to
highlight the importance of this commitment to generalism and to directly address it.
Given the predominance of a commitment to generalism, it is no surprise that
many have seen Murphy’s argument as important, but I mean to undercut the convictions
that ground generalism. To do so, I now what to look at the major arguments in favor of
Generalism and then show why each is inadequate. Doing this will show why an
argument from generalism against those who do not accept it can only be questionbegging.
5.2. Sidgwick’s argument for Generalism
Through this chapter, I aim to combat that view that fully general first principles are the
ground for all legitimate justifications. By blocking this view, I defend limited
conventionalism and thereby defend the primacy of the the basic structure as a distinct
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subject. In §4.2, I will be concerned specifically with an argument that seeks to show that
there must be one fully general first principle that settles all moral conflict.
This argument is most famous from Chapter 5 of J.S. Mill’s Utilitarianism 122 but
is most developed in Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics.123 There, Sidgwick argued for
utilitarianism from the intuitive idea that any moral conflict can be definitively settled.
He argued that this intuition could only be correct if there were a single overarching
moral principle capable of settling all conflicts. How else could any moral conflict be
definitively decidable if there were not an overarching principle that had authority over
any conflict? If there were such a principle, then its requirements would always
determine how one ought to act in all instances. This reasoning establishes an agenda for
moral philosophy that many still accept: to identify the single fundamental principle that
settles all possible conflicts. For both Sidgwick and many today, the argument for
utilitarianism is that promoting the greatest happiness seems to be the most appropriate
principle that could play this role. Even those who deny utilitarianism, however, might
still be tempted to identify such a fundamental principle. One might, for example,
advocate the Kantian principle to preserve and promote autonomy in all instances. 124
To be more precise, the argument goes as follows. If all moral conflicts are able to
be definitively settled, then there must be one choice that it is right to make for any two
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mutually exclusive choices. The next step is to suppose that for one choice to be right,
there must be some principle that can articulate what it is right to choose explicitly. Now,
suppose that principle X determines what is right in the choice between α and β, and
principle Y determines what is ethical between γ and δ. Now, imagine that there is some
possible conflict where principle X justifies doing ε while principle Y justifies doing θ,
where ε and θ are mutually exclusive choices. For our choice amongst ε and θ to be right,
we must now appeal to some principle Z to ethically choose between what is warranted
by X and what is warranted by Y. This same process continues as there might now be
conflicts between principles Z and and some principle W, and it continues until there is a
single fully general principle. Once we determine that single fully general principle, we
can appeal to that principle to definitively settle all moral conflicts. If that principles
settles all conflicts, than we need only ever appeal to that principles to determine what to
do.
5.2.1 Response from irreconcilable pluralism
One way to respond to Sidgwick would be to claim that not all moral conflicts can be
definitively settled. One might suppose that we live amongst competing values and that we
can do no better than to strike a balance between them in our judgments. Such a view might
recognize that the considerations relevant within our particular moral contexts are amongst
these competing values. With this view, there is no reason to suppose that there must be some
final principle that settles all moral conflicts. We might develop principles that balance values
relevant for our institutions and we might develop principles that balance values relevant for
individual actions, but we do not need to suppose that there is anything beyond our
competing values that unifies them.
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I take it that whether one believes in irresolvable value conflicts is one of the
major dividing lines between contemporary ethical theorists. For some, the project of
ethics is to determine the structure of ethics that resolves these conflicts, and for others
the project is to start from the fact of irresolvable conflict. For figures such as Isaiah
Berlin, Michael Walzer and Bernard Williams, to start an argument from the assumption
that there must always be a rational way to resolve a moral conflict is to construct a bad
argument. As Williams writes,
“It is my view, as it is Berlin’s, that value-conflict is not necessarily
pathological at all, but something necessarily involved in human values,
and to be taken as central by an adequate understanding of them. I also
think, though Berlin may not, that where conflict needs to be overcome,
this ‘need’ is not of a purely logical character, nor a requirement of pure
rationality, but rather a kind of social or personal need, the pressure of
which will be felt in some historical circumstances rather than others.”125
Here, Williams emphasizes value conflict is an inherent part of our lives, one that should
not be explained away or avoided. Importantly, the fact that not all conflicts in value are
rationally reconcilable does not mean that no conflicts of value are rationally
reconcilable. 126 Reflection, understanding and revision of our values might go some way
towards resolving these conflicts, and ethical philosophy might have an important role in
doing this.127 Yet, one makes a mistake if one assumes that all conflicts must be
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resolvable. For those who follow a perspective like Williams, the argument from the
demands of practical reason to generalism does not even get off the ground.
5.2.2 Response from Constructivism
While this kind of intuitionism is one plausible response to Sidgwick, those on the other side
of the dividing line than Williams will find it inadequate. If one believes that our moral
conflicts can be definitively settled, then we need to appeal to something beyond a balance of
intuition. John Rawls recognized this, and he drew a response to Sidgwick’s arguments from
a constructivist interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy. In his lectures on Kantian
Constructivism, Rawls writes,
“Sidgwick overlooked [the possibility of constructivism] because of a second
limitation: he failed to recognize that Kant’s doctrine...is a distinctive method
of ethics...Since Kant’s view is the leading historical example of a
constructivist doctrine, the result once again is that constructivism finds no
place in Methods [of Ethics].”128
The fact that constructivism finds no place in Sidgwick’s argument is significant because the
method of constructivism provides a way to definitively settle moral conflicts, and this
method does not rely on a single fundamental principle. Instead, the principles that settle
moral conflict are determined by an appropriate constructive procedure. 129 It is not a more
fundamental principle that justifies our institutional and individual principles but the pedigree
of their constructive procedure.
It is by appeal to a constructivist method that one can address Sidgwick’s argument
and justify the possibility that principles can be distinct at a deep level. According to
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Sidgwick’s argument, our various principles are all justified by a substantive first principle.
Once we recognize this, we see the variety of principles we might use merely as a variety of
principles that guide us in satisfying the first principle. The picture is quite different
according to constructivist reasoning. According to this view, our principles are justified by
whether an appropriate procedure would result in those principles.130 If a principle is so
justified, it maintains its own authority as a principle. It’s authority is not merely that it
guides us towards satisfying a more fundamental principle. After all, the procedure is
constructed to result in principles that have such authority. These principles are constructed
as fundamental principles, and we should not look past them towards anything more
fundamental. After all, they are not justified as satisfying some deeper principle but from the
pedigree of their procedure. In this way, a commitment to constructivism can justify a
plurality of fundamental principles, so long as each would result from an appropriate
procedure.
This point might be better seen by comparing three different constructivist views.
First, in Rawls’s version of Kantian Constructivism, fundamental principles are justified as
those that express our nature as free and equal moral persons. In determining the principles of
justice, we accept the principles that persons would agree to under specified conditions
because those principles respect our nature as free and equal. The principles resulting from
such procedures are not merely applications of a first principle to a particular context but are
themselves constructed as first principles. Second, T.M. Scanlon’s contractualism warrants
those principles that no one could reasonably reject. If we come to recognize that a moral
principle could not be reasonably rejected, then we accept it as one of many fundamental
principles. We do accept these principles as applications of a first principle or as guides for
how to act in ways that no one could reasonably reject. Third, those who read Kant as a
130
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constructivist can explain our principles as those that can be willed as universal law. Only
those maxims that align with these principles will be free of empirical determination, so only
those actions in accordance with such principles are truly autonomous. In each of these three
cases, the constructivist procedure results in a plurality of fundamental principles rather than
applications of a first principles or mere guiding principles.
Once we appreciate this aspect of constructivism, we can see why Sidgwick’s
argument is mistaken. We can recognize that moral conflicts can be definitively settled
without an appeal to a single first principle. Rather than any one fundamental value--such as
the greatest happiness or maximal coextensive autonomy--constructivists recognize a
plurality of principles that fit with one another and settle any moral conflict.
5.2.3 Responses from Conceptions of Rationality

Finally, we could recognize the possibility of other moral theories that accept neither
constructivism nor that moral conflicts cannot be definitively settled. Implicit in
Sidgwick’s argument is a typical claim that a decision between two options can be
rational only if there is a single scale on which they can be compared. Another response
to Sidgwick’s argument can deny that this is a condition of rational choice.
Once example of such a theory is offered by Elizabeth Anderson in Value in
Ethics and Economics. There, Anderson argues against the view that there is a single
overarching standard of value. She identifies the appeal of this view in that it can satisfy
two demands of practical reason,

that “reason can settle all question about what to

choose” and “that reason requires the global maximization of value.”131 If there is only
one standard of value, then these two demands can be settled by reference to that one
131 Anderson
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value; Reason settles all questions by appeal to maximizing that single value. In this way,
she recognizes the appeal of a single standard of value as similar to the intuition behind
Sidgwick’s argument, it allows us to settle any possible value conflict.
Anderson argues against this view by rejecting the notion that the values of statesof-affairs can be globally compared, opting for more contextual guidance in decisionmaking. Practical reason can still settle all questions about what to choose (as it needs to),
but we do not need to suppose that it does so by reference to some global value. Instead,
it only needs to settle specific questions within determinate contexts, which it can do by
being responsive to relevant contextual features. In this way, Anderson gives an example
of a third way in which all moral conflicts can be settled that does not appeal to
constructivism. Specifically, she relies on the determinate values that are relevant within
a context to settle what to do.
Similarly, Henry Richardson offers another example of how practical reason can
settle value conflicts. In Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, he argues for a kind of
reflective equilibrium that supports our principles.132 When we recognize that any two
principles conflict, we should revise one or both principles. We might revise them in any
number of ways, but we see the conflict as reason why our principles are in need of
revision. We do not search for a single foundational principle that resolves all conflict but
instead revise our principles for coherence amongst themselves.
So, the most daunting argument against the claims of Chapter 3 is Sidgwick’s
view that, if all moral conflicts can be definitively settled, then there must be a first
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principle that is capable of settling any conflict. In response, I have first shown that many
will deny Sidgwick’s starting premise that all conflicts can be settled. Second, I have
shown that even those who do not deny this starting premise can explain how conflicts
are definitively settled without appeal to first principles. Constructivism provides a way
of settling conflict by appeal to the principles that are licensed by an appropriate
procedure. Also, nothing blocks more alternative conceptions of rationality like those of
Anderson’s and Richardson’s, both of which show the problems with Sidgwick’s
assumption about rationality. Together, these arguments show why we do not need to
accept a single fully general first principle.
5.3 Other Arguments for Generalism
Even those who do not think that all moral conflicts can be definitively settled might still
think that any judgement must be justified by appeal to fully general first principles. For
some, this does not mean that there is a single first principle; there are many. In this
section, I treat three arguments that seem to support the idea that there must be first
principles from which all judgments are justified. The first argues from simplicity, the
second from unity and the third from our attempts to explain our various moral
judgments. In each case, I show that the arguments are inadequate to ground generalism.
5.3.1 Scientific Simplicity
First, one important advantage to broad explanations in science is that they allow us to
easily understand and apply those explanations. As Quine wrote, “Simplicity also
engenders good working conditions for the continued activity of the creative imagination;
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for, the simpler a theory, the more easily we can keep relevant considerations in mind.”133
This might be one reason why both laws of nature and ethical principles should be
sufficiently broad. By articulating fully broad principles that relate to all domain-specific
principles, we have “good working conditions” for solving our ethical problems.
Yet, this is only a point about the advantageousness of simple theories, and does
not give reason for us to suppose that the simple theory is more correct or reasonable. If
Newtonian mechanics is simpler or easier to understand than Quantum Mechanics, that is
no reason to believe that Newtonian Mechanics is true. While we surely have reason to
prefer simple and broad explanations, there is little reason to suppose that all explanations
must be simple and broad. Rather, the most important question is whether our
explanations adequately explain, regardless of whether they are complex and narrow or
simple and broad. We might think that the simplicity of Kepler’s models defeated
Copernicus’s use of epicycles, but the simplicity would not count in Kepler’s favor unless
its predictions were also more accurate.
The tendency to suppose fully general ethical principles probably developed from
the general appreciation of the scientist’s ability to provide simple and broad explanations
for our observations of the world. Yet, on what basis can one defend this tendency in
ethics? Why would we suppose that ethical questions are best answered by broad and
simple principles rather than restricted or complicated principles? Since the values in life
are so diverse and multifaceted, why would our ethical principles be any less complex
than ethical life itself? Surely, if one asks the question, “what is the foundation for all
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ethics,” one invites an answer that is maximally broad, but the tendency to ask that
question assumes a view under which it can be answered. While it is possible that the
best way to treat all these ethical subjects is to find some maximally broad principle, it
does not need to be the only way. Without some other argument for their similarity, we
should not assume that the model for physics is appropriate for ethics.
Overall, we should recognize that a simple explanation of any complex
phenomenon is bound to be wrong. Human life is complex, so ethical theory should be
hesitant about simplicity. Think of all the different pursuits that persons engage in and all
the different relationships we have. Think of all the different tradeoffs we might face and
all the persons we might become. Think of all the different responsibilities that might
direct us, opportunities that might open to us, and understandings that might close to us
when we pick one path in life over another. Now think of all the lives we could have led
had our social world or material conditions been different. Human life is astoundingly
complex in its subtleties and possibilities. With so many ways of engaging with the world
and only a single life within which to do so, we should recognize the complexities of
ethics.
In science, a simple theory can be elegant but fail to explain the evidence. It
would be nice if all matter were composed of four elements but, when we use such a
theory in the world, the world pushes back. When we use our elegant and simple theories
for ethics however, the world does not push back. Instead, we just see the world in terms
of that simpler theory; we see our actions as means to happiness or choices as instances
of autonomy. What tells against simplicity in science does not do so in ethics, so we need
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to be extra careful of our own theoretical preference for simplicity in the case of ethical
theory.
5.3.2 The Unity of Ethics
Second, one might argue in favor a broad principles on the basis that they would explain
the unity of our practical judgments. Typically, we think that our ethical judgements
should form a coherent whole and an appeal to fully broad principles or values would
explain that unity. Regardless of the role that such unity plays in resolving conflict, we
might take it to be a basic condition of ethics that all values form some kind of unity. It is
because general principles express a unity amongst our various commitments, that our
commitment to ethical unity would lead us to think that broad principles have a greater
authority.
Yet, a commitment to broad first principles is not the only way to explain a unity
amongst our ethical commitments. Even if we recognize the importance of some unity in
ethical judgements--which many might not recognize--we do not need to suppose that
general principles are part of that unity. For example, Elizabeth Anderson explains the
unity of judgments as arising from the active constitution of our identities and ideals. She
says, “When a person’s psychological states are rationally justified, or come tolerably
close, they bear expressive relations to one another that give them an internal coherence
and unity.”134 Alternatively, as we saw in 4.2.2, Rawls understand the unity of
constructivism as consisting in an appropriate sequence of subject. For him, “The
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underlying unity is provided by the idea that free and equal moral persons are to construct
reasonable and helpful guidelines for moral reflection in view of their need for such
organizing principles and their corresponding subjects are presumed to have.”135 The
important thing to notice is that both Rawls and Anderson provide alternative ideas of
what makes unity possible in ethics without general first principles. Both appeal to more
contextual judgments but Anderson unifies these judgments by appeal to the unity of self
while Rawls does so by a practical procedure. While fully general principles may provide
one way of unifying our ethical commitments, general principles are not necessary for
such unity.
An argument from unity has recently been used by Ronald Dworkin in Justice for
Hedgehogs, and it might seem like his argument could be used on behalf of fully general
first principles. After all, Dworkin appeals to an ideal of dignity--the constituent parts of
which are respect towards others and responsibility for oneself--as defining the unity of
all value.136 Yet, we need to be careful to separate the whole of Dworkin’s positive
proposal from his specific argument for unity.137 This specific argument arises from
Dworkin’s understanding of morality and ethics as independent of the scientific world of
brute facts. As he says in the introduction, “Value judgments are true, when they are true,
not in virtue of any matching but in view of the substantive case that can be made for
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them.”138 Since our values depend upon the cases that will be made for them, our
justification will depend on other values. It is from this that Dworkin now supposes that
an ideal--fully responsible--agent’s values would be fully complementary and mutually
supporting. The core idea is that our arguments for our values depend on our other values,
so a fully worked out conception of value must bring our values into a broader unity.139
Since there is no realm of value independent of our argument for our values, we cannot
say that the fully harmonized conception of value gets anything wrong. It can only fail to
make the case for itself.
While I find Dworkin’s argument about the independence of morality and ethics
quite appealing and tend to agree that the vindication of a value judgment depends only
how it is supported by other values, I do not see how this argument could be used in favor
of fully general first principles--or even in favor of the unity of value. The reason why it
could not favor fully general first principles is because that would prejudge the final
interpretation of how our values hang together. Why would we think that our values must
ultimately support one another through fully general first principles? Whether we ought
to accept such principles depends on whether our acceptance of them is supported by our
other values. Even if his arguments show that value judgments cannot conflict, there are
other ways of resolving conflicts than by appeal to fully general first principles--as the
arguments against Sidgwick show. Even if Dworkin’s argument gets us unity, it does not
138
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get us unity through first principles. That comes only through the more arduous task of
showing what understanding of morality and ethics is best.
A second problem goes closer to the core of Dworkin’s project. He argues from
(a) the idea that value judgments depend on their supportability by other value
judgements, to (b) the mutual supportability of value judgments for a fully responsible
moral agent, 140 to (c) the fact that values do not conflict, to (d) the unity of value. For the
sake of argument, I will assume that (c) and (d) are mutually interchangeable; I assume
that the unity of value is nothing more than the fact that values do not conflict. If they do
differ, then I see no argument that would get from (c) to (d). This is worth pointing out
because it emphasizes the way in which “unity,” for Dworkin, is nothing more than a lack
of conflict. With this point aside, my bigger concern is with the move from (b) to (c); I
see little reason to suppose that the mutual supportability of values supposes the lack of
conflict between values. We can--and Dworkin does--imagine a scheme of values
whereby there is no principled way to settle conflicts. There is nothing that rules out this
possibility, and Dworkin even acknowledges this when he writes,
“There is another possibility. It might be that for some reason the best
interpretation of our values requires that they conflict: they serve our
underlying moral responsibilities best if we conceive of them in such a
way that from time to time we must compromise one to serve another.
Values don’t conflict just because they do, but because they work best for
us when we conceptualize them so that they do. That is a conceivable
view, and perhaps someone might make it seem plausible...It would
140
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provide an interpretation that reconciles values in a different way: by
showing conflict as deeper collaboration.”141
In this passage, Dworkin recognizes a possible view that would block the move from (b)
to (c). If we see conflict between values as the best way to show the mutual supportability
of our values, then we do not get to the fact that values do not conflict. This is an odd
passage because Dworkin does not explain why this view would be implausible and he
does not say why this interpretation of values would be a “deeper collaboration.” To what
end would our values then be collaborating? We can only suppose that they are working
together if we assume the unity of value, but that is the very thing that this view blocks
the argument towards.
My suggestion is that our commitment to the mutual supportability of values does
not license a commitment to the lack of conflict in values. Accordingly, Dworkin lacks an
argument for value unity. It is of course true that his full view presents a picture of of
ethics that is unified, and his picture might end up being the very best. However, his
arguments do not show that we should accept the unity of value unless we accept his
whole view.
As a final point in favor of my argument, I want to point out the incongruity
between the unity that Dworkin supposes is in ethics and the disunity that he supposes in
interpretation. In order to make sense of interpretation in all its guises, Dworkin gives a
disunified conception of interpretation. What makes for a good interpretation depends on
the particular genre within which the interpretation is given. What makes for an
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interpretation of the law substantially differs from an interpretation of Hamlet. In each
case, what makes for interpretation depends on the values implicit in the practices of that
genre.142 In this story, Dworkin gives a disunified conception of interpretation in order to
best interpret it. What would block the same kind of disunified conception from being the
best interpretation of our values?
5.3.3 The “Why?” question
While broad first principles are not necessary for unity across ethics, these principles do
seem to satisfy a different need for explanation. Suppose we could show a consistent set
of range-limited principles that adequately captured our moral convictions and gave us
guidance in our decisions. Still we would wonder why these principles were adequate,
and why they were adequate for their particular ranges. This would seemingly require
some general principle that could explain why a principle is fit for a particular range.
Henry Sidgwick presses this intuition in Methods of Ethics when he writes,
Even granting that these rules can be so defined as perfectly to fit together
and cover the whole field of human conduct, without coming into conflict
and without leaving any practical questions unanswered,--still the
resulting code seems an accidental aggregate of precepts, which stands in
need of rational synthesis. In short, without being disposed to deny that
conduct commonly judged to be right is so, we may yet require some
deeper explanation of why it is so. From this demands springs the third
species or phase of Intuitionism, which...to get one or more principles
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more absolutely and and undeniably true and evident, from which the
current rules may be deduced.”143
In this quotation, Sidgwick emphasizes that it is not the need to avoid practical conflict
alone that leads us towards first principles from which judgments can be deduced, but
also the need to answer why the principles we accept are the right principles. It might
seem like fully general first principles can adequately answer this why question.
In his book, Practical Reasoning about Final Ends, Henry Richardson focuses on
Sidgwick’s claim, trying to understand exactly why Sidgwick aims to find fully general
first principles in order to put ethics on a rational basis. To be more particular, Richardson
imagines two principles of limited scope that do not conflict and asks why Sidgwick
would demand that these two principles be explained by a broader first principle. As an
example, he uses the two principles “benevolence towards one’s friends, implacable
justice to strangers” because there is no conflict in what the principles require.
Richardson points out that Sidgwick seems to suppose that an adequate answer to the
“why?” question must provide a reason that “(a) is of wider scope than the two
subordinated principles because it concerns itself with what should happen on both sides
of the scope restriction (in our example, with both friends and strangers), and (b) can
soundly or appropriately override each of these two subordinated principles.”144 In this
way, Richardson views the Sidgwick model as proposing a kind of “judicial” model of
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practical reasoning wherein “Principles of superior validity thus sit in judgment over
lesser principles, overruling them when necessary and settling their boundaries.”145
Richardson’s arguments against Sidgwick are primarily challenges to this judicial
model of practical reasoning. After all, his ultimate concern is to understand the structure
of practical reason, so Sidgwick’s claims about practical reason are his primary concern.
He makes two separate points against this model, both of which are important to see for
us to reject broad first principles as answering the why question. First, Richardson points
out that we are rarely as confident with our general and broad principles as we are about
our beliefs about particulars.146 So, why would we think that we would get an more
authoritative verdict by appealing to the broader principle we are less confident in?
Second, Richardson argues that it involves a problematic dissociation to the self. If one
set of our values pulls in one way, and a different set of our values pulls in another way,
then in settling the issue by appeal to a superior authority, we distance ourselves from the
values that pull us. As Richardson puts it,
“It would be an oddly dissociated person who generally felt a distance
from his competing desires and commitments as a judge is supposed to be
from parties who come before her...How can you decide a case fairly when
you are sleeping with both the plaintiff and the defendant?”147
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The basic idea in this criticism is that thinking of fully general principles as fully
authoritative in practical conflicts would not adequately recognize the particular cares we
have that give rise to the conflict.148 Deliberation, for Richardson, is more about finding a
way to adequately respect both sides of the conflict, to “meet in the middle,”149 than it is
to look towards principles outside of the concerns themselves. Both these reasons seem to
suggest that the judicial model is not an appropriate understanding of our practical
reasoning.
If the judicial understanding is not a proper understanding of practical reasoning,
then what reason do we have to think that a fully general principle would answer the why
question of ethics any better than principles that are not fully general. If we had some
proof of a moral theory that consisted of first principles, which grounded all other
principles, then we would have reason to think that such first principles justified all
others. Yet, it would be the proof of this moral theory that answered our why question and
not that fact that they are general principles. Any such proof of this moral theory could
not rely on the claim that first principles better explain all our other principles--as
Sidgwick’s argument does. Yet, barring such proof, we cannot suppose that the best
answer to our why question would necessarily involve general first principles. One might
appeal to simplicity or unity to make that argument, but I have already shown why we
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have no reason to suppose that ethical life is simple or that general principles are the only
way to get ethical unity.
So, without an appeal to simplicity, unity, the structure of practical reason or a
proof of valid first principles, the argument that first principles explain our moral
principles best is ungrounded. We have no reason to think that first principles would
better answer the why question than would an account that did not rely on any such
principles.
5.3.4 Defending Against Generalism
Without an argument from simplicity, unity, or explanation, it is not clear how one can
ground the claim that broader principles have greater authority. So, it is not clear why
someone who is not committed to the greater authority of broad principles can be
convinced of it. We are left with a distinction between those committed to a theoretical
intuition, and those not committed to it.
I know of no ways by which this difference can be settled than by showing that
one moral theory does better for what we want a moral theory to do than another. Until I
am shown a reason why a moral theory that involves broad first principles does better
than any that do not, then I see no reason to be committed to such a view. However, I do
think there are prima facie reasons why a moral theory that relies on general first
principles to directly settle all moral conflicts would do worse than moral theories that do
not. Explaining these prima facie reasons is the goal of the next section.
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5.4 Objection to Generalism
I’ve defined generalism as the view that fully general first principles directly settle all
moral and ethical conflicts. The most common form of generalism is act-utilitarianism,
but we can likewise identify certain forms of Kantianism or value pluralism as also
committed to generalism. My remarks in §4.2 and §4.3 are meant to block various
arguments that might seem to show that one must be committed to generalism, but I have
not given any reason to reject a commitment to generalism. The goal of this section is to
give one brief reason why I think such a commitment is morally problematic.
One alternative to generalism--and the alternative that I am concerned with
defending in this dissertation--is the view that our social context affects the moral
principles that appropriately regulate our actions. If persons generally recognize a
practice of property that can be sufficiently justified, then persons have an obligation to
follow the rules of property. If persons generally recognize a legal system, then persons
have an obligation to follow the law. If flaunting certain norms would express disrespect,
then persons ought to follow those norms. It is true that a generalist can often explain
why we should respect property, obey a law, or follow etiquette in any particular instance
by arguing that some fully general principle applied to the circumstances would show that
we should do that which respects property, obeys a law, or follows etiquette. They might
even say that, given the facts, it will generally be the case that we should do these things,
so “respect property,” “follow the law,” and “follow etiquette” will be good heuristics for
guiding our action. However, the generalist cannot make sense of our having an
obligation to respect property, follow the law, or follow etiquette. Doing so would mean
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that not all legitimate justifications appeal directly to first principles. In such a case, we
would need to appeal to the rules of our social practices as legitimately determining how
we should act. Our moral conflicts would be settled by the particularities of our social
context. Such a view would no longer be generalist.
To focus on one example, one could either explain the obligation to respect
property as either (a) a natural obligation, (b) not really an obligation, or (c) a practicedependent obligation. If (a), then one must claim that property, in all its specificity, is a
natural obligation. Even if one is willing to bite this bullet for property, there is a wider
range of obligations that seem conventional, which one would also need to explain as a
natural duty. For example, if one recognizes a citizen’s obligation to vote, this would
need to be justified as a natural duty as well. If (b), then one claims that it is only the case
that we often should respect property claims, and not that we truly have an obligation to
do so. This is the act-utilitarian route. I have claimed that the best option was (c), which
requires that we recognize our obligation to respect property as contingent; they rely on
the general recognition of norms of property. When such a system is adequately justified,
we have reason to respect property.
Here, I want to expand on this argument and better explain why I think option (c)
is the best way to think about obligations like property. As I also indicated in the last two
chapters, there are many more aspects of social life beyond obligation that I think are
dependent on the particularities of a social structure. The virtues that we aspire to, the
values that direct our activities, and relationships that we care about are also given their
particular form within a social context. So, my argument is meant not only to defend
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practice-dependent obligations, like property, but practice-dependent values, virtues, and
relationships.
The first step of my argument is to point out the ways in which contingent
features of our social world are important to us. Many of our goals only make sense as
goals within a particular society; for example, the goal to get tenure or to write a
particular book. How we think of our selves is also tied to the social roles we occupy or
our particular hobbies; to see oneself as American, or as an academic, or as someone who
likes to sail or paint. Moreover, many of the norms that we have internalized are
conventional. We can recognize that a morally seamless life, in which our aims our
integrated with appropriate moral constraints, is an ideal. Yet, this ideal only occurs when
we have internalized moral constraints into our daily behavior, and this will often mean
integrating conventional constraints--such as our respect for property. Once internalized
in this way, these norms are important to who we are and how we live. In all the various
ways that we plan our life, we plan it against a background of social expectations. We
rely on the fact that there are authorities, such as judges, that decide conflicts. That we
feel obligated to such an authority may be contingent, but it is nonetheless an important
part of how we plan our lives. In many more ways than I can go into here, the
contingencies of our social life specify what matters to us.
The second step of the argument is to insist that the right view of morality must
respect what is important to us and--more importantly--what is important to others.
Beginning in the 1980s, there was a swath of philosophical articles and books that
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stressed the ways in which morality should not be over-demanding. 150 Samuel Scheffler
expressed this point as arguing that morality should be human; it should fit with the kinds
of creatures that we are.151 A morality that did not respect what was important to us and
important to others would be burdensome to us, but it would also be inhuman in other
ways. We are social creatures, who build our lives with others according to conventional
rules and contingent norms, and morality ought to be sensitive to the ways in which our
lives are socially embedded. How we understand ourselves, our lives and our
relationships with others are influenced by the contingencies of society. A morality that
was not sensitive to these contingencies would not be a human morality. This is apparent
from a first person perspective because we would not want to be bound by a morality that
did not fit with the lives we lead, but it is even more apparent in how we should live with
others. We do not want to treat others according to moral norms that do not respect what
is important to them.152
With these two points established, the problem with the generalist view is that it
does not respect what is important to us and others because it does not respect the
contingent features of our moral context. According to this view, how we ought to choose
is directly determined by fundamental principles that hold across all social contexts. The
generalist might recognize particularities of our society as social facts that bear on the
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application of general principles, but it does not treat the practices of society as having
any significance for us. Once we see who we are and what we care about as crucially
linked to the particularities of our social structure, this makes generalist morality quite
alienating. The fundamental principle of the generalist are imposed upon us and our
society rather than being a manifestation of who we are.
By contrast, a theory that recognizes contingency in ethical life can properly
respect the way that particularities of the social structure are important to us. If our claims
to property and to other conventional rights are important to us, a conception of morality
that puts our property claims and conventional rights on a firm foundation respects what
is important to us. I have throughout argued for a view of morality that is sensitive to our
social context, partly because such a view of morality better expresses who we are.
The obvious objection to this view is that it seems too relativistic. To admit this
kind of contingency in ethical life might seem to say that all of ethics and morality is
contingent. To say that are social structure establishes certain values, virtues,
relationships and obligations might seem to say that all there is to ethics is a particular
social structure.
If the only way to develop such a view were to accept relativism, then I would
recognize that this would be an objection to the view. I recognize that relativism is
inadequate as a moral theory. Yet, saying that ethical life is sensitive to the particularities
of our society is not to say that it is fully determined by the particularities of our society.
A view of ethical and moral life that is sensitive to our moral context does not deny that
there are many obligations, values, virtues are relationships that are directly justified by
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absolute principles. For example, it might be immoral in any society to deceive or
murder. It also does not deny that there are certain obligations, values, virtues and
relationships that are justified by absolute principles but need to be specified within a
particular social context. For example, Barbara Herman has argued that the imperfect
duty of beneficence is specified into particular moral requirements only in a society.153
Others might think that there is a natural right to property, but that right is specified
within particular social communities. In either case, the absolute principles that surpass
any particular community are still an important element of ethical life.
The broader point of this dissertation is to show why the view developed here is
not relativist in yet another sense. The particular practices that explain much of the
contingency in ethical life are themselves open to assessment. The fact that they establish
certain obligations, values, virtues or relationships does not make those practices any
more prima facie justified. It remains the case that our assessment of these institutions
will often be sensitive to the moral context those institutions are set within--as argued in
§3.2.2. Yet, our assessment of the basic structure institutions does not occur within any
moral context. They are the institutions that the vast majority of our practices occur
within, so they establish a moral context rather than being situated within one.
Accordingly, the proper way to assess the basic structure institutions is by values that are
outside of moral context. We ought to assess these institutions by appeal to absolute
moral principles that are independent of social particularity. From there, we can assess
the various institutions within a moral context that is justified by absolute moral
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principles. It is in this way that the basic structure acts as a mooring for ethical life. As
argued in Chapter 4, the particularities of our society and culture will swash the content
of ethical life one way or another, but our ethical life stays tethered to non-relativist
moral ground so long as our basic structure is justified by absolute principles,
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Chapter 6
The Concept of Justice
“Plainly we cannot grapple adequately with the issue if we see it as one concerning
the proprieties of linguistic usage. For what really is at stake is the comparative merit
of a wider or narrower concept...If we are to make a reasoned choice between these
concepts, it must be because one is superior to the other in the way in which it will
assist our theoretical inquires, or advance and clarify our moral deliberations, or
both.”
-H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 209

With the work of the past four chapters complete, we can now return to the topic of
justice. I have defended the claim that “the basic structure has primacy as a distinct moral
subject,” but the more typical Rawlsian claim is that “the basic structure is the primary
subject of justice.”154 I choose to make the former claim because the value of taking the
basic structure as subject transcends any particular view about justice. Our political and
moral theory should recognize the primacy of the basic structure regardless of our
particular understanding of justice as an ideal.
Most objections to the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure come from
alternative articulations of justice that show why the basic structure is not the primary
subject of justice. Unfortunately, these arguments are unlikely to resolve any conflicts.
More often than not, one’s views about justice are fitted to our broader moral and
theoretical commitments. We do not share significant agreement over what justice is such
that appeals to justice could settle our disagreements. Arguments about the nature of
justice might provide helpful contrasts between moral views, but they are unlikely to
154
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settle the deep disagreements that typically divide philosophers. So, I have sought to
construct an argument that appeals to notions that are less contentious than a conception
of justice. In particular, I have tried to show that those who accept a limited form of
moral conventionalism should recognize the primacy of the basic structure as a distinct
moral subject.
Yet, I cannot merely ignore those arguments that start from a conception of
justice. While I do not think that arguments about the nature of justice are the best way to
vindicate the primacy of the basic structure, others think that arguments about the nature
of justice are the best way to defeat the primacy of the basic structure. I need to address
claims about the nature of justice insofar as they are an objection to the view I defend.
That is the central task of this chapter.
In particular, I am concerned with two objections that begin with a claim about
justice. According to the first, we misrepresent justice by focusing on the basic structure
of society. Suppose we recognize that the basic structure should be just, and we set out to
determine moral principles that apply to the basic structure. We are then likely to
conceive of the principles we come to accept as principles of justice. This, in turn, is
likely to skew our perspective towards justice more generally. We will think that the
moral demands on the basic structure indicate the moral demands of justice tout court.
Thereby we run the risk of misrepresenting justice by associating the broader ideal with
its limited application to the basic structure. As an example, suppose that justice requires
equality of treatment, and we determine that a just basic structure equalizes each person’s
opportunities for securing social goods. It would misrepresent justice if we took it to
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require equality of opportunities for social goods. We would be representing the demands
of justice as more limited than they really are. More generally, if justice requires X and
this requires that a basic structure meet condition Y, it would be wrong to understand
justice as Y. We would misunderstand an application of justice as justice itself. In this
way, one’s focus on the basic structure might be objectionable because it misrepresents
justice.
The second objection claims that we must determine what justice requires in order
to determine the correct principles for the basic structure. While I have argued that the
basic structure has primacy as a moral subject, one might claim that articulating an ideal
of justice has greater primacy. After all, such an ideal is necessary to properly understand
how the basic structure could be just. Accordingly, we should primarily be focused on
articulating what justice requires and not on how the basic structure should be organized.
If these objections relied on a particular conception of justice, then they would not
be that problematic. The objections would then only be offering a contrast between
conceptions of justice. What makes these objections more forceful is that they seek to
identify standards that any conceptions of justice must meet. They do not start from such
premises as “justice consists in equality” or “justice consists in respect for natural rights.”
Instead, they appeal to the way that justice figures into our practical reasoning and moral
debate. The first objection supposes that any adequate conception of justice is broader
than the demands it places on the basic structure. The second objection supposes that any
adequate conception of justice has justificatory primacy. In this way, the arguments start
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from conditions on the concept of justice. These two objections start from premises about
how the idea of justice fits within our moral deliberation and debate.
Since the objections start from claims about the concept of justice, my response
offers a perspective towards how we should think about the concept of justice. I do not
argue against any conception but against the concept of justice that these objections
appeal to. To do so, I will contrast two ways that the ideal of justice figures in our
deliberation and debate. A concept of justice might be “unified” or “disunified.”
If one conceives of the concept of justice as “unified,” then one supposes that the
demands of justice can be articulated as a single moral demand across the various objects
that might be considered just or unjust. We could, in theory, identify a single property that
all just institutions, persons, actions, dispositions and societies have. In this way, a unified
concept of justice is Platonic in that it identifies justice as having a particular essence
instantiated in each just thing. By contrast, a “disunified” concept of justice holds that the
demands of justice differ from one subject to the next. What makes for a just law is
different than what makes for a just person, and what makes for a just basic structure can
be different from what makes for a just action. In this way, a disunified concept of justice
is like a deontologist’s concept of rightness; what is “right” is determined by a principle
that applies in that circumstance rather than by a single principle that applies across all
circumstances. Likewise, what is “just” is determined by a principle that applies to that
subject and not by a single principle that applies across all subjects.
In response to the two objections, I argue for a disunified concept of justice over a
unified concept. Instead of thinking that “a particular is just if it instantiates a unified and
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general ideal,” we should think that “a particular is just if it satisfies a principle of justice
that applies to it.” Beyond the formal property of satisfying a principle of justice, I argue
that there does not need to be a single property that makes all just things just.155 To
determine whether something is just, we need not look for a single, unified and fully
general principle of justice. Instead, we look to see whether that object satisfies a
principle of justice.
If one accepts a disunified concept of justice, then neither of the two above
objections is a problem. First, focusing on the basic structure would not misrepresent
justice. Determining how the basic structure should be does not influence how we should
think about justice more generally because we can recognize that the principles of justice
for the basic structure might be distinct from a principle of justice for other subjects. In
determining how the basic structure should be, we could be seen as determining an
appropriate principle of justice for the basic structure without making claims about justice
as a whole. Second, we would not need to first articulate the demands of justice in order
to determine how the basic structure should be because there is no single demand of
justice for all subjects. We do not obviously reason from a prior and broad ideal to the
instances of that ideal.
My primary concern is in responding to these two objection, but a disunified
conception of justice also allows me to better explain why the basic structure could be
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“the primary subject of justice.” It might seem odd to make this claim once we accept a
disunified concept. After all, if something is just when it satisfies a principle of justice,
then why would one subject of justice be more primary than another? However, I argue
that it is the primacy of the basic structure as a moral subject that makes the basic
structure the primary subject of justice. The particularities of our basic structure have
profound and pervasive effect on our moral context, and this makes it a primary concern.
In this way, the arguments of the past four chapters combine with a disunified conception
of justice to show why the basic structure might be properly understood as the primary
subject of justice.
The argument of this chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I motivate the
importance of the argument in §6.1 by showing the ways in which G.A. Cohen’s most
developed criticism of Rawls relies on a unified concept of justice. Over the years, Cohen
has made a lineage of arguments against Rawls, and they end with an argument that the
Rawlsian focus on the basic structure is arbitrary from the perspective of justice. Those
who are not interested in seeing how Cohen’s argument developed between 1992 and
2009 can skip ahead to §6.1.3. There, I show how Cohen’s most developed arguments
rely on a unified concept of justice. By arguing on behalf of a disunified concept, this
chapter addresses the most developed form of Cohen’s argument.
In §6.2, I give two arguments against a unified concept of justice. My first
argument seeks to show how a disunified concept can better capture the argument
between those who offer alternative conceptions of justice because it allows for both
unified and disunified conceptions of justice. My second argument seeks to show that a
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disunified concept is more aligned with the way in which we treat justice as having a kind
of “preeminence.” The fact that something is often means that it is as it should be, and a
disunified concept can more easily fit with this feature of justice. I end my argument in
§6.3 by responding to an important objection. My response to this objection allows me to
explain how the basic structure might be rightfully identified as the primary subject of
justice.
I do not doubt that there is a strong intuitive pull towards thinking about justice as
a single unified ethical demand. Much about our use of the idea pulls us to articulate a
single sense of justice that explains why all things are just. What I mean to show here is
the problem with thinking that justice must be a single moral demand. There is nothing
conceptually necessary about treating justice as a unified and general moral demand, and
I think we can give a better conception of justice that is not unified and general.
6.1 The Development and Force of Cohen’s Critique of Rawls: A Review
The lineage of arguments represented in Cohen’s 2009 book began with his 1992 Tanner
Lectures titled “Incentives, Equality and Community.”156 In these Tanner Lectures, Cohen
took issue with an intuitive motivation for Rawls’s difference principle. The difference
principle justifies inequalities when they are to the advantage of the worst off, and such
justified inequalities are typically thought possible only because persons work harder
when incentivized to do so, thereby yielding benefits for all. Yet, Cohen points out, this
only occurs when the incentivized hold their hard work hostage for the incentive; the
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worst off could be even better off if the incentivized were willing to work hard without
the incentive. Cohen emphasizes that if persons really accepted the difference principle,
then they would not demand such incentives. In this way, Cohen argued that mutual
acceptance of Rawls’s difference principle requires a much more egalitarian society than
most recognize; it requires a society of persons who work to the advantage of the worst
off without requiring incentives to do so.
This line of argument was sharpened in a 1995 article where Cohen argues against
Brian Barry’s argument for the difference principle.157 Barry’s argument comes in two
steps; we start from a prima facie commitment to the justice of equality, and then
recognize that each is made better off in a society structured by the difference principle.
Accordingly, even the worst off prefer a society structured according to the difference
principle rather than equality. Yet, echoing his earlier argument, Cohen replies that a
society organized in accordance with the difference principle is preferable only because
the well-situated choose to act unjustly. If equality is prima facie just, then those who
demand incentives to work towards the improvement of the worst off are working against
equality, and thus against justice. Accordingly, Barry’s argument “accedes to injustice in
its account of what justice is.” Yet, even if Cohen’s argument stands against Barry’s view,
it does not stand against Rawls’s. Rawls does not recognize equality as a prima facie just
starting point, and Rawlsians should not do so. Accordingly, this 1995 article plays a
minor role in Cohen’s substantive argument against Rawls.
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Cohen’s more important argument was published in 1997 and titled “Where the
Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice.” There, Cohen is centrally concerned with
responding to a Rawlsian objection to his original 1992 argument. The conclusion of the
original argument was that acceptance of the difference principle should lead members of
society to refuse those incentives offered to make the worse off better off. Yet, the
Rawlsian can respond that the difference principle applies only to the basic structure of
society, and so its acceptance would not have any impact on personal decisions. To
extend the difference principle to individual choices would be like supposing that if one
accepts that (a) governments should not favor a particular religion, they should accept
that (b) individuals should not favor any particular religion. In this way, the Rawlsian
appeals to the distinction between principles for individuals and principles for
institutions.
What has made Cohen the primary interlocutor in the arguments of this
dissertation is how he responds to this distinction between individual and institutional
principles. He offers a number of different responses that I have addressed at various
points in my arguments.

6.1.1 The first argument: profound and pervasive effects
In “Where the Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice,”158 Cohen argues that any
principle that applies only to the basic structure is problematic because there was no way
in which the Rawlsian could adequately distinguish the basic structure from individual
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choices. He writes, “a major fault line in the Rawlsian architectonic not only wrecks the
basic structure objection but also produces a dilemma for Rawls’s view of the subject of
justice....The fault line exposes itself when we ask the apparently simple question: what
(exactly) is the basic structure?” Cohen recognizes two ways of answering this question;
the basic structure is understood as the coercive structure or it is not. If defined as the
coercive structure, it conflicts with the Rawlsian aim of assessing those aspects of society
that have profound effects because more than the coercive structure has such effects. If it
is not defined as the coercive structure, then it must necessarily involve personal choices,
which would make the difference principle apply to personal choices. Given this
dilemma, the basic structure cannot be distinguished as subject. Since it cannot be
distinguished as subject, the Rawlsian cannot reply that the difference principle applies
only to the basic structure. Thus, if the difference principle is an appropriate principle of
justice, it must be applied to individual choices.
After the publication of Cohen’s 1997 article, the Rawlsian responses to Cohen’s
criticism proliferate and Cohen’s arguments against these responses proliferate in return.
The three above-mentioned articles form the first three chapters of Cohen’s 2009 book,
and the remaining chapters of the book develop the argument further. We do wrong,
however, to think that Rescuing Justice and Equality is merely a clarification and
extension of the views expressed in “Where the Action is.” In fact, there is a significant
alteration of his argument stated in an 2008 appendix to the 1997 article and corroborated
by an important change in the text. In 1997, the second horn of the dilemma is based on
the claim that there is no way to distinguish the basic structure from individual choices,
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but the 2008 appendix admits that there is a way to distinguish structure from individual
choice. He writes,
“Actions are, in general, no part of the basic structure, because a structure,
in the present sense of the term, is a set of rules, and actions are not
members of sets of rules. So the relevant customary actions...are
nevertheless not themselves a set of rules. My point is not that daily
behavior, including ‘individual market behavior,’ is part of the basic
structure but that it is so closely related to what must on pain of
arbitrariness be included in the basic structure, to wit, the informal
structure demanded by justice, that it too, that is, daily behavior, comes
under the same principles of justice that judge structure properties of
justice.”159
Read alongside the 1997 article, this is an odd passage. In 1997, the second horn of
Cohen’s dilemma relies on the claim that there is no adequate way of distinguishing the
basic structure from personal choice. Yet, in the above passage, Cohen admits that there is
a way of doing this because “a structure...is a set of rules and actions are not members of
sets of rules.” In this way, he seems to undermine his argument from 1997.
However, this is no issue for Cohen because he has a new argument. In 2008, the
claim is that the informal structure of society must “on pain of arbitrariness” be included
in the basic structure. Yet, if the distinction between the basic structure and personal
choices is a real one--as he admits in the passage--then why would distinguishing the two
be arbitrary? Cohen here relies on another implicit argument to show that the distinction
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between the basic structure and personal choice might be possible but is nonetheless
ethically arbitrary. The distinction could be made, but it could not be justified.
Why would this distinction be ethically arbitrary? Cohen gives two different
answers in Rescuing Justice and Equality. The first answer is contained in a 2008 change
to the text of “Where the Action is.” There, Cohen argues the distinction is ethically
arbitrary because any reason to be concerned with the basic structure is likewise a reason
to be concerned with personal choices. In a passage added in 2008, he writes,
“Structure and choice remain distinguishable, but not from the point of
view of the applicability to them of principles of justice (at any rate when,
as it is ex hypothesi the case here, they are thought to apply because of the
fateful consequences of that to which they apply: you cannot bring the
informal norm into the compass of justice for that reason without also
bringing within its compass the action that gives the norm substance and
that account for much, if not most, of the effect).”160
For Cohen, if our reason to be concerned with the basic structure is the profound effects
they have on our life, we must also be concerned with personal choices because they have
similar effects. The distinction would be ethically arbitrary because our grounds for
concern with one also grounds a concern with the other. Readers will notice that in
making this argument in 2008, his treatment of the second horn of his dilemma is now the
same as his treatment of the first horn. Whether the basic structure is defined coercively
or not, distinguishing the basic structure from personal choice is ethically arbitrary
because both have profound effects. Accordingly, Cohen’s 2008 argument is that Rawls
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cannot justify a focus on the basic structure from an appeal to profound effects. There is
no longer any dilemma for Rawls, but this single argument.
Yet, this argument relies on a mistaken reading of Rawls, and Cohen’s concern
with profound effects is only a distraction. Appeal to profound effects was not meant to
explain why Rawls focuses on the basic structure rather than other aspects of society. It
was instead meant to explain why the organization of the basic structure is of such ethical
importance. In comparing this concern with the basic structure to other ethical concerns,
the basic structure is of such high importance because it has profound and pervasive
effects. In short, the appeal to profound and pervasive effects is not meant to answer the
question “what distinguishes the basic structure from other ethical concerns?” but to
instead answer “why is the concern with a basic structure primary amongst ethical
concerns otherwise distinguished.”161

The organization of the basic structure has

profound and pervasive effects, so it is ethically important that we address it. The
informal structure of society also has profound and pervasive effects, so it is ethically
important that we address it as well. Yet, the fact that both the informal structure and
basic structure are ethically important is no reason to address them together as a single
subject.
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6.1.2 Cohen’s second argument: the scope of justice
Since Rawls does not appeal to the “profundity of effects” criterion 162 to distinguish his
concern with the basic structure, Cohen’s first argument to show that this distinction is
ethical arbitrary does not succeed. However, Cohen has a second argument. This second
argument is contained neither in the 1997 article nor in the 2008 edits, but it runs through
the remaining chapters of Rescuing Justice and Equality. According to this second
argument, the reason why we should not distinguish the basic structure is because doing
so is arbitrary from the perspective of justice. To make this point, Cohen turns his
attention to clarifying the nature of justice. Once we see what kind of requirement justice
must be, we can see why it is arbitrary to distinguish structure and choice from the
perspective of justice.
To show what kind of requirement justice must be, Cohen appeals to a theory of
justification.163 He argues that all justification proceeds by appeal to more fundamental
ethical principles. While the justification of any particular act, judgment or principle
might go in many stages--appealing to still more fundamental principles at each stage-this process bottoms out at fundamental normative principles. These fundamental
normative principles express our core ethical commitments, which are often implicit and
cannot themselves be justified.
162
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Before arguing about the concept of justice, however, he first sharpens his view about the content of
justice. In Chapter 4, he tries to show that the appropriate standard for distributive justice is not the
difference principle, but equality. In Chapter 5, he answers an objection that requiring persons to be
concerned with equality would unfairly restrict either freedom of occupation or the value of self-realization.
These two chapters together fill in Cohen’s substantive view; Justice does not require that the basic
structure be organized in accordance with the two principle of justice, it requires equality. It requires
equality in structuring an economy and in person’s individual choices.
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Cohen uses this model of justification in two related arguments. First, in Chapter
6, “The Facts,” Cohen argues against those theorists who ground a conception of justice
on certain facts. The basic argument is that any principle that is based on certain facts can
only be justified if a more fundamental principle shows those facts to be morally relevant.
For example, the utilitarian might support a moral principle that we ought to protect
religious freedom, and she might argue for this moral principle based on the fact that
doing so would promote happiness. Yet, this fact is only relevant because of her
acceptance of the more fundamental principle that we ought to do that which promotes
happiness. Since facts are only relevant because more fundamental principles make them
so, the most fundamental principles cannot be based on facts. In short, fundamental
ethical principles must be fact-free.
The second argument where Cohen uses his model of justification is against
constructivism about justice in Chapter 7. In this chapter, Cohen argues that
constructivism mistakes “rules of regulation” for fundamental normative principles. He
defines rules of regulation as rules we adopt to order our choices, and this distinguishes
them from fundamental principles because rules of regulation are chosen whereas
fundamental normative principles are unchosen. Cohen argues one determines “how the
basic structure ought to be organized” by choosing a rule of regulation that addresses this
question. Since we choose such a rule of regulation, we will need to justify that choice.
To do this, we need to (eventually) appeal to a fundamental normative principle.
Moreover, if we think that rule that applies to the basic structure is a principle “of
justice,” then we must appeal to a fundamental normative principle “of justice.”
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Accordingly, Cohen concludes that even Rawlsian constructivists must be
committed to fundamental principles of justice. In order to justify a rule of regulation for
the basic structure, the Rawlsian needs to implicitly use a fundamental principle of
justice. Bringing Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 together, Cohen claims that all Rawlsian
constructivists must ultimately be committed to a fundamental and fact-free principle of
justice. Rawls’s two principles of justice are merely rules of regulation, which need to be
ultimately justified by such a fundamental principle of justice.
This argument allows Cohen to identify why the Rawlsian focus on the basic
structure is arbitrary from the perspective of justice. Justice is the expression of a
fundamental normative commitment, and as such, it is general across all things that might
be just. If we justify a global norm, constitution, economic scheme, law, social norm or
individual action as being just, we make ultimate appeal to the same fundamental
principle of justice. Yet, given that this fundamental principle is fully general across all
these subjects, it is arbitrary to focus merely on the basic structure. Accordingly, the
Rawlsian focus on the basic structure is ethically arbitrary. Even if the basic structure can
be distinguished from daily behavior, it should not be.
Yet, the Rawlsian should not be any more worried by this second argument for
ethical arbitrariness than she should be worried by the first. In this second argument,
Cohen tries to show that the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure is arbitrary on the basis
of his model of justification, but every Rawlsian should deny Cohen’s model of
justification. Put simply, Cohen is a foundationalist but Rawls is a holist. Cohen supposes
that all justification must ultimately appeal to fundamental normative principles, but
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Rawls argues that all justification ultimately appeals to a reflective equilibrium.
Accordingly, moral principles are not justified by more fundamental normative principles
for Rawls, they are justified by their fit with our considered convictions. Thus, Rawlsians
do not need to ultimately appeal to fact-free principles (though, they can) and they do not
need to appeal to any fundamental principle of justice. Instead, they appeal to a broad
range of considered convictions, both about generalities and particulars. For Cohen’s
argument against Rawls to succeed, he would thus need to invalidate reflective
equilibrium as a model of justification and show the necessity of his own
foundationalism. Without doing so, his criticism gets no grip against Rawlsians.
Just as Rawls’s model of justification shows that Cohen’s arguments are
insufficient against the Rawlsian view, so does Cohen’s model of justification show
certain Rawlsian arguments to be insufficient against his own view. In explaining justice
as a particular fundamental principle, Cohen is not committed to the priority of justice.
For him, being just is merely one consideration that counts in favor of some option, and
other considerations will often be more significant. If justice requires one choice over
another, it is not necessarily the case that we ought to choose what justice requires.
Likewise, the fact that one institution would be more just than another does not
necessarily mean that we ought to establish the more just institution. Instead, Cohen
views justice as one competing fundamental value amongst others. We might sometimes
rightly act in accordance with justice, and sometimes rightly act against it. As he says in
Chapter 6, “Justice is not the only value that calls for (appropriately balanced)
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implementation: other principles, sometimes competing with justice, must also be
variously pursued and honored.”164
This commitment protects Cohen from any argument that claims that his view of
justice does not take some important value into consideration. After all, he can merely
distinguish that other important value as expressed by a different fundamental principles
than justice. For instance, some might respond that Cohen’s conception of justice is odd
because it would lead to “leveling-down.” According to Cohen, the society in which each
has equal welfare is more just than a society in which all have higher welfare but some
have much more than others. Yet, Cohen can respond and say that the more unequal
society is indeed less just but might still be preferable. In that case, we are merely
sacrificing justice for welfare, and that might be okay.165 A second example of this
response occurs in Chapter 8, “The Publicity Argument.” There, he treats an objection
from Andrew Williams that requiring individuals to promote equality does not satisfy the
demands of publicity. To this Cohen can merely deny that publicity is a requirement on
justice, though it might be a concern grounded by a different fundamental principle. In a
third instance, others might argue that Cohen’s conception of justice is problematic
because it ignores the importance of personal projects.166 If justice requires each
individual to pursue equality in their personal choices, then persons would not have the
opportunity to pursue those projects important to themselves Yet, Cohen can again
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respond that persons can pursue personal projects, but they are merely sacrificing justice
to do so. While doing so might be unjust, it might not be wrongful. Sometimes, we
should sacrifice justice for personal pursuits. Since Cohen does not suppose that we
should always do the most just course of action or that we ought to live in the most just
society, these kinds of arguments would not force Cohen to give up his view. For some,
this commitment might cut against Cohen’s view, but it is not argument against Cohen,
given the role he assigns justice in his model of justification. It seems that we have
reached a stalemate.
6.1.3 The broader argument
However, even if Cohen’s arguments in Chapter 6-7 of Rescuing Justice and Equality do
not succeed in invalidating the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure, they still make an
important point. To see why, we can deconstruct the form of Cohen’s argument, which
goes in two basic steps. The first step is establishing that justice must be a unified ethical
requirement that is general across all contexts. By referring to justice as a unified ethical
requirement, I mean that something can rightly be considered just only when it is related
to a single conception of justice, which is the same across all contexts. For contrast,
justice would be “non-unified” if there were some object for which the properties that
warranted calling that object “just” were wholly different from the properties that
warranted calling some different object “just.”167 By referring to justice as general across
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all contexts, I mean that this unified requirement is relevant across a broad range of
subjects; institutions, laws, choices, dispositions, etc. Cohen’s theory of justification is
meant to show why justice must be unified and general; it must be so in order to be a
fundamental normative principle.
The second step of the argument is to show that, since justice is a unified and
general ethical requirement, the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure is arbitrarily
restrictive. Rawls’s two principles of justice are not unified and general, so they cannot be
principles of justice. Accordingly, the basic argument can be expressed as follows:
1) Justice is a unified ethical requirement that is general across all contexts
2) The Rawlsian focus is restricted to the justice of the basic structure
3) Thus, the Rawlsian focus ignores the requirements of justice in all other
contexts
4) Thus, the Rawlsian focus is ethically arbitrary from the perspective of justice.
In short, the Rawlsian goes wrong because she mistakes the nature of justice. Since
justice is, by its nature, unified and general, any principle that artificially restricts the
authority of justice is arbitrary from the perspective of justice.
Now, I have claimed that this argument is unsuccessful because Cohen has not
adequately argued for (1); he has not shown that justice must be a unified ethical
requirement general across all contexts. To prove (1), Cohen appeals to a theory of
justification, but Rawlsians should reject this theory. Accordingly, Rawlsians can and
ought to reject (1), and thus they ought to reject Cohen’s conclusion.
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However, even if Cohen has not proved (1), persons might otherwise be
committed to it; they might think that justice must consist in a unified and general moral
requirement. In this way, they might treat the concept of justice as unified; for a
conception to be a conception of justice it must offer a unified and general requirement.
Someone so committed will accept (1), and someone who is not so committed will reject
(1). Even though Cohen does not prove that we should have a unified concept of justice,
his argument still shows why those who are committed to a unified concept should view
the Rawlsian perspective as problematic.
In short, while Cohen does not show the Rawlsian position to be incoherent, he
does show an inconsistency between the commitment to a unified concept of justice and
the Rawlsian focus on the basic structure. Rawlsians do not need to be committed to
thinking of justice as a fundamental, general and unified ethical value, but those who are
committed to such a conception of justice might find the Rawlsian view problematic.
One of the reasons why Plato’s dialogues are so intriguing is that they record the
views of an interlocutor as they are sharpened over the course of conversation. As various
issues are cleared away, we are often left with the core commitments of the interlocutor
laid bare. The most invaluable aspect of Rescuing Justice and Equality is that we can
likewise see how Cohen’s own views are sharpened over the course of a 17 year
conversation. While the Rawlsian interlocutor is always offstage, his presence is felt as
Cohen responds to objection after objection. I here mean to suggest that as years have
cleared away various issues, we are now left with Cohen’s own core commitment laid
bare. What began as an extension of the difference principle to individual choices,
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eventually became an argument about the nature of justice. Cohen’s core commitment is a
view of justice as a unified and general ethical requirement. For Cohen, Rawls’s theory
goes wrong because it does not treat justice as it is. Accordingly, the next topic that would
continue the conversation is whether we ought to treat justice as a fundamental, general
and unified ethical value.
I argue that we cannot assume that the concept of justice is unified. Even if we
ultimately accept a unified conception of justice, we cannot argue that any adequate
conception of justice must present a unified and general ideal. Accordingly, Cohen’s
argument that just must consist in an unified ideal goes wrong. Whether we should accept
a unified conception of justice depends on whether it is the best conception of justice, and
not on any conceptual necessity.
6.2 The Argument against a Unified Concept of Justice
It is difficult to know what could settle a dispute between whether the concept of justice
is unified or disunified. If we argue about a natural fact, we look for evidence in the
world to settle the debate. We cannot, however, look towards evidence in the world to
determine the nature of justice. One might say that we look to the patterns of how persons
use the phrase, “justice,” and then look towards what their implicit beliefs about what its
content is. Yet, such an analysis would (at most) tell us what people think about justice,
and we recognize that persons can be wrong about this. If most in a country use justice in
such a way that implies that the death penalty is just, we would not take that to mean that
the death penalty was just. Instead, in appealing to the idea of justice we appeal to an idea
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that could correct what people believe. In the same way that persons might be wrong
about what is or is not just, persons could also be wrong about whether the concept of
justice is or is not unified.
As I understand the issue, the best way to settle a debate about whether justice is
unified or disunified is by determining which way of thinking about justice better
explains the role that justice plays in our practical reasoning. Justice has a particular role
in our deliberation and moral debate, and the right concept of justice should fit that role.
In other words, the terms of the argument should be practical. We vindicate one way of
thinking about justice by showing that it fits best with the role the idea plays in practical
reasoning and debate.
One clear feature of how justice is used in debate is that people disagree about
what justice requires. Even a single individual might be “of two minds” on what justice
requires. In order to accurately represent the concept of justice, then, we need to
recognize that the idea is not used to refer to any particular requirement(s). Luck
Egalitarians, Civic Republicans, Libertarians, Contractualists, and Marxists all employ
the same concept of justice--lest we see them as merely talking past one another--but they
differ in what they think the requirements of justice are.
For this reason, it is always helpful to distinguish the concept of justice from a
conception of justice. We can think of a conception as an articulation of what justice
requires. Egalitarians, Republicans, Libertarians, Contractualists, and Marxists all employ
different conceptions of justice. By contrast, a concept of justice is that which these
groups disagree about when they offer different conceptions of justice. The difficulty is
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giving a characterization of the concept of justice that (a) does not dissolve into a
conception of justice and (b) still respects the ways in which justice is distinct from
rightness, goodness, merit, and other normative concepts.
In the introduction, I introduced two objections to the argument of this
dissertation. First, one might object that developing principle for the basic structure leads
us to misrepresent justice. Insofar as we think of the principles for the basic structure as
principles of justice, we risk understanding justice as consisting in the requirements on
the basic structure if we first develop principles for the basic structure. Second, one might
suppose that articulating a conception of justice has primacy over developing principles
for the basic structure. Only if we apply a conception of justice to the basic structure
could the principles that apply to it be principles of justice. In §6.1, I argued that Cohen’s
most developed criticism seeks to show that Rawls’s focus on the basic structure is
arbitrary from the perspective of justice. We should notice that none of these arguments
seems to come from a particular conception of justice. Instead, they come from claims
about what justice must necessarily be like. Yet, these claims of necessity are not claims
of physical or logical necessity, they are claims of conceptual necessity. They are about
what justice is for all those who advocate different conceptions of justice.
The specific claim about justice that these arguments advance is that justice
consists in a single unified and general requirement across context. In this way, they
advance a “unified concept of justice.” If justice is not unified, then developing principles
of justice for the basic structure would not have definitive implications for justice more
broadly. If justice is not unified, then developing a general conception of justice would

276

not tell us what would make a basic structure just. If justice is not unified, then
developing principles for a particular subject would not be arbitrary from the perspective
of justice. So, in order to respond to these three arguments, I want to argue against a
unified conception of justice. I want to argue conceptual necessity does not require that
all conceptions of justice be unified.
As an alternative to a unified concept, I offer a disunified concept. A unified
concept of justice maintains that “a particular is just if any only if it relates to a single
unified and general requirement.” By contrast, a disunified concept maintains that “a
particular is just if and only if it satisfies a principle of justice.” Given this definition, it is
important to ask what makes a principle of justice a principle of justice, and I return to
that issue in §6.3. Before that, I want to argue on behalf of a disunified concept of justice
over a unified concept. This will allow me to address the two objections and Cohen’s
criticism.
My argument on behalf of a disunified concept of justice moves in two stages. In
§6.2.1, I argue that a disunified concept of justice can better explain the field of
disagreement about justice. Even those who favor a unified conception of justice can
recognize disunified conceptions as rival conceptions of justice. However, a unified
concept of justice fails to recognize disunified conceptions of justice as conceptions of
justice. By contrast, a disunified concept of justice can recognize unified conceptions as
conceptions of justice. Therefore, a disunified concept can better account for
disagreement between rival conceptions. In

§6.2.2, I argue on behalf of a disunified

conception of justice. This bolsters the important of the first argument by better
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indicating why we should recognize a disunified concept, but is also favors a disunified
conception more generally. After making these arguments, I briefly survey one possible
objection from the recent work of Ronald Dworkin.
6.2.1 A disunified concept better sets the space of disagreement
My first argument points out that it is meaningful for someone to wonder whether the
requirements of justice are unified and general across context. If we accept a unified
concept of justice, however, we cannot make sense of this as meaningful. If we suppose
that justice consists of a unified and general requirement, then someone who wonders
whether justice consists of a unified and general requirement must be making some kind
of mistake. We would say that they are not wondering about justice. By contrast, a
disunified concept of justice does not impose such a requirement. Instead, it supposes that
a particular is just whenever it satisfies a principle of justice. Given the vagueness of
what “a principle of justice” might consist in, someone could not wonder whether justice
consists in satisfying some principle of justice in the same way. For this reason, a
disunified concept of justice better captures the space of possible disagreements about
justice.
To some, this argument might seem reminiscent of Moore’s “Open Question
Argument,” which has been thoroughly scrutinized. This argument was used to better
emphasize the way in which we cannot define goodness by identifying it with a property
that all good things have. Even if something is good whenever (and only whenever) it is
pleasurable, we cannot define goodness with the pleasurable. This is shown in how,
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whenever goodness is defined in terms of some property P, we can always meaningfully
ask, “are P things really good?” In this way, it is always an open question whether
something is good. It cannot be settled by definitions alone.
The typical challenge to the Open Question Argument is that it only expresses the
paradox of analysis. However, those who criticize the argument in this way interpret it as
meant to do more than the arguments aims to do. We can recognize that the question, “is
water really H2O?” is a meaningful question, but this does not mean that we cannot
define water as H2O. The difference between the water case and the goodness case is that
the person who claims that water is H2O does not merely offer it as a definition; they can
also show why what we are looking for when we identify something as water is the same
as that which we identify by H2O. The meaningfulness of the question does not show that
water and H2O are not the same, it merely shows that more beyond mere definition needs
to be said. The chemist who defines water as H2O can say more in defense of this claim,
but the hedonist who defines goodness as pleasure cannot. Moore’s open question
argument merely points out that whoever defines goodness as “the pleasurable,” “the
natural,” or “the unified” must do more than stipulate a definition. The open question
argument helps us to recognize that a definition is not enough, but it does not show that
an analysis is impossible.
A much better way to express the point that Moore gestures towards is through the
distinction between concepts and conceptions. We can understand Moore’s target as
offering a particular conception of goodness. For example, the hedonist offers a
conception goodness as the pleasurable, but this hedonist goes wrong whenever they
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mistake their conception of goodness for the concept of goodness. A hedonist cannot say,
“goodness consists in the pleasurable, that is merely a fact of definition,” because the
voluntarist does not think that goodness consists in pleasure. The voluntarist responds,
“goodness consists in fulfilling god’s will, that is a fact of definition.” If both stick to
their words, then they would merely be talking past one another. In order to makes sense
of their debate, we differentiate the concept of goodness from the conception. The
hedonist might define their conception of goodness as “goodness consists in the
pleasurable” and the voluntarist might define their conception of goodness as “goodness
consists in fulfilling god’s will.” Yet, they should recognize that either would be
inadequate as the concept of the goodness. Instead, the concept need be defined in such a
way that does not predetermine a particular conception. In order to make sense of how
the word is used, a one cannot define goodness in terms of a conception. That is why we
find the question, “are P things really good?” to always be an open question. Our concept
of goodness is distinct from any articulation of good things provided by a conception.
Returning now to my argument, I want to point out that--what I have called--a
unified concept of justice comes closer to being a conception of justice than a concept of
justice. Of course, the unified concept is not itself a conception because it is consistent
with different conceptions. Someone who thinks “justice always consists in promoting
equality” and someone who thinks “justice always consists in promoting autonomy” both
identify justice with a unified and general requirement, but they offer different
requirements. So, it would be wrong to suppose that a unified concept of justice is really
a concept. It is better to see the unified “concept” of justice as picking out a class of
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conceptions rather than the concept of justice. Conceptual necessity does not requires that
justice consist in a unified and general demand. Instead, it is merely the case that there is
a class of conceptions that posit a unified and general demand.
The fact that we can meaningfully ask, “does justice really consist in a single
unified and general moral requirement?” shows that someone cannot merely stipulate that
the concept of justice is unified. Someone can reasonably think that justice consists of a
unified requirement just as they can think that goodness is the pleasurable. They cannot,
however, stipulate the meaning of justice so as to exclude conceptions of justice that are
not unified.
When we have fully accepted the concept/conception distinction, we can
recognize that one not only accepts either a unified or disunified concept of justice, they
might also accept either unified or disunified conceptions. Oddly enough, one could
simultaneously recognize the concept of justice as disunified while accepting a unified
conception. Recall that a disunified concept of justice identifies any particular as just if it
satisfies a principle of justice. If someone were to argue that the only relevant principle of
justice is that “any particular should promote autonomy” then they can accept a
disunified concept of justice while arguing for a unified conception. The unified
conception recognizes a unified and general ethical demand--to promote autonomy--as
the best understanding of justice. However, someone who holds this conception might
also think that when disputants disagree about conceptions of justice, they disagree about
what the appropriate principles of justice are. They can recognize that someone who
offers a disunified conception of justice is still offering a conception of justice.
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By contrast, I see no way in which someone can accept a unified concept of
justice while accepting a disunified conception. If someone understands disputes about
justice as disputes about which unified and general demand represents the demands of
justice, then they will not recognize someone who advocates a disunified conception as
offering a conception of justice. Since their conception of justice does not consist in a
unified and general demand, it is not consistent with the concept of justice. Thus, there
are only three positions one might hold; (a) recognizing a disunified concept and
disunified conception, (b) recognizing a disunified concept and unified conception, and
(c) recognizing a unified concept and a unified conception.
For this reason, the argument I use against a unified conception of justice does not
extend to an argument against a disunified conception. Let us imagine that someone asks,
“does justice really consist in satisfying a principle of justice?” If this is a meaningful
question then it shows a problem for the disunified concept as much as my argument
shows a problem for the unified concept. Yet, is this question meaningful? The idea of a
“principle of justice” is so open and vague that I doubt it rules out any conception of
justice.
For these reasons, the disunified concept of justice is better able to make sense of
the space of disagreement about justice. If one accepts a unified concept of justice, then
they cannot make sense of a disunified conception as a conception of justice. By contrast,
someone who accepts a disunified concept of justice can make sense of both unified and
disunified conceptions. In this way, a disunified concept of justice better represents the
role that justice plays in our reasoning and debate.
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6.2.2 One reason for a disunified conception
The second stage of my argument aims to give one reason why we should accept a
disunified conception of justice. This argument plays two roles. First, it supports the first
argument by showing why it is important that the field of disagreements about justice be
able to include disunified conceptions of justice. Second, it gives us reason to think that
any conception of justice that posits a unified and general moral requirement goes wrong.
I don’t think this argument proves that a disunified conception of justice is the best one,
but it meant to counterbalance the intuitive pull that unified conceptions might have.
The core claim of the second argument is that how a particular ought to be is often
settled when we identify what would make it “just.” Likewise, if a particular is “unjust”
then we recognize that it should not be that way. In these cases, we do not treat justice
merely as a consideration that is balanced amongst others in making final judgements.
Instead, justice determines how particulars should be. In this way, justice has a kind of
“preeminence,” it authoritatively settles how something should be. Typically, we think
that “if a law is unjust, it should be overturned,” “if an institution is just, it should be
respected” “if an action is just, it should be performed,” and “if a society is unjust, we
must act to change it.” If these statements are typical of how justice figures into our
deliberation and debate, then justice has a kind of preeminence.
Now, a disunified conception is better able to explain the preeminence of justice
than a unified conception is. This is because a disunified conception has greater
flexibility to pick out how different particulars should be. It can identify one standard for
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how institutions should be and another standard for how actions should be. In order to
simultaneously maintain (a) a unified conception of justice, and (b) the preeminence of
justice, we would need to be committed to (c) a single moral demand that determines how
a broad range of things should be. My point is not that someone cannot be committed to
(c), but that it is a very contentious commitment with high costs. 168 By contrast, a
disunified conception of justice identifies a particular as just when it satisfies a principle
of justice. Since different principles of justice can be sensitive to different considerations
in different contexts, a disunified concept has a kind of moral flexibility. It can identify
different considerations as settling how different particulars should be. If justice is
disunified, it does not rigidly identify some single demand as settling how all particulars
should be. Instead, it is sensitive to differences between cases.
To see this point, let’s start from a toy example of a disunified conception of
justice. According to this conception, (a) a basic structure is just when it’s institutions
protect basic rights, which includes equal political rights, (b) laws are just when they are
the result of a democratic process within a just basic structure, (c) actions are just when
are in accordance with just laws or promote just laws, and (d) dispositions are just when
they lead persons to act justly. Now someone who supports a unified concept of justice
would deny that these four principles, (a)-(d), express a conception of justice. Since they
do not offer a unified and general demand that all just particulars instantiate, this
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For example, utilitarians might being committed to (c) but they then have difficulties distinguishing
justice from rightness.
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disunified conception is not a conception of justice. Someone who maintains a disunified
concept of justice, however, can recognize this toy conception as a conception of justice.
With this toy example in hand, we can see the way in which a disunified concept
of justice has greater flexibility. With such a view, we can see why the fact that a basic
structure, law, action, or disposition is just can imply that it is as it should be.169 In each
case, the principle of justice that applies to that particular is suited to the kind of thing-basic structure, law, act, or disposition--that it is. Compare this to a more unified
conception of justice. If justice consists in promoting equality, for example, we might see
why a social structure that is just is as it should be. However, we might doubt that actions
that promote equality are always the actions we should take.170 Likewise, if justice
consists in respecting certain natural rights, then we might see why actions should always
be just. However, it is less clear that this conception would be adequate for determining
how a social structure should be. After all, there are institutional questions that are not
settled by respect for rights alone. In each of these cases, a unified conception does not
provide the flexibility that allows for justice to be preeminent.
In summary, a unified concept of justice faces two problems. First, a unified
concept is less able to make sense of all our disagreement about justice because persons
might disagree about whether justice is unified. Second, a unified concept is less able to
169

It is an important point to recognize that my argument does not require that justice is preeminent for all
moral questions. It might be the case that there are some issues for which we do not think that whether
something is just settles the issue. All that matters is that there are some issues for which justice is
preeminent, and even those who do not think it always settles the issue can recognize that it sometimes
does.
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The force of this objection can be well represented in the development of Cohen’s own argument. In
arguing for justice as a unified and general ideal, Cohen abandons the primacy of justice (as discussed in
§6.1.2)
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respect the preeminence of justice. A disunified conception, however, has the flexibility
to make sense of how any particular that is identified as just is as it should be. This
second arguments gives us one reason to resist the intuitive pull of a unified conception
of justice, and thereby shows the advantage of a concept of justice that allows for both
unified and disunified conceptions.
6.2.3 Justice as an interpretive concept
In this section, I want to treat one possible defense of a unified concept of justice. This
argument does not come from Cohen’s own views, but from the recent argument of
Ronald Dworkin. While I do not think that Cohen would be entitled to use these
arguments, they might be available to someone else who would want to defend the
unified concept of justice and then use it to object to the views I defend.
The defense that I have in mind argues that justice is an interpretive concept.
Dworkin distinguishes “interpretive concepts” from both “natural-kind concepts” and
“criterial concepts,” and shows how moral concepts like justice are best understood as
interpretive concepts rather than natural-kind or criterial concepts.171 A natural-kind
concept is something that has a fixed identity in nature. If one thought that justice was a
natural property instantiated in just things that we must come to identify and articulate,
then justice would be a natural kind concept. Since we do not think that any natural
discovery will settle what justice requires, justice is not a natural kind concept. Criterial
concepts are those defined by criteria used to identify something. If one thought that
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Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 157-170.
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justice was a criterial concept, then we would share a concept of justice only if we agreed
about which things in the world are just. Since both socialists and libertarians seem to
share the concept of justice, justice cannot be criterial. Instead, justice is an interpretive
concept. Interpretive concepts are identified by the practices we use them in--often
because of the overlapping paradigms to which we apply them--and we interpret what is
the best way to understand that concept as it figures in these practices. We, as a linguistic
community, use the concept of justice in various ways, and we differ on how best to
interpret the idea as it figures in these practices.
Applied to the current argument, one might make two claims from this
understanding of the concept of justice. First, one might claim that treating justice as an
interpretive concept can make sense of the role that justice plays in practical reasoning.
Second, one might claim that recognizing justice an interpretive concepts shows why it
must be unified. I agree with--or, at least, will grant--the first argument, but I disagree
with the second. Even if justice is an interpretive concept, that gives us no reason to see it
as necessarily unified.
In regards to the first argument, I recognize treating justice as an interpretive
concept does not face the objections to a unified concept in §6.2.1 and §6.2.2. In fact,
many of the same reasons that I deny a unified concept of justice are the same as
Dworkin’s reasons for denying that justice is either a criterial or natural-kind concept. If
justice is a natural-kind concept, we cannot make sense of the Open Question Argument.
Once we have identified what justice is in the world, we would not be able to ask whether
what we identified as just was really just. If justice were a criterial concept, then persons
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would be talking past one another in arguing about justice. If justice is an interpretive
concept, however, we can recognize that we treat justice as preeminent for some
concerns. Any interpretation of justice would then have to explain why it is preeminant
for those concerns, and also why it is not preeminant for others. Likewise, since our
practices often treat judgments of justice as the terminus of practical reasoning, the
interpretation of justice must do the same. Dworkin’s articulation of interpretive concepts
resolves much of the problems I have articulated above.
Nonetheless, accepting that justice is an interpretive concept does not give us any
reason to suppose that justice is unified. Once we recognize it as an interpretive concept,
the question is what the best interpretation of it is. Whether justice is unified or disunified
then depends on which interpretation is best. The mere fact that justice is interpretive
does not mean that it is unified because there is nothing that compels us to interpret
justice as unified. 172 Given the range of objects that we consider just and unjust, and the
range of moral concerns that are relevant for these judgements, it seems to me that the
best interpretation would need to be disunified, but a complete argument would be
needed to show this definitively.
I will grant that a person who both (a) sees justice as an interpretive concept, and
(b) interprets justice as unified is able to overcome the objections offered in §6.2.1. Yet,
this is only because they offer a unified conception of justice rather than a unified
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For Dworkin, all of ethics and morality is unified, and that might seem at first to lend some argument to
why justice must be unified. However, his unity of value comes at a high-level. This unity only needs to
show that our values do not conflicts when all our values are fully supported by one another. This does not
mean that we need to articulate justice as unified but only that however we articulate justice must
ultimately support how we articulate our other values. Moreover, it is unclear why Dworkin thinks all
values must be unified--as I point out in §5.3.2
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concept. So long as they recognize the possibility that a conception of justice might be
disunified, they do not support a unified concept. Instead, they support a unified
conception as the best interpretation of the concept. Such a view does not misrepresent
how justice figures in practical reasoning.
Once someone grants that justice is an interpretive concept, they cannot block the
possibility of a disunified conception of justice. Whether justice is unified or disunified
then depends on the best arguments we can give in favor of one conception or the other.
We need to show that a unified conception better interprets the practices in which we use
justice or that a disunified conception does so. What is important for my argument is that
one can no longer appeal to a unified concept of justice to block a disunified conception.
Neither conception has prima facie authority but are instead rival interpretations of
justice.
6.2.4 How a disunified concept addresses the two objections
At the beginning of this chapter, I introduced two objections that one might make against
focusing on the basic structure from a concern with justice. First, one might argue that
focusing on the basic structure would misrepresent the nature of justice. Second, one
might argue that we can only determine how the basic structure ought to be by
determining what justice requires. Both these objections are defeated once we accept a
disunified concept of justice.
The overall reason why these objections are defeated is because we recognize that
whether the basic structure is just is the same as whether it is as it ought to be. In arguing
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that the basic structure ought to be organized in one way rather than another, we are
arguing about what would make it just. In arguing about the justice of the basic structure,
we are arguing about how the basic structure ought to be. In arguing about the injustice of
actions, we are arguing about what actions ought not to be done. So, to focus on the
question of how the basic structure ought to be or which actions are unjust, we are neither
misrepresenting the nature of justice nor ignoring a proper order of explanation.
First, we do not misrepresent the nature of justice by focusing on a principle for
the basic structure of society because we do not claim to be offering any general
conception of justice at all in doing so. If one determines what makes a basic structure
just, that does not itself determine anything about what makes something else just. To
figure out whether a particular law, action or disposition of character is just, we need to
determine what the appropriate principle of justice for that law, action, or disposition of
character is. We do not suppose that the same thing that makes the basic structure just
makes all things just, so we do not misrepresent justice generally by focusing solely on
the basic structure.
Second, we do not need to first determine what justice generally requires to
determine how the basic structure ought to be. Instead, we determine whether a basic
structure is just by determining the appropriate principle of justice for the basic structure;
we determine how the basic structure ought to be. This will require that we look at the
particularities of the basic structure and how it fits within ethical life. It is not a
requirement of practical rationality or the order of value that we first determine a unified
concept of justice and then apply it to the basic structure.
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6.2.5 Where the argument stands
With my major arguments in favor a disunified concept of justice complete, I want to
summarize where I think my broader arguments stands. I have not shown that the correct
conception of justice must be disunified. Instead, I have merely argued against the view
that the correct conception of justice must be unified. In so doing, I have argued against a
unified concept of justice and for a disunified concept. However, one might still argue
that the best conception of justice--understood as a disunified concept--is unified. That is
fine. I only mean to argue against those arguments that presume a unified concept of
justice. The two objections surveyed in the introduction and Cohen’s fully developed
criticism only get their force if we assume a unified concept of justice, and I mean to
show why these arguments are wrong to do this. A conception of justice might be
disunified.
All this leaves open the question, “what is the best conception of justice?” I think
that it should leave this question open. I do not doubt that persons with a particular
conception of justice might disagree with my view on the basis of that conception of
justice. In such cases, we have a contrast between views. Whether the view I advocate or
a rival is best will depend on a more holistic comparison between the advantages of both
views and how they fit with ethical and theoretical commitments.
I only mean to block those arguments that show my argument must be wrong
regardless of which conception of justice one accepts. I think that the argument should be
about what conception of justice we should accept, and I hope that this dissertation
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contributes to that argument. I believe that my arguments show why the basic structure
has primacy as a moral subject even when we do not presume a particular conception of
justice, and I believe that this favors those conceptions of justice that are consistent with
treating the basic structure as a primary moral subject.
6.3 A New Objection and the Primary Subject of Justice
I have explained a disunified concept of justice as committed to the idea that an object is
appropriately identified as just when it satisfies a principle of justice. Yet, this only opens
the question, “what makes a principle of justice a principle of justice.” In order for a
principle to be identified as a principle of justice, there needs to be something that ties
together all the principles of justice as principles of justice.173 The defender of a unified
concept of justice will say that this issue shows why my articulation of a disunified
concept only pushes the problem back another level. We will need some substantive unity
to explain what distinguishes certain principles as principles of justice. 174
Now, I recognize that I need some way of bringing the various principles of
justice together, but I deny that we need a unified concept of justice to do this. Instead,
we only need to explain what makes principles of justice distinct and unified as
principles. This does not require us to represent justice as a single unified demand. So
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This need is most apparent in distinguishing what is just from what is right. Both might be understood as
that which satisfies a moral principle, but what differentiates what is just is that it satisfies a principle of
justice.
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I suspect that Cohen would object in this way because it resembles his own argument against the
Rawlsian view. As mentioned above, Cohen appeals to the idea that a unified concept of justice is needed to
explain why all the just things are just (Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality, 291). Similarly, one might
argue that the various principles of justice associated with a disunified concept of justice are only principles
of justice if they apply a fundamental principle of justice, and that will need to be unified.
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long as the various principles of justice have some feature in common, they can be
identified as principles of justice.
In this section, I want to offer one candidate for a way to tie the principles of
justice together without appeal to a unified moral demand. A full argument in defense of
my suggestion would require a different project, so I leave it only as a suggestion for
now. If my suggestion is plausible, then it shows how we can make sense of the basic
structure as the primary subject of justice. If my suggestion is not plausible, then my
argument serves merely as an example for how another account might work. To
overcome the objection, it only needs to be the case that there is some way to bring the
principles of justice together that does not rely on a unified moral demand.
6.3.1 A proposal: principles of justice as specifying claims
While a complete argument would need to better support any judgment of this type, I
suggest that principles of justice are moral principles that deal specifically with valid
claims we on our broader community. What makes a principle of justice a principle of
justice, is that it relates to these claims.
According to this view, principles of justice might specify the claims members of
society have or they might specify what claims persons should have. We might call the
violation of rights unjust because it violates claims that persons have, and we might call a
society that does not secure healthcare for all as unjust because it should do so. It is in
this sense that justice can both be a requirement and an ideal. It is a requirement in
identifying what persons have claims on, and it is an ideal in establishing the best systems
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of claims that persons could have. It is in this sense that justice can have both a natural
component, as when we believe that persons have natural rights, and an artificial
component, as when we think rights arise from conventional practices. It also
differentiates the demands of justice from the morally supervenient because persons do
not have claims on you to act in morally supervenient ways.175
In offering this unifying feature of justice, I follow Mill’s articulation of justice in
Book V of Utilitarianism. There he sketches a social history of the idea and its
development through the modern period. At the conclusion of this history he writes,
“Whether the injustice consists in depriving a person of a possession, or in
breaking faith with him, or in treating him worse than he deserves, or
worse than other people who have no greater claims--in each case the
supposition implies two things: a wrong done, and some assignable person
who is wronged. Injustice may also be done by treating a person better
than others; but the wrong in this case is to his competitors, who are also
assignable persons. It seems to be that this feature in the case--a right in
some person, correlative to the moral obligation--constitutes the specific
difference between justice and generosity of beneficence. Justice implies
something which it is not only right to do, and wrong not to do, but which
some individual person can claim from us as his moral right. No one has a
right to our generosity or beneficence because we are not morally bound to
practice those virtues toward any given individual.”176
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Likewise, what makes a principle of justice within this view differentiates justice from the promotion of
the good because the promotion of good is a first-personal moral ideal whereas valid claims deal with a
more second-personal stance.
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In this passage, Mill specifically identifies justice as distinct from utility, and explains it
by the idea of a valid claim that one has on another. Of course, Mill soon uses this notion
of justice in order to show that we need the principle of utility because the claims that
persons have often conflict and we need some principle by which to settle these conflicts.
Yet, nothing compels us to accept Mill’s idea that our disputed claims need to be resolved
by some fully general first principle such as the principle of utility. I addressed that
argument in Chapter 5. Rawls also conceives of the problem of justice in a similar way in
his early writing. In “A Decision Procedure for Ethics,” Rawls writes;
“the problem of justice arises whenever it is the reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the satisfaction of two ore more claims of two or more
persons that those claims, if given title, will interfere and conflict with one
another.”177
In this passage, the particular problem of justice is understood in ways that are similar to
Mill’s understanding. In the later article, “Justice as Fairness,” Rawls specifically
recognizes that his two principles of justice are not principles that settle all questions of
justice, but are only “typical of a family of principles normally associated with the
concept of justice.”178 Later in the essay, he gives an articulation of how the members of
this family are related to one another, “It is typical of cases of justice to involve persons
who are pressing on one another their claim, between which a fair balance or equilibrium
must be found.”179 In these passages, the idea of a claim is crucial for justice. A particular
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conception of justice will settle persons’ claims in some specific way. My suggestion
follows Mill and Rawls’s early work in understanding the various principles of justice as
those moral principles that specify claims and settle disputes.
One objection to this articulation is that we have all sorts of claims that are not
related to justice in any way. I have a valid claim that you bring me to the store if you
promised to, but you do not commit an injustice if you do not fulfill your promise. In
cases like this, not every valid claim relates to justice, so this articulation of what makes a
principle a principle of justice is inadequate.
To answer this objection, we only need to specify that the principles of justice are
not related to all claims that we have, but claims we have on our broader community.
When we have a right, for example, it is a claim we have on persons generally. When
someone commits an injustice, it is a wrong done to the larger community rather than to a
particular person. So, the suggestion is that principles of justice relate to those claims we
have on persons in our community generally. This overcomes the promising objection,
because that is a claim against a particular person rather than on the members of a
community generally.
Of course, this is only a first approximation of what unites the principles of
justice, and it will undoubtedly need to be tweaked. Since my present goal is not to
defend a complete account of what differentiates justice, I only offer this suggestion as a
plausible idea to show how such an articulation may be possible and how it can aid in
answering the present objection. I should stress that this understanding of the unifying
idea of justice answers no substantive questions about justice. Specifically, it does not
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determine what valid claims we have or what institutions we ought to have. To answer
those questions we require a complete conception of justice.
The challenge that I mean to address in this section is to show what ties the
various principles of justice together as principles of justice. Someone who advocates a
unified concept of justice might suppose that the only way to identify a principle as a
principle of justice is to suppose that it relates to a single unified moral demand. By
identifying the principles of justice as those related to valid claims, I have instead tied
together the various principles of justice in a more formal way. By explaining the link
between principles of justice with such a formal feature, I show why we do not need to
rely on any unified concept of justice. What is most important for answering the objection
is to show how a formal link between the principles of justice would be possible. Other
formal links--that justice deals with distributions of advantages or with laws, for
example--might also answer this objection.
6.3.2 The primary subject of justice
Beyond answering the objection, the idea that principles of justice are related to valid
claims can show us why the basic structure of society would be the “primary subject of
justice,” as Rawls famously labeled it. To see why it would be a subject “of justice,” we
only need to look back at how the basic structure was identified in Ch. 1. Recall that the
basic structure is the system of social institutions that together establish our rights,
obligations, and powers as members of society. In this way, these institutions establish the
basic claims we have on one another as members of society. Since the institutions of the
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basic structure establish claims we have as members of society, the principles that apply
to the basic structure can rightly be identified as principles of justice. It is not because the
principles themselves represent a single unified conception of justice, but because they
relate to our claims on the broader community that they can be considered principles of
justice.
To see why the basic structure would be the “primary” subject of justice, we only
need to recall the argument of Chapter 3. Recall all the ways in which both institutions
and individual actions need to be understood within the moral context established by the
basic structure. When we articulate principles of justice that do not apply to the basic
structure, we need to recognize that the principles should be sensitive to the moral
context established by the basic structure. Some claims that we have will be due to
institutions that are not part of the basic structure, but which institutions we ought to have
need to be sensitive to the moral context established by the basic structure. When claims
are not specified by institutions, those claims still need to be sensitive to the moral
context established by the basic structure. In this way, the various principles of justice can
only be fully specified within a particular basic structure.
It is for this reason that the basic structure would be the “primary subject of
justice.” In order to adequately develop other principles of justice, we need to have a
sense of the moral context those principles will apply in. The basic structure forms the
moral context within which these principles of justice can be rightly determined, but the
principles for the basic structure should not be specific to a moral context. Thus, they
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have a kind of primacy amongst the principles of justice. The basic structure would be the
primary subject of justice for the same reason why it has primacy as a moral subject.
6.4 The Priority of the Practical
The full argument of this dissertation, beginning with the introduction and ending here,
might seem to involve a subtle trick. I began by saying that my arguments would not
come from any claims about the nature of justice. In the introduction, I said that I did not
defend the claim that “the basic structure is the primary subject of justice” but instead
that “the basic structure is a centrally important ethical subject.” Yet, even if I have not
appealed to any claims about the nature of justice, my arguments do bear on our views
about the nature of justice. What seems like a trick is that I have an argument for why the
basic structure is “the first subject of justice,” but the argument is a pragmatic one. Rather
than arising from a conception of justice, it shows the primacy of the basic structure as a
moral subject, and then claims that this gives reason for us to regard it as the primary
subject of justice.
I do not claim that the basic structure is a centrally important ethical subject
because justice is uniquely related to it. Instead, I claim that we should understand justice
as uniquely related to the basic structure because it is a centrally important ethical
subject. My argument for the primacy of the basic structure was made in the first four
chapters, and it did not appeal to any broader conception of justice. Instead, it relied on a
view of social institutions, their assessment, and the assessment of actions within those
institutions. Instead of arguing from justice, I argued from a conception of the normative
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structure of social practices. This all shows the importance of determining how the basic
structure ought to be organized, and I believe it is appropriate to understand this as the
primary subject of justice because of its importance.
The core question at hand is an odd one; how should we understand our moral
concepts like justice? Those who argue that the basic structure is not the primary subject
of justice, take a stance not only on what is just and unjust but on how we should use the
idea of justice. Yet, how should we settle a debate between persons who disagree about
how we use the idea? I suggest that we should understand justice by the role it plays in
our practical reasoning. Of course, there is no settled agreement on what role this is, but I
have suggested it often plays the role of identifying a terminus of practical judgement.
When we judge something just, we often seem to judge that it is as it should be rather
than judging that it is good in only one respect. This is what, in part, blocks the claims
that justice is--by necessity--a unified ethical demand.
Yet, even if I am wrong and there is not this, or any, pattern of use, then we can
still ask the question of how we should use the concept of justice. Here, I believe that the
central importance of the basic structure is key. If we agree that the basic structure is a
centrally important subject for ethics, then we have reason to think that the basic structure
is a central concern of justice. Insofar as we use the idea to discuss one of the most
important aspects of ethical life, it would be appropriate to use the idea of justice to
discuss one of the most important questions. In this way, it is the argument for the
importance of the basic structure that shows why it would be a primary subject of justice
and not any claim about the nature of justice per se. In this way, it is more of a pragmatic
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argument about justice. How we use the idea should be tied to what moral problems we
need to solve.
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Afterword: Social and Moral Complexity

Rarely is good philosophy merely about proving a conclusion. More often, it is about a
broader perspective to take towards a range of issues. For the best understanding of the
world, we need more than truths. We need to know the best ways to articulate truths, how
to connect them, and which are most significant. More than any particular conclusion, I
want this dissertation to show a particular perspective towards the social structure and
ethical life. I have tried to construct this perspective by addressing a number of different
issues, arguing for particular conclusions and contrasting my view with alternatives. I
hope that the broader perspective I want to get across has already been revealed across
the various arguments, but I want to make this broader perspective more apparent in this
final note.
There are a few motivating ideas that underlie much of this argument. One of the
most important is an appreciation for social complexity. We act within a network of
intertwined practices. When practices are stable, they get built upon with additional
practices, adding to the complexity and making any change more difficult and disruptive.
One of the most amazing features of human life is how we navigate and manipulate these
practices with ease. Yet, the fact that we live within this web of practices without much
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difficulty can also blind us to them. 180 When theory tries to make an understanding of
our actions explicit, however, it goes wrong if it fails to recognize the complex of
practices that we implicitly act within. Any accurate understanding of our actions and
values needs to see them as within a moral context established by our practices.
It is in the theorist’s search for a simple way of understanding morality and ethics
that we come to ignore the complexities that our practices give rise to. We try to look past
and through these practices to identify a moral foundation. Doing this is not problematic
in itself, but becomes problematic if we do not recognize the ways in which any such
foundation only matters to us within the practices of our social world. First, any such
foundation would be too abstract; it would need to be made real to us through our ways
of living. Second, any such foundation would be alienating if it were not tied into our
social life. If morality and ethics is to be important to us, it must be important to the
people we are as members of our particular social world with our particular characters.
Our practices are bound to skew the correct moral understanding in some ways, but the
correct understanding must still be shown to us through our ways of living together. The
account of ethics that matters for us must be tied to our practices.
If we appreciate the importance of contingent practices in specifying the content
of our ethical life and we appreciate social complexity, we can also appreciate both (a)
180

In a commencement speech to Kenyon College, David Foster Wallace told the simple parable of two
young fish swimming along one day and are passed by an older fish going the other direction. In passing,
the older fish says, “Morning, boys. How’s the water?” Long after the older fish has passed, one younger
fish turns to the other and asks, “what the hell is water?” My point is that social practices are our water; no
adequate account of our ethical life can neglect the role that practices play even if it is so easy for us to
ignore them. This point has been much insisted by figures from Hume to Wittgenstein and beyond, but “the
most obvious, important realities are often the ones that are hardest to see and talk about.” (David Foster
Wallace, Convocation to Kenyon College, <http://moreintelligentlife.com/story/david-foster-wallace-inhis-own-words>)
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why it is so difficult to argue that we should be concerned with the basic structure and (b)
why the basic structure is so important. The argument is difficult because the basic
structure is just one particular set of social practices in our complex social world. What
would make it any more deserving of our attention than other practices or the whole of
society? One cannot merely distinguish the assessment of practices or institutions from
the assessment of individual action and then claim that they have vindicated the focus on
the basic structure. One must give an argument for what makes the basic structure a
particularly important ethical subject.
What I have tried to argue throughout is that what makes the basic structure a
particularly important more subject is the way in which it establishes our obligations,
rights, and powers as members of society. We can understand what the basic structure is-it’s identity--as the set of institutions that together specify our role as member of society.
It is because these institutions together form a system that we need to assess the basic
structure as a single subject; to properly assess any major social institution we need to
assess it as part of the basic structure and this means that we need evaluate the basic
structure as a whole. Finally, it is the way in which the basic structure establishes an
institutional context for both practices and individual actions that explains the moral
distinctiveness of the basic structure. The particularities of the major social institutions
are relevant for assessing the actions and practices within a society, but these
particularities are not relevant for assessing the major social institutions themselves.
Recall that I understand social cooperation in a particular way. Rather than being
focused on production or a lack of conflict, I understand it as the unique cooperative
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relationship between members of society. I have argued that this cooperative relationship
consists in following the rules of our major social institutions. We coordinate with one
another in mutually following these rules, and this coordination counts as cooperation
when it is done with deference (rather than exploitation) towards those we coordinate
with. This provides a tight link between the terms of social cooperation and the major
social institutions because it is by following the rules of the major institutions that
persons in society cooperate in the way specific to members of society.
When members of society cooperate in this way--that is, when they follow the
rules of the major social institutions--they establish obligations, rights, and powers for
individuals background as members of society. Persons have a level of surety that others
will act in accordance with the rules of the major social institutions, so they can plan on
the basis of what these rules are. They can rely on their property claims, on an authority
to settle conflicts, on protection from threats, on an economic system, on certain
relationships, and on a form of political power. At a fundamental level, this surety only
comes from persons mutually following the rules of social practices. The basic structure
consists of the ways in which these major institutions together establish background
security. Accordingly, social cooperation consists in following the rules of the basic
structure institutions, and we assess the terms of social cooperation by assessing the basic
structure.
What should be obvious at this stage is that these ideas together form a kind of
conceptual circle. I have defined major social institutions, social cooperation, and
member of society in inter-reliant ways. This is no problem because these ideas are meant
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to make explicit an implicit understanding of social practices. Since these practices are
already up and running, and we find ourselves in the midst of them, it is no problem that
their explication does not build up from primary ideas with the theoretical beauty of
Leviathan’s Part I. There is no problem with circularity in this reconstruction, so long as
it accurately reconstructs our practices.
This is the core argument that takes us from the complexity of social life to the
central importance of the basic structure as an ethical subject. Our social practices
influence much of the content of ethical life; they establish new obligations, shape our
values, determine our virtues and set the terms of our relationships. Not only our basic
structure, but also our social practices generally, have profound and pervasive effects on
ethical life. However, what makes the basic structure such a centrally important ethical
subject is the particular role it has in social and ethical life. In establishing obligations,
rights, and powers for individuals as members of society, it is distinct from the rest of the
social structure. It sets the moral context for the assessment of individual actions and
many of our other social practices. Accordingly, if our moral theory is to appropriately
appreciate the complexity of the social world, moral theory should treat the basic
structure as a distinct and centrally important subject.
From the perspective of a moral theory that has tried to look past our particular
practices, I have little doubt that this method will seem odd. If we think that morality is
fundamentally about first principles directly applied to solve our problems, we will think
it odd that our practices can generate moral and ethical considerations. If we think of
justice as a single, unified ethical demand, we will think it odd to be less concerned with
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articulating that demand. That is why I used the fourth and fifth chapters to argue against
these views. Not only do they motivate some of the most discussed objections to a
Rawlsian focus on the basic structure, they also represent two of the deeper convictions
that can lead to a philosophical impasse.
In both responses, I want to advocate a view of moral theory that appreciates the
complexity of our social world. First, to rely on fully general first principles to settle all
our moral conflicts ignores the ways in which we are social creatures, living lives bound
up in our particular practices. The fact that we live together with others according to these
practices generates new and specific moral and ethical considerations that first principles
alone cannot adequately respect. Since the major arguments that advocate such principle
all fail, one cannot assume such a view of moral theory against the view I defend.
Second, one should not assume that justice must be a single unified ethical idea. To do so
necessarily limits its importance in our complex world. Any single articulated moral
demand is unlikely to be sensitive to all the nuances of ethical life, so a view of justice
that takes that role is bound to be limited. It relegates justice to one concern among many,
and an argument about justice would not settle the difficult questions of what we ought to
do. Instead, we should recognize that in arguing about justice, we argue about how things
should be. If there is no easy answer to determining how all things ought to be, then we
should not represent justice as a single unified ethical demand.
Undoubtedly, some of the claims I make in this dissertation will raise new
questions and concerns. I know, for instance, that much more needs to be said about
exactly how our practices influence the content of ethical life. How exactly can we make
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sense of values, virtues, relationships and obligations being influenced by social practices
while denying strong forms of ethical relativism? I hope to better address these questions
in time, but even if I have muddied the waters, I hope they are clear enough to see my
core point. The focus on the basic structure of society is not justified merely by a
particular view of the nature of justice. Those who doubt some view of justice do not
adequately show that we should not be concerned with the basic structure. The basic
structure is a distinct moral subject that figures centrally in ethical life. Once we
recognize that we act within a particular moral context that is partly established by our
social practices, we should see the basic structure as a centrally important and distinct
moral subject.

308

Bibliography
Applbaum, Arthur. Ethics for Adversaries (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1999).
Abizadeh, Arash. "Cooperation, Pervasive impact, and Coercion: on the Scope (not Site)
of Distributive Justice." Philosophy & Public Affairs 35.4 (2007): 318-358.
Anderson, Elizabeth. Value in Ethics and Economics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1995), 45.
Bicchieri, Cristina. Grammar of Society (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2006).
Blake, Michael. “Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy,” Philosophy and
Public Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2001).
Bradley, Francis Herbert. Ethical Studies (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 1988).
Carens, Joseph. Equality, Moral Incentives, and the Market: An Essay in Utopian
Politico-Economic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
Cohen, G.A.. “Incentives, Inequality, and Community” Tanner Lectures on Human
Values, 1992 ( http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/cohen92.pdf ).
-------- “The Pareto Argument for Inequality” Social Philosophy and Policy, Vol. 12, Iss.
1, 1995, 160-185.
-------- “Where the Action is: On the Site of Distributive Justice,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1997), 3-30.
-------- Rescuing Justice and Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2008).
-------- Why Not Socialism? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
Dworkin, Ronald. Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2011)
Dewey, John. Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology
(New York, NY: Carlton House, 1922).
Freeman, Samuel. Rawls, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2007).

309

Freeman, Samuel. "The Basic Structure as First Subject of Justice," in Jon Mandle and
David A. Reidy (eds.), A Companion to Rawls (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell,
2014).
Gibbard, Allan. Reconciling our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics. (Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2008).
Hardimon, Michael O. "Role Obligations." The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 91, No. 7
(1994): 333-363.
Hart, HLA. "Are There Any Natural Rights?" The Philosophical Review, Vol. 64, No. 2
(1955) .
------- The Concept of Law (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012).
Herman, Barbara. The Practice of Moral Judgment, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1993)
------- "The Scope of Moral Requirement." Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 3
(2001): 227-256.
Hooker, Brad. Ideal Code, Real world: A Rule-Consequentialist Theory of Morality.
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000).
Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), 319.
Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. J.B. Schneewind
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983).
Kagan, Shelley. The Limits of Morality (Oxford, UK; Oxford University Press, 1991)
Kymlicka, Will. Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction (Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 208-282.
Lewis, David. Convention: A Philosophical Study (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Press, 2002).
Malady, Matthew. New York Times article; “Want to Save Civilization? Get in Line” New
York Times, May 31st, 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/magazine/
want-to-save-civilization-get-in-line.html?_r=0>.
Mandel, Jon. “Tolerating Justice” in The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism Brock,
Gillian, and Harry Brighouse, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press,
2005).
Marmor, Andrei. Social Conventions: From Language to Law (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 2009).

310

Mill, J.S. Utilitarianism, 2nd Edition (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company,
2001).
------- The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X – Essays on Ethics, Religion,
and Society, ed. John M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985)
Murphy, “Institutions and the Demands of Justice,” 254.
Nagel, Thomas. Equality and Partiality (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1991).
Nagel, Thomas and Liam Murphy in The Myth of Ownership, (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2002).
Rawls, John. “The Basic Structure as Subject” American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.
14, No. 2 (April 1977), 161.
-------- Theory of Justice (Revised), (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
-------- Political Liberalism, (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1993)
-------- Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2001).
-------- Lectures in the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. Barbara Herman (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 173-176.
-------- Collected Papers; Samuel Freeman, ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2001).
-------- “The Contingencies of Social Dependence,” (unpublished draft located in Papers
of John Rawls; Harvard Archives, HUM 48, Box 26, Folder 1).
-------- “The Contingencies of Social Dependence (unpublished draft located in Papers of
John Rawls; Harvard Archives, HUM 48, Box 28, Folder 9).
Richardson, Practical Reasoning about Final Ends (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1997).
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The First and Second Discourses, trans. Roger D. and Judith R.
Masters, (Boston, MA: St. Martin’s Press, 1964).
Sable, Andrew. “Looking Forward to Justice” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 9, No. 3
(2001).
Scheffler, Human Morality (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1992).
Scheffler, Samuel. Equality and Tradition (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010).

311

Scheffler, “The Moral Division of Labor: Egalitarian Liberalism as Moral Pluralism,”
Equality and Tradition (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010)
Seabright, Paul. The Company of Strangers (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2004).
Shiffrin, Seanna. “Incentives, Motives and Talents,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 38,
Iss. 2 (2010)
Sidgwick, Henry. Methods of Ethics (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company),
418-422.
Simmons, A. John. Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1981)
Skyrms, Brian. Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2010).
Street, Sharon. "What is Constructivism in Ethics and Metaethics?." Philosophy Compass
Vol 5, No. 5 (2010): 363-384.
Quine, Willard. Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960), 20.
Tan, Kok-Chor. “Justice and Personal Pursuits” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 101, No.
7 (2004): 331-362.
-------- Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality.
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012).
Waldron, Jeremy. "Special Ties and Natural Duties." Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol.
22, No. 1 (1993).
Wallace, David Foster. Convocation to Kenyon College, <http://moreintelligentlife.com/
story/david-foster-wallace-in-his-own-words>)
Walzer, “Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands,” Philosophy & Public Affairs,
Vol. 2, No. 2 (1973), 160 - 180.
Williams, Andrew. “Incentives, Inequality and Publicity” Philosophy and Public Affairs,
Vol. 27, No. 3 (1998).
Williams, Bernard. “Persons, Character and Morality;” Moral Luck: Philosophical
Papers 1973-1980 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
Williams, Bernard. Moral Luck (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1981)
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York, NY: Wiley, 2001).

312

Wolf, Susan. “Moral Saints,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 79, No. 8 (1982), 419-439.
Wolf, Susan. “Two Level of Pluralism” Ethics, Vol. 102, No. 4, (1992).
Young, Iris Marion. Responsibility for Justice (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
2013)

